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Immigration	as	Commerce:	
A	New	Look	at	the	Federal	Immigration	Power	and	the	Constitution		
	93	Indiana	Law	Journal	__	(forthcoming	2018)		Jennifer	Gordon1	
Draft—November	20,	2017		
Introduction	Can	 the	 United	 States	 government	 set	 immigration	 law	 and	 policy	 with	 little	regard	 for	 constitutional	 rights?	 	 This	 question	 has	 been	 much	 debated	 since	President	Donald	Trump	issued	a	series	of	immigration-related	executive	orders	in	his	 first	 week	 in	 office,	 including	 a	 bar	 on	 entry	 by	 citizens	 of	 a	 set	 of	 majority-Muslim	countries,	but	it	was	controversial	long	before	then.		In	important	part,	the	answer	 depends	 on	what	 the	 Constitution	 says	 about	 the	 scope	 and	 limits	 of	 the	power	of	 the	 federal	government	over	 immigration.	 	Therein	 lies	 the	 tale.	 	On	this	subject,	 the	country’s	 founding	documents	say	very	 little,	and	the	Supreme	Court’s	interpretations	have	been	inconsistent	at	best.			The	 reigning	understanding	 is	 that	 the	 immigration	 authority	 is	 rooted	 in	 the	Constitution’s	 grant	 to	 the	 federal	 government	 of	 control	 over	matters	 related	 to	sovereignty	 and	 foreign	 affairs.	 This	 explanation	 forms	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 plenary	power	doctrine,	first	announced	in	1889,	which	grants	Congress	and	the	Executive	Branch	nearly	unreviewable	powers	in	the	immigration	arena.		This	Article	offers	an	alternative.	 	 It	 asserts	 that	 immigration	 to	 the	United	 States	 is	 and	 has	 long	 been	economic	 in	 its	purpose	and	 impact,	and	thus	 is	properly	considered	a	 function	of	both	 the	 foreign	 and	 interstate	 Commerce	 Clause.	 The	 constitutional	 source	 of	 a	particular	authority	of	a	branch	of	 the	government	does	not	wholly	determine	the	degree	 of	 constitutional	 review	 that	 courts	 will	 exercise,	 but	 it	 is	 an	 important	factor.	 	An	 immigration	power	 rooted	 in	 the	Commerce	Clause,	 the	Article	argues,	would	put	a	thumb	on	the	scale	in	favor	of	ordinary	judicial	review	for	immigration	statutes,	rules,	and	policies	challenged	as	violating	constitutional	rights.	The	 argument	 that	 the	 immigration	power	 grows	 from	 the	 foreign	 Commerce	Clause	 has	 a	 “Return	 of	 the	 Jedi”	 quality.	 	 For	 half	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 the	Supreme	 Court	 did	 root	 the	 immigration	 power	 in	 the	 Constitution’s	 explicit	statement	 that	 the	 federal	 government	 has	 control	 over	 commerce	 with	 foreign	nations.2	In	the	mid-1800s,	when	immigration	first	became	seen	as	a	national	rather	
                                                
1 Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.  The author would like to thank the following 
individuals for very helpful comments on earlier drafts: Rose Cuison-Villazor, Nestor Davidson, Lee 
Gelernt, Abner Greene, Clare Huntington, Andrew Kent, Joe Landau, Thomas Lee, Stephen Legomsky, 
Robin Lenhardt, Catherine Powell, Jed Shugerman, and Benjamin Zipursky.  My research for this Article 
benefitted from the early assistance of Krista Hahn Blumenberg, support from Emerson Argueta at a 
critical moment, and the tireless dedication of Alex Mintz throughout. 
2 The Commerce Clause grants this power to Congress, not to the Executive Branch.  Later in this 
article, I argue that the Executive Branch shares in this power, both because of its role as the enforcer of 
congressional policies, and because of its independent authority.  See infra Notes [187-188] and 
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than	 state	 issue,	 courts	 treated	 the	 federal	 immigration	 power	 as	 an	 ordinary	function	 of	 the	 foreign	Commerce	 Clause,	 and	 relied	 on	 this	 theory	 to	 sustain	 the	federal	 government’s	 right	 to	 tax	 the	 ships	 that	 transported	 newcomers.	 	 	 While	plenary	 in	 the	sense	that	 it	granted	control	over	 immigration	to	the	 federal	rather	than	 the	 state	 governments,	 this	 power	 was	 subject	 to	 ordinary	 constitutional	limitations.			This	era	came	to	an	end	with	the	Court’s	announcement	of	 the	plenary	power	doctrine	 in	 the	Chinese	Exclusion	Case	 in	1889.	There,	 the	Supreme	Court	declared	that	Congress	and	the	President	have	a	near-absolute	power	to	control	immigration,	with	 the	 corollary	 that	 the	power	 is	 “plenary”:	 courts	 are	highly	deferential	when	reviewing	 such	 decisions	 for	 constitutionality.	 	 For	 over	 125	 years,	 intermittently	but	particularly	at	times	of	peak	concern	about	national	security,	the	Supreme	Court	has	 relied	 on	 this	 plenary	 power	 doctrine	 in	 limiting	 the	 extent	 of	 constitutional	review	of	immigration	policies	that	facially	discriminated	against	individuals	on	the	basis	of	their	race,	nationality,	political	beliefs,	and	gender.	In	the	contemporary	era,	the	Supreme	Court’s	use	of	the	plenary	power	doctrine	has	 fluctuated.	 	 In	 a	 number	 of	 cases,	 the	 Court	 has	 ignored	 the	 doctrine,	 leading	many	scholars	to	predict	its	demise.3	In	others,	it	has	relied	on	it.4		In	no	case	has	the	Court	 overruled	 the	 doctrine	 or	 even	 explicitly	 critiqued	 it,	 and	 has	 proposed	 no	alternative	theory	to	take	its	place.		Plenary	power	arguments	still	make	consistent	appearances	 in	 contemporary	 briefs,	 including	 those	 filed	 by	 the	 Trump	administration,5	and	in	today’s	lower	court	decisions	as	well.6		In	2017,	the	Supreme	Court	 postponed	 decisions	 in	 two	 cases	 that	 squarely	 raised	 issues	 about	 the	relationship	of	the	Constitution	to	immigration	law,	leading	to	speculation	that	the	Court	was	split	4-4	and	that	newly	seated	Justice	Neil	Gorsuch	would	be	called	on	to	decide	the	tie.7		At	 this	moment	 of	 incoherence	 in	 the	 relationship	 of	 immigration	 law	 to	 the	Constitution,	 and	 of	 urgent	 need	 for	 clarity,	 this	 Article	 advances	 the	 Commerce	Clause	 as	 the	 anchor	 of	 a	 new	 understanding	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	
                                                                                                                                            
accompanying text. [Ed: the note I’m referring to begins “Cox & Rodriguez, supra note…”] 
3 E.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 
1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 305; Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and 
the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925, 934 (1994-1995); Kevin Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme 
Court, 2009–13: A New Era of Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 57 (2015).   
4 See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 521–22 (2003).  The controlling opinion in a recent Supreme 
Court plurality decision also cited plenary power with approval.  Kerry v. Din, No. 13-1402, slip op. at 2-4 
(576 U.S. ___ (2015)) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
5 See, e.g., Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 15-19, Castro v. United States Department of 
Homeland Security, 835 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2016) ; opening lines of the Deputy Solicitor General’s argument 
in Jennings v. Rodriguez (Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Jennings v. Rodriguez, -- S.Ct. -- (2016) (No. 
15-1204).).  
6 See, e.g., Memorandum and Order issued by Judge Gorton in Louhghalam v. Trump, 230 F. Supp. 3d 
26, 37 (D. Mass. 2017).  
7 See, e.g., IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG, Breaking News: Supreme Court Ends 2016 Term, Agrees 
to Hear Travel Ban Cases, Vacates and Remands Cross-Border Shooting Case, Punts in Two Immigration 
Cases (June 26, 2017), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2017/06/supreme-court-ends-2016-
term-with-three-immigration-decisions.html#.  
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Constitution	 and	 immigration	 law	and	policy.	 	 	 The	Commerce	Clause	 today	plays	almost	no	role	in	immigration	jurisprudence.	Despite	the	extensive	early	history	of	the	foreign	Commerce	Clause	as	the	presumed	source	of	the	immigration	power,	few	scholars	have	seriously	considered	its	contemporary	suitability	for	that	role.8		More	strikingly,	 none	 have	 explored	 the	 interstate	 Commerce	 Clause	 as	 an	 appropriate	source	 of	 the	 immigration	 power,	 and	 one	 that	 could	 open	 the	 door	 to	 a	normalization	of	constitutional	analysis	in	the	immigration	context.9		Given	the	outsized	economic	impact	of	immigration	on	the	United	States	during	the	 past	 two	 centuries,	 the	 absence	 of	 contemporary	 discussion	 about	 the	relationship	between	the	Commerce	Clause	and	the	immigration	power	comes	as	a	surprise.	 	 Immigration	 to	 the	 United	 States	 was	 fundamentally	 an	 economic	phenomenon	at	 the	nation’s	 founding,	and	the	courts	soon	acknowledged	as	much	by	 grounding	 it	 in	 the	 foreign	 Commerce	 Clause.	 	 And	 it	 is	 fundamentally	 an	economic	phenomenon	today.10	Most	newcomers	arrive	in	search	of	more,	better,	or	higher-paying	work.		Even	those	admitted	in	non-economic	categories—as	refugees,	to	study,	to	be	reunited	with	relatives—are	likely	to	seek	a	job	soon	after	arrival.11		The	 numbers	 tell	 the	 current	 story:	 currently,	 twenty-six	 million	 permanent,	temporary,	 and	 undocumented	 immigrants	make	 up	 almost	 seventeen	 percent	 of	the	 US	 labor	 force,	 a	 higher	 percentage	 than	 at	 any	 other	 point	 in	 the	 nation’s	history	and	a	labor	market	participation	rate	far	higher	than	natives.12	Immigrants	work	in	rural	areas,	suburbs,	and	metropolises	throughout	the	nation.	By	 highlighting	 this	 longstanding	 aspect	 of	 immigration,	 and	 with	 it	 the	Commerce	Clause	as	an	alternative	source	of	government	power,	the	Article	seeks	to	clear	a	pathway	to	more	consistent	judicial	consideration	of	constitutional	rights	in	
                                                
8 The principal treatments of this issue are historical in focus. See, e.g., Mary Sarah Bilder, The 
Struggle over Immigration: Indentured Servants, Slaves, and Articles of Commerce, 61 MO. L. REV. 743, 
761 and passim (1996); Sarah Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and 
the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L REV. 1, 99–112 (2002); 
Matthew Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion: Sovereignty, Security, and the Origins of the Federal 
Immigration Power, 45 HAR. C.R.-C.L L. REV. 1 (2010); Kif Augustine-Adams, The Plenary Power 
Doctrine After September 11, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 701, 718–721 (2005).  Others have suggested more 
briefly that the foreign Commerce Clause might be an appropriate contemporary source for the immigration 
power: STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND 
AMERICA 186 (1987); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. 
J. INT’L LAW 862, 864, 866 (1989); Jack Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 26–27 (2010) (arguing 
that his “interaction theory” of foreign commerce “best explains and justifies Congress’s powers over 
immigration”); Gabriel “Jack” Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 56–57 (1998). 
9 The closest to such a discussion that I have seen is Cristina Rodriguez’s mention of the potential 
impact of United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), on the reformulation of the division between federal 
and state/local spheres of immigrant regulation that she proposes in The Significance of the Local in 
Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 629–630 (2008). 
10 On the economic nature of immigration in the history of the United States, see generally MICHAEL PIORE, 
BIRDS OF PASSAGE: MIGRANT LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES (1979); ARISTIDE ZOLBERG, A NATION 
BY DESIGN: IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE FASHIONING OF AMERICA (2006). 
11 Cf. ZOLBERG at 14 (“In the perspective of capitalist dynamics, immigrants of any kind—including 
refugees—are considered primarily as labor.”).  
12 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Characteristics of Foreign-born Workers Summary, U.S. 
Department of Labor (May 19, 2016), https:/ /www.bls.gov/news.release/forbrn.nr0.htm. 
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the	 immigration	 context.	 Drawing	 on	 the	 history	 of	 the	 Supreme	 Court’s	 early	immigration	jurisprudence	rooting	the	immigration	power	in	the	foreign	Commerce	Clause,	 and	 on	 data	 demonstrating	 immigrants’	 higher	 level	 of	 engagement	 with	national	 and	 interstate	 labor	 markets	 compared	 to	 natives,	 and	 their	 greater	interstate	 mobility	 in	 search	 of	 work,13	 it	 argues	 that	 immigration	 today	 is	fundamentally	 economic	 in	 its	 impact,	 and	 thus	properly	 considered	 a	 function	of	both	the	foreign	and	interstate	Commerce	Clause.			The	 consideration	 of	 the	 interstate	 Commerce	 Clause	 as	 a	 source	 of	 the	immigration	 power	 is	 one	 of	 the	 Article’s	 unique	 contributions.	 	 	 Changes	 in	Commerce	 Clause	 jurisprudence	 during	 the	 twentieth	 century	 have	 extended	 the	understanding	of	 “commerce”	beyond	 international	or	 interstate	 transportation	of	goods	or	people	to	include	direct	regulation	of	individuals	crossing	national	or	state	borders	for	economic	reasons.		Meanwhile,	when	the	New	Deal	interstate	Commerce	Clause	cases	expanded	the	scope	of	the	interstate	Commerce	Clause,	it,	too,	became	available	to	ground	the	immigration	power.				Beginning	 with	 Lopez	 in	 1995,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 has	 sought	 to	 rein	 in	Congress’s	power	under	the	Commerce	Clause.14		Yet,	the	Article	contends,	even	the	more	restrictive	contemporary	understanding	of	 interstate	commerce	 leaves	room	for	 the	 interstate	 Commerce	 Clause	 to	 encompass	 federal	 action	 on	 immigration.	Immigrants	 are	 a	 central	 force	 in	 the	United	States	 economy.	 	This	Article	 asserts	that	 law	 and	 policy	 on	 immigration	 fundamentally	 serves	 both	 as	 regulation	 of	interstate	commerce	 in	 the	 form	of	 the	national	 labor	market	and	as	regulation	of	individuals	in	interstate	commerce.	To	be	clear,	were	 the	Court	 to	accept	 the	Commerce	Clause	as	an	appropriate	source	 of	 the	 modern	 immigration	 power,	 it	 would	 not	 automatically	 guarantee	broader	 judicial	 review	 of	 the	 constitutionality	 of	 immigration-related	 laws	 or	policies.15	Other	doctrines—such	as	limits	on	the	extraterritorial	application	of	the	Constitution,	and	the	conceptual	link	between	sovereignty	and	immigration—seem	likely	 to	 continue	 to	 cast	 a	 shadow	 over	 Supreme	 Court	 review	 of	 the	 political	branches’	 determinations	 about	 admission	 and	 deportation	 categories	 and	processes.	 	 Yet	 an	 explicit	 recognition	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 Commerce	Clause	 and	 the	 immigration	 power	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 initiate	 a	 constructive	
                                                
13 See infra Part III.B. 
14 1995 was the year United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), was decided.  Since then, the 
boundaries of the Commerce Clause have remained somewhat fluid, with cases such as United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) and National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 
2566 (2012),  reinforcing the limits of interstate commerce, and cases such as Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 
1 (2005), suggesting a return to openness.  See infra Part III.B for discussion of the current legal landscape 
regarding the interstate Commerce Clause and its implications for the immigration power as an outgrowth 
of that Clause. 
15 The relationship between constitutional powers and constitutional rights is its own field, a full 
exploration of which is beyond the scope of this article. For a sense of the scope of debate in this area, see 
Symposium: Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27 GA. L. REV. 343-501 (1993). For my 
purposes, it suffices to note that the clause of the Constitution that grants the government a particular power 
influences, but is not the only determinant of, the degree to which the Court will recognize individual 
constitutional rights as a constraint on that power.   
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reconsideration	 of	 jurisprudence	 regarding	 the	 constitutional	 norms	 that	 should	govern	immigration	policies.				The	Article	proceeds	as	follows.	Part	I	briefly	traces	the	evolution	of	the	plenary	power	doctrine	from	its	introduction	in	the	late	1800s	through	2017,	with	particular	attention	 to	 the	 Court’s	 ambivalence	 toward	 and	 frequent	 abdication	 of	constitutional	 review	 in	 the	 immigration	 context.	 	 Part	 II	 turns	 to	 the	 Commerce	Clause	 as	 an	 alternative	 source	 of	 the	 immigration	 power.	 	 It	 highlights	 the	 view	widely	held	earlier	in	the	ninteenth	century	that	immigration	was	commerce,	which	supported	the	Supreme	Court’s	attribution	at	the	time	of	the	federal	government’s	authority	over	immigration	to	the	foreign	Commerce	Clause.	 	 It	then	contends	that	changes	 in	 the	 jurisprudence	 of	 the	 interstate	 Commerce	 Clause	 during	 the	 New	Deal	 have	 rendered	 the	 interstate	 Commerce	 Clause	 available	 as	 an	 underlying	source	 of	 the	 government’s	 authority	 to	 make	 immigration	 laws	 and	 policies,	notwithstanding	some	retrenchment	on	the	scope	of	interstate	commerce	since	the	Supreme	Court’s	Lopez	decision	 in	1995.	 	Part	 III	argues	that	both	the	 foreign	and	the	 interstate	 Commerce	 Clauses	 should	 be	 understood	 to	 undergird	 the	immigration	 power	 today,	 and	 suggests	 that	 acknowledging	 immigration’s	relationship	to	the	Commerce	Clause	clears	a	path	to	more	routine	judicial	review	of	immigration	laws	for	constitutionality.	Part	IV	concludes.	
I.	 The	Evolution	and	Impact	of	the	Plenary	Power	Doctrine	Early	 in	 his	 presidency,	Donald	Trump	 asserted	 that	 the	United	 States	 faced	 a	crisis	 of	 national	 security	 that	 justified	 immediate	 Executive	 Branch	 action	 with	regard	to	immigration.	In	a	series	of	executive	orders	issued	in	early	2017,	President	Trump	 followed	 through	on	his	 campaign	promises	 to	bar	Muslims	 from	entering	the	United	States16	and	to	create	ideological	tests	to	screen	would-be	immigrants	for	American	values.17	Faced	with	what	appeared	to	be	a	policy	of	facial	discrimination	against	 immigrants	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 religion,18	 advocates	 for	 and	 scholars	 of	constitutional	rights	alike	cried	foul.19		Immigration	scholars,	however,	tended	to	be	
                                                
16Patrick Healy & Michael Barbaro, Donald Trump Calls for Banning Muslims from Entering U.S., 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/12/07/donald-trump-calls-for-
banning-muslims-from-entering-u-s.  
17As to the President’s campaign promises, see Christina Wilkie & Elise Foley, Donald Trump 
Proposes Ideological Test For Entry To The United States, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 16, 2016),  
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/donald-trump-immigration-test_us_57b224c9e4b007c36e4fc81e; 
David E. Sanger & Maggie Haberman, Donald Trump’s Terrorism Plan Mixes Cold War Concepts and 
Limits on Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/16/us/politics/donald-trump-terrorism.html. As to his execution of those 
promises, see Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, Exec. Order No. 13767, 82 
Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017); Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, Exec. Order 
No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017); and Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into 
the United States, Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017). 
18 For a detailed exploration of the last time a President sought to apply restrictions to men from 
predominately Muslim countries, in the wake of 9/11, and the outcome of court challenges to that policy, 
see Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Business as Usual: Immigration and the National Security Exception,114 
PENN ST. L. REV. 1485 (2010); see also Shoba S. Wadhia, Is Immigration Law National Security Law?, 
EMORY L. J. (forthcoming 2017). 
19 When President Trump campaigned on these promises, constitutional experts declared that they 
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less	 sanguine.20	 	 Their	 skepticism	 that	 the	 Supreme	 Court	would	 invalidate	 these	orders	 was	 grounded	 in	 their	 awareness	 of	 the	 longstanding	 debate	 about	 the	source	of	 the	 immigration	power	and	 the	plenary	power	doctrine	 that	had	grown	from	it.	In	 a	 federal	 government	 of	 enumerated	 powers,	 immigration	 is	 an	 exception:	nowhere	 does	 the	 Constitution	 explicitly	 grant	 the	 federal	 government	 full	immigration	 authority.21	 	 There	 are	 some	 apparent	 leads—the	 Migration	 and	Importation	Clause,	 for	 example,	which	 sounds	 like	a	 fine	option	but	 in	 fact,	most	agree,	 was	 written	 with	 slavery	 and	 indentured	 servitude	 rather	 than	 voluntary	immigration	in	mind.22	 	There	are	some	partial	sources,	such	as	the	Naturalization	Clause,	which	is	generally	understood	to	refer	only	to	the	government’s	ability	to	set	rules	for	the	granting	of	citizenship.23		The	War	Powers	Clause	probably	includes	the	
                                                                                                                                            
would likely be struck down by the Supreme Court as facial violations of fundamental rights.  See, e.g., Ari 
Melber, Constitutional Scholars: Trump’s Anti-Muslim Immigration Proposal Is Probably Illegal, MSNBC 
(Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/trump-anti-muslim-proposal-probably-illegal; Debra 
Cassens Weiss, Trump’s Policies Would Be Unconstitutional and Will Be Challenged If Adopted, ACLU 
Says, ABA JOURNAL (July 14, 2016), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/trumps_policies_would_be_unconstitutional_and_will_be_challen
ged_aclu_says/; Anthony D. Romero, ACLU Director: We will defend the constitution against a President 
Trump, WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-president-trump-
would-threaten-our-constitutional-freedoms/2016/07/13/42b41048-4876-11e6-bdb9-
701687974517_story.html?utm_term=.7f388a43e4ad; Ari Melber, Legal Scholar: Trump’s Muslim Ban Is 
Probably Legal, MSNBC (Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/trump-muslim-ban-probably-
legal (quoting Lawrence Tribe: “The Constitution's ‘bar against declaring an official religion’ would 
apply to discrimination against non-citizens.)  
20 See, e.g., Peter Spiro, Trump’s Anti-Muslim Plan is Awful. And Constitutional., N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 8, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/10/opinion/trumps-anti-muslim-plan-is-awful-and-
constitutional.html; Ariel Melber, Legal Scholar: Trump’s Muslim Ban Is Probably Legal (Interview with 
Eric Posner), MSNBC (Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/trump-muslim-ban-probably-legal.  
But see Adam Cox, Why A Muslim Ban Is Likely To Be Held Unconstitutional: The Myth of Unconstrained 
Immigration Power, JUST SECURITY BLOG (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/36988/muslim-
ban-held-unconstitutional-myth-unconstrained-immigration-power/. 
21 STEPHEN LEGOMSKY & CHRISTINA RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 99 
(6th ed. 2015).  
22 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 1 (“The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States 
now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one 
thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding 
ten dollars for each Person.”).  Despite its open wording, some scholars believe that the Importation Clause 
was intended only to relate to slavery. See, e.g., Walter Berns, The Constitution and the Migration of 
Slaves, 78 YALE L.J. 198 (1968).  Others see the Clause as having had a broader meaning at the time of its 
adoption, reaching white immigrants as well as slaves. See DAVID LIGHTNER, SLAVERY AND THE 
COMMERCE POWER 21 (2006); Bilder, supra note 8. 
23 The Naturalization Clause exclusively enables Congress to set the terms on which a noncitizen can 
gain citizenship, not temporary or permanent admission short of naturalization, and has nothing to say 
about removal. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4 (“Congress shall have the power . . . To establish an uniform 
Rule of Naturalization.”).  But see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940–41 (1983) (locating the immigration 
power exclusively in the Naturalization Clause but stating that the resulting power was plenary); In a 
forthcoming paper, my colleagues Andrew Kent and Thomas Lee offer evidence from original debates that 
Founders saw Naturalization as encompassing immigration more broadly. Andrew Kent & Thomas Lee, 
"Congress's Unenumerated Powers," draft on file with author. 
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ability	 to	 regulate	 “enemy	 aliens,”24	 but	 says	 nothing	 about	 the	 majority	 of	newcomers	who	come	from	friendly	nations.	 	The	best	candidate	 for	the	source	of	an	implied	power	is	the	Commerce	Clause.		Indeed,	the	Supreme	Court	relied	on	the	foreign	 Commerce	 Clause	 to	 undergird	 the	 immigration	 power	 for	 decades	 in	 the	1800s.25		But	given	the	lack	of	an	explicit	link	between	the	two,	the	Court	was	free	to	change	its	mind—and	did	so	as	that	century	drew	to	a	close.			The	 origin	 story	 of	 judicial	 deference	 to	 the	 federal	 political	 branches	 over	immigration	has	been	oft-told.26			The	Supreme	Court	articulated	the	plenary	power	doctrine	for	the	first	time	in	Chae	Chan	Ping	v.	United	States	(the	“Chinese	Exclusion	
Case”).27	 	 	 The	 Court	 declared	 that	 the	 “political	 branches,”	 and	 particularly	Congress,	held	the	exclusive	power	to	determine	who	could	enter	the	United	States	and	on	what	terms.			Legislative	action	regarding	the	exclusion	of	newcomers	would	be	subject	to	extremely	limited	judicial	review	for	constitutionality.28		With	no	clear	constitutional	boundaries	on	the	field,	the	Court	established	a	doctrine	for	review	of	immigration	 law	and	policy	 that	stood	outside	 the	mandate	of	Marbury	v.	Madison	that	 “a	 law	repugnant	 to	 the	Constitution	 is	void;	and	 that	courts,	 as	well	as	other	departments,	are	bound	by	that	instrument.”29	The	 Chinese	 Exclusion	 Case	 was	 decided	 at	 a	 time	 of	 positive	 U.S.-China	diplomatic	 relations,	 but	 virulent	 anti-immigrant	 sentiment	 directed	 at	 Chinese	people	in	the	United	States.	In	Chae	Chan	Ping,	despite	the	absence	of	hostilities	with	China,	 Justice	 Field	 develops	 an	 extended	metaphor	 of	 immigrants	 as	 invaders	 to	justify	 transferring	 the	 political	 branches’	 power	 to	manage	 foreign	 affairs	 during	times	 of	war	 to	 the	 control	 of	 routine	 immigration	 from	 a	 friendly	 nation	 during	peacetime.		To	 preserve	 its	 independence,	 and	 give	 security	 against	 foreign	 aggression	
                                                
24 See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587–88 (1952) (relating the immigration power to 
deportation in times of war or “Congressional apprehension of foreign or internal dangers short of war”). 
25 See infra Part III.A. 
26 Stephen Legomsky was the first to lay out a comprehensive, case-by-case account of the evolution of 
the doctrine, in his 1987 book Immigration and the Judiciary.  See supra note 8, at 177-219. Legomsky 
argued that the Supreme Court had constructed the Plenary Power doctrine by leaping from the 
international law principle that countries have the right to exclude foreigners, to the assertion that US 
constitutional law assigned the immigration power exclusively to the political branches of the federal 
government, and that the decisions of those branches were immune from judicial review.  Id. at 184-87. 
27 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). Chae Chan Ping, a 12-year lawful resident of 
the United States, was barred from returning to the US because he had failed to obtain a re-entry permit—
even though the permit requirement had not been in place at the time of his departure.   The Chinese 
Exclusion Act of 1882, this country’s first (but far from last) effort to bar immigration from a nation or 
ethnic group, was the source of this mandate.  The Act was not repealed until 1943.  Later, the Asian 
Exclusion Act, part of the Immigration Act of 1924, banned all immigration from Asian 
nations. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153 (1924). 
Legomsky traces the beginning of the plenary power doctrine to the earlier line of cases invalidating 
state efforts to regulate immigration, establishing the federal government as the sole authority in that arena.  
LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY at 180-192. For a discussion of those cases, which relied on 
the Commerce Clause as the source of the immigration power, see infra Part III.A. 
28 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).  
29 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803). 
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and	 encroachment,	 is	 the	 highest	 duty	 of	 every	 nation,	 and	 to	 attain	 these	ends	nearly	all	other	considerations	are	to	be	subordinated.	It	matters	not	in	what	 form	 such	 aggression	 and	 encroachment	 come,	 whether	 from	 the	foreign	 nation	 acting	 in	 its	 national	 character,	 or	 from	 vast	 hordes	 of	 its	people	crowding	in	upon	us.30		.	.	.	.	If,	 therefore,	 the	 government	 of	 the	 United	 States,	 through	 its	 legislative	department,	 considers	 the	presence	of	 foreigners	of	 a	different	 race	 in	 this	country,	who	will	 not	 assimilate	with	 us,	 to	 be	 dangerous	 to	 its	 peace	 and	security,	their	exclusion	is	not	to	be	stayed	because	at	the	time	there	are	no	actual	hostilities	with	the	nation	of	which	the	foreigners	are	subjects.31	In	 the	 phrase	 that	 elevated	 the	 immigration	 power	 out	 of	 the	 ordinary	 sphere	 of	checks	 and	 balances	 into	 the	 “plenary”	 domain,	 Justice	 Field	 declares	 that	 the	legislature’s	 decision	 about	 who	 to	 exclude	 from	 the	 United	 States	 “is	 conclusive	upon	the	judiciary.”32			It	is	not	surprising	that	there	is	some	judicial	deference	to	the	political	branches	in	the	context	of	immigration.	Despite	predictions	to	the	contrary	at	the	turn	of	the	twenty-first	 century,	 the	nation-state	 remains	 the	 foundational	unit	of	governance	around	 the	 globe.33	Most	people	 instinctively	 feel	 that	 a	 sovereign	 country	 should	have	the	right	to	establish	rules	about	the	categories	and	processes	for	immigration.	More	controversial	has	been	the	doctrine’s	extent.	 	A	number	of	other	government	powers	 have	 been	 labeled	 “plenary”	 and	 yet	 remain	 subject	 to	 constitutional	constraints.34			Yet	the	immigration	plenary	power	doctrine	has	often	been	deployed	by	 courts	 to	 insulate	 rules	 and	 processes	 regarding	 those	 who	 seek	 to	 enter	 or	remain	in	the	United	States	from	most	of	the	protections	of	individual	rights	that	the	Constitution	 grants	 in	 other	 contexts.35	 	 The	 irony	 is	 acute:	 a	 government	 power	tenuously	 rooted	 in	 the	 Constitution	 has	 been	 interpreted	 to	 grant	 the	 political	
                                                
30 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 605.  
31 Id. at 606. 
32 Id. at 630.  
33 But see Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 965 (1993) 
(arguing that the sovereignty rationale for a broad plenary power is a relic of the 19th century, and no longer 
make sense after the creation of a positive law structure for nations’ obligations in the international realm 
and the individual rights revolution); Sarah Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty, 81 TEX. L REV. 1, 
277-285 (2002), supra n. 8; Matthew Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion: Sovereignty, Security, and the 
Origins of the Federal Immigration Power, 45 HAR. C.R.-C.L L. REV. 1, 53-56 (2010) supra n. 8. 
34 For example, the War Powers and the Indian and Foreign Commerce Clauses.  For discussion of the 
difference between how “plenary” has been interpreted in the context of the foreign Commerce Clause and 
in the immigration context, see infra notes [189-192] [Ed: Note 189 cites Gibbons v. Ogden; note 190 cites 
Chew Heong.] 
35 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (“Whatever the procedure 
authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”); Kleindienst v. 
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972) (“‘Over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress 
more complete than it is over the admission of aliens.’”) (quoting Ocean Steam Navigation v. Stranahan, 
214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (“[T]his Court has firmly and 
repeatedly endorsed the proposition that Congress may make rules as to aliens that would be unacceptable 
if applied to citizens.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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branches	 carte	 blanche	 to	 ignore	 constitutionally-protected	 rights	 with	 regard	 to	immigrants	and	those	who	associate	with	them.36	Within	 a	 few	 years	 of	 the	 Chinese	 Exclusion	 Case,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 had	elaborated	the	federal	government’s	control	of	immigration	as	inherent	in	the	rights	of	 a	 national	 government	 to	 conduct	 foreign	 affairs	 and	 establish	 and	 defend	 its	sovereignty.37	In	a	series	of	decisions,	it	extended	the	plenary	power	doctrine	to	the	immigration	actions	of	 the	executive	branch	as	well	as	Congress,	and	(in	a	weaker	form)	to	the	deportation	of	noncitizens	residing	in	the	United	States	as	well	as	the	exclusion	 of	 those	 seeking	 admission.38	 	 It	 established	 doctrinal	 distinctions	 still	dominant	 today,	 for	 example	 that	 judicial	 review	 will	 usually	 be	 more	 vigorous	where	noncitizens	have	already	been	admitted	to	the	country	rather	than	standing	(literally	or	by	legal	fiction)	outside	the	border,39	and	where	procedural	rather	than	substantive	rights	are	at	stake.40		These	cases	set	the	course	for	the	jurisprudence	of	the	 federal	 immigration	 power	well	 into	 the	 1970s,	 with	 sporadic	 reappearances	through	the	twenty-first	century.41			
                                                
36 Stephen Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. 
CT. REV. 255, 275.  
37 “The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government 
of the United States as a part of those sovereign powers delegated by the constitution, the right to its 
exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the government, the interests of the country require it, cannot 
be granted away or restrained on behalf of any one.” Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609.   
38 In Nishimora Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1891), the Supreme Court extended plenary 
power doctrine to procedures and decisions of the California immigration commissioner and the (separate) 
federal inspector for port of San Francisco, both acting via grant of authority from federal Treasury 
Secretary.  This closed off most avenues to appeal to federal courts by noncitizens denied entry.  “[T]he 
decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, 
are due process of law.” Id. at 660 (emphasis added).  Ekiu did, however, preserve the writ of habeas 
corpus for noncitizens who were detained by the US government after being excluded. Id. at 660.   
Note that this extension of the power to both political branches goes beyond the Chinese Exclusion 
Case’s initial assignment of plenary power to Congress alone.  In Fong Yue Ting, the Supreme Court 
extended the plenary power doctrine to noncitizens already admitted to the country.  Fong Yue Ting v. 
United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).   
The Executive Branch plays a critical role in regulating immigration. The plenary power doctrine 
encompasses both of the political branches, and courts have been unable or unwilling to clarify where 
which aspects of the power lie. See Adam Cox & Cristina Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law, 
119 YALE L. J. 458 (2009); Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601 (2013). The 
Commerce Clause, however, is explicit in granting the authority over commerce solely to Congress. See 
infra notes [187-188] and accompanying text for a discussion of how the Executive’s current extensive role 
in immigration decision-making and standard-setting is related to the congressional immigration power as 
currently understood.  A similar understanding would bring the Executive Branch under a Commerce 
Clause-based understanding of the immigration power.    
39 See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).  Immigration law uses the legal fiction of 
“standing outside the border” to distinguish those who have been legally admitted from those who have not.  
A noncitizen is referred to as “standing outside the border” whether she is in another country applying for a 
visa, actually at the border requesting admission, or present in the United States without having been 
legally admitted.   
40 Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law after a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional 
Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L. J. 545 (1990). 
41 At the outset, it is important to clarify that jurisprudence on immigrants and the Constitution is 
generally bifurcated.  Although the plenary power line of cases, at issue here, limits judicial review for 
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Litigation	over	the	relationship	between	immigration	and	the	Constitution	has	waxed	 and	 waned.	 	 	 Immigration	 all	 but	 fell	 off	 the	 federal	 docket	 during	 the	restrictionist	 1920s,	 30s,	 and	 40s,	 taking	 the	 question	 of	 plenary	 power	 with	 it.		When	 the	 issue	 returned	 in	1950,	 however,	 the	Cold	War	was	underway,	 and	 the	plenary	 power	 doctrine	 came	 back	 in	 full	 force.	 	 The	 Supreme	 Court’s	 1950	statement	 in	Knauff	 v.	 Shaughnessy	 that	 “[w]hatever	 the	 procedure	 authorized	 by	Congress	is,	it	is	due	process	as	far	as	an	alien	denied	entry	is	concerned”42	signaled	the	 renewed	 vigor	 with	 which	 the	 Court	 would	 turn	 to	 the	 doctrine	 during	 the	decades	 that	 followed.43	 	 National	 security	 and	 foreign	 affairs	 rationales	 were	central	 to	 decisions	 upholding	 actions	 on	 immigration	 by	 both	 the	 legislative	 and	executive	branches	as	the	Cold	War	proceeded.44	
                                                                                                                                            
constitutionality of immigration law and policy, i.e. as to noncitizens’ right to enter and remain in the 
United States, a separate line of cases, dating from Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), grants 
immigrants—including in many cases undocumented immigrants—constitutional protections as to many 
aspects of their daily lives in the country.  See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976): “There are 
literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the United States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as the 
Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one of these persons from deprivation of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law. [citations omitted] Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful, 
involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional protection.”  Id. at 77.  The Court emphasizes, 
however, that these protections do not extend to the context of exclusion and deportation. “In the exercise 
of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be 
unacceptable if applied to citizens. The exclusion of aliens and the reservation of the power to deport have 
no permissible counterpart in the Federal Government's power to regulate the conduct of its own citizenry.” 
Id. at 79-80. 
So, for example, the 5th and 14th Amendments have been held to encompass the right of noncitizen 
children, including undocumented children, to a free public education through secondary school (Plyler v. 
Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)); and of noncitizens in criminal proceedings to the same Miranda warning and 
protection against unconstitutional searches and seizures enjoyed by citizens (Almeida-Sanchez v. United 
States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973)).  For assessments of the extent of the constitutional rights of noncitizens, see 
GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION (1996); Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: 
Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1731 and passim (2010).   
The Supreme Court has, however, permitted Congress to distinguish between legal permanent 
residents and citizens in certain other contexts.  In Graham v. Richardson 403 U.S. 365 (1971), the Court 
established that state classifications based on alienage should be subject to strict scrutiny [id at 372], but 
soon carved out an exception where the distinction was tied to the state’s governmental operations, 
permitting state discrimination against legal permanent residents in hiring for policing (Foley v. 
Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978)) and for public school teaching (Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979)) 
among other arenas. In Mathews v. Diaz, moreover, the Court made clear that a lower level of scrutiny 
applied when examining federal alienage classifications created by Congress.  That case upheld a federal 
law requiring five years of continuous residents from legal permanent residents before qualifying for 
certain federal public benefits, with no such requirement for citizens. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).  
42 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950). 
43 See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530–31 (1954) (Justice Frankfurter: While “much could be said 
for the view” that due process limits congressional power in the immigration arena “were we writing on a 
clean slate,” “But the slate is not clean. As to the extent of the power of Congress under review, there is not 
merely ‘a page of history’. . . but a whole volume. Policies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to 
remain here are peculiarly concerned with the political conduct of government. In the enforcement of these 
policies, the Executive Branch of the Government must respect the procedural safeguards of due process. . . 
. But that the formulation of these policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly 
imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government. . . .”). 
44 Shaughnessy v. United States el rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (citing national security concerns 
and the plenary power doctrine in upholding as constitutional the indefinite detention of a legal permanent 
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Others	have	amply	described	the	impact	of	the	plenary	power	doctrine	over	the	past	 century.	 	 For	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 Article,	 it	 suffices	 to	 note	 that	 despite	 its	tenuous	link	to	an	enumerated	power,	the	doctrine	has	been	cited	by	the	Supreme	Court	 in	upholding	 immigration	policies	 that	openly	discriminate	on	the	basis	of	a	noncitizen’s	 race,	 gender,	 national	 origin,	 and	 political	 views.45	 As	 of	 2017,	 the	Supreme	 Court	 had	 never	 held	 unconstitutional	 a	 substantive	 criterion	 for	admission	or	“removal”	(the	modern	term	that	covers	both	exclusion	at	the	border	and	 deportation	 from	 the	 interior),	 whether	 established	 by	 Congress	 or	 the	executive	branch.46		In	addition,	the	Court	has	relied	on	plenary	power	in	permitting	
                                                                                                                                            
resident seeking re-admission to the United States); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 
537 (1950) (citing national security concerns and the plenary power doctrine in upholding as constitutional 
the exclusion from the United States without a hearing of the wife of a United States citizen); Kleindienst v. 
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (citing national security concerns and the plenary power doctrine in 
upholding the decision of the Attorney General not to permit a foreign scholar with Marxist views to enter 
the United States to attend a conference). 
45 See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 521–22 (2003).  The controlling opinion in a recent 
Supreme Court plurality decision also cited plenary power with approval.  Kerry v. Din, No. 13-1402, slip 
op. at 2-3, 4 (576 U.S. ___ (2015)) (Kennedy, J., concurring). For a review of modern cases, see 
Legomsky, supra note 36, at 261–69; Chin, supra note 8, at 3–7; Regarding Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 
(1977), Chin argues that despite its holding the case actually represents a “quiet expansion of judicial 
review,” because the Court did not say that there was no review of Congress’s substantive categories in the 
immigration context, instead accepting “‘limited judicial responsibility under the Constitution even with 
respect to the power of Congress to regulate the admission and exclusion of aliens.’” Id. at 62–66 (quoting 
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. at 793 n.5). However, as Chin notes, the Court upheld Congress’s differential 
gender-based standard following “an exceedingly deferential review.” Id. at 64. 
46 Note, though, that in 2017 the Court did decide Sessions v. Morales-Santana, No. 15-1191, slip op. 
(U.S. June 12, 2017). There, it found that the larger burden that the Immigration and Nationality Act 
imposes on unwed U.S. citizen fathers vs. mothers in order to pass citizenship to their children was a 
violation of Equal Protection.  In so doing, the Court explicitly sidestepped the question of the vitality of 
the plenary power doctrine.  It distinguished the question presented as related to a claim of citizenship on 
birth, rather than “an entry preference for aliens” that might have triggered the need for maximal judicial 
deference that plenary power mandates in considering constitutional challenges to immigration.  Slip op. at 
15. 
This is not by any means to say that noncitizens always lose in cases about immigration.  As Stephen 
Legomsky observed thirty years ago, in the modern era the Court has not infrequently turned to liberal 
statutory interpretation as a way of avoiding the plenary power doctrine.  LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND 
THE JUDICIARY at 156-170.  See also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law after a Century of Plenary 
Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L. J. 545 (1990); Hiroshi 
Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive 
Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992).  Kevin Johnson has recently argued that the Court 
increasingly relies on ordinary tools of statutory construction, including the constitutional avoidance 
doctrine and clear statement rules, as well as the application of administrative law principles, to rule in 
favor of immigrants. See Kevin Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, 2009–13: A New Era of 
Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 57, 61–65 and passim (2015).   
Indeed, Supreme Court decisions in 2017 saw a number of immigrants prevail in challenges to 
immigration law.  See, e.g., Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 1918 (2017) (before the government can 
denaturalize a naturalized citizen on the basis of a conviction for misstatements on her citizenship 
application, it must show that the misstatements were central to the grant of citizenship); Lee v. United 
States, 137 S.Ct. 1958 (2017) (finding that attorney’s faulty advice regarding the immigration 
consequences of a criminal plea led to prejudice, and ruling for noncitizen); Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 
137 S.Ct. 1562 (2017) (applying a categorical approach to the crime of statutory rape for the purposes of 
immigration law; holding that for a conviction of statutory rape to qualify as an aggravated felony, the 
underlying state law must criminalize sexual intercourse with an individual younger than sixteen).  
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procedures	 in	 the	 immigration	 arena	 that	 would	 clearly	 violate	 the	 due	 process	protections	 of	 the	 Constitution	 if	 they	 were	 applied	 elsewhere.	 	 These	 include	indefinite	 detention	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 evidence	 not	 revealed	 to	 the	 noncitizen;47	removal	 based	 on	 an	 administrative	 hearing	 held	 in	 English	 at	 which	 the	noncitizen—whose	 sole	 language	 was	 Japanese—was	 unrepresented,	 had	 no	translator,	 and	was	unaware	 that	 the	procedure	 related	 to	 her	 deportation;48	 and	indeed	the	removal	of	a	noncitizen	based	on	a	hearing	held	 in	absentia	or	without	any	hearing	at	all.49		When,	in	the	wake	of	9/11,	the	Executive	Branch	required	that	all	men	 from	 predominately	Muslim	 countries	 in	 the	 United	 States	 on	 temporary	visas	register	with	the	government,	the	initiative	was	upheld	by	every	circuit	court	that	 considered	 constitutional	 challenges	 to	 it.50	 As	 a	 number	 of	 scholars	 have	pointed	 out,	 in	 addition	 to	 its	 consequences	 for	 immigrants,	 the	 plenary	 power	doctrine	limits	citizens’	ability	to	exercise	their	constitutional	rights.51		
                                                                                                                                            
Consistent with Johnson’s thesis, all of these rulings were made on statutory interpretation grounds and did 
not mention plenary power.  In the one immigration case where the Supreme Court resolved a 
constitutional question, Morales-Santana (discussed supra), it was careful to distinguish between the 
context where the constitutional challenge arose, which it characterized as relating to citizenship at birth, 
and the context of noncitizen admission categories in which greater deference is due to Congress.  .  Slip 
op. at 15. 
47 Shaughnessy v. United States el rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). 
48 Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903).  Ironically, Yamataya is a case remembered for 
acknowledging some procedural rights in the deportation context, because it required a sliver of 
opportunity for the immigrant to be heard in administrative proceedings.  This standard was found to be 
met when Ms. Yamataya, who spoke no English, was granted a hearing at which she was not provided a 
translator and did not realize that the proceedings related to her deportation.  “If the appellant’s want of 
knowledge of the English language put her at some disadvantage . . . that was her misfortune, and 
constitutes no reason, under the acts of Congress, or under any rule of law, for the intervention of the court 
by habeas corpus.” Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 102. 
49 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b); Maldonado-Perez v. INS, 865 F.2d 328, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“Another 
example of a diminished constitutional safeguard in a deportation hearing, and most significant to the 
present case, is that an immigration judge may deport an alien in absentia based on the existing record.”).   
50 For a review of these decisions, see Center for Immigrants’ Rights at Penn State’s Dickinson School 
of Law, NSEERS: The Consequences of America’s Efforts to Secure Its Borders at 22–23 (2009), 
http://www.adc.org/fileadmin/ADC/Pdfs/nseerspaper.pdf; see also Wadhia, Is Immigration Law National 
Security Law?, supra note 18. 
51 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (although the Court there claimed it did carry out 
constitutional review on this issue, it did so with extreme deference to Congress, and ultimately held that 
citizens’ rights were not infringed); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (declining to balance US 
citizen professors’ asserted First Amendment right to engage with the views of a noncitizen professor 
whose visa was denied, against Congress’s plenary power over immigration; requiring that the US 
government provide only  a “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason for its denial of the visa); Kerry v. 
Din, 576 U.S. ___ (2015) (Justice Scalia for the plurality: a citizen has no liberty right in being reunited 
with her noncitizen spouse, and therefore there is no process due to her that would require notice of why 
her husband’s visa was denied). But see Justice Kennedy’s controlling concurrence in Kerry v. Din, where 
he assumes without deciding that US citizens have a liberty interest in being reunited with a noncitizen 
spouse or other relatives abroad, but finds that right not infringed by the U.S. government policy of giving 
no further information when a visa is denied on terrorism grounds by a consular authority. No. 13-1402, 
slip op. at 1 (576 U.S. __ (2015)) (Kennedy, J., concurring). For further discussion, see Rachel E. 
Rosenbloom, The Citizenship Line: Rethinking Immigration Exceptionalism, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1965 (2013); 
NEUMAN, supra note 41 at 138 (mentioning as examples citizens’ 1st amendment rights when denied the 
opportunity to hear from and interact with the noncitizen). 
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Plenary	power	has	been	roundly	critiqued	by	academics	and	advocates	who	see	it	as	an	unwarranted	exception	to	baseline	constitutional	protections,	born	of	an	era	of	 xenophobia	 and	 racism.52	 	 As	 to	 the	 source	 of	 the	 power,	 scholars	 have	emphasized	in	particular	the	weak	constitutional	soil	in	which	the	Court	rooted	the	doctrine	when	 it	 turned	away	 from	 the	 enumerated	powers	 to	 foreign	 affairs	 and	sovereignty	rationales.53		One	such	critique	emphasizes	that	if	the	foreign	affairs	power	is	to	be	relied	on	across	 the	 board	 as	 a	 source	 of	 the	 immigration	 power,	 it	 must	 be	 justified	 by	reference	to	the	centrality	of	international	relations	to	most	immigration	decisions	made	 by	 the	 executive	 and	 legislative	 branches.54	 	 Indeed,	 some	 small	 number	 of	immigration	 determinations	 do	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 influence	 the	 United	 States’	standing	 with	 other	 nations.	 	 A	 decision	 to	 refuse	 a	 visa	 to	 a	 foreign	 official,	 for	example,	or	to	create	additional	requirements	for	entry	for	citizens	of	a	country	with	which	the	United	States	is	in	conflict,	may	provoke	a	reaction	from	the	government	of	 the	 affected	 country.55	 But	 today,	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 immigration	 laws	 and	procedures,	 and	 the	 decisions	made	 under	 them,	 are	 routine,	 set	 out	 criteria	 that	apply	 to	 nationals	 of	 all	 countries,	 and	 at	 least	 ostensibly	 reflect	 considerations	unrelated	to	foreign	relations,	such	as	the	individual’s	 impact	on	the	public	health,	her	criminal	record,	the	likelihood	she	will	become	a	public	charge,	and	whether	her	presence	 will	 deprive	 U.S.	 workers	 of	 employment.	 	 While	 relationships	 with	individual	 nations	 may	 receive	 outsized	 attention	 when	 they	 arise	 in	 the	immigration	context,	 in	 fact	 they	affect	a	miniscule	percentage	of	 immigration	 law	and	 its	 application.56	 	 Shoba	 Sivaprasad	 Wadhia	 has	 made	 a	 similar	 argument	regarding	the	 limited	nexus	between	genuine	national	security	concerns	and	most	
                                                
52 See, e.g., Chin, supra note 8 at 56-57. See also LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE 
IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW 69–93 (Univ. North Carolina Press 1995); 
Kevin R. Johnson, Race Matters: Immigration Law and Policy Scholarship, Law in the Ivory Tower, and 
the Legal Indifference of the Race Critique, 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 525, 531 (2000).  
53 Note, however, that foreign affairs was already present as an explicit rationale in Henderson v. 
Mayor of City of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875) and Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876). The 
principle concern about foreign affairs at that time seems to have been that one state could end up 
disrupting the country’s relationship with another country.  “If it be otherwise, a single State can, at her 
pleasure, embroil us in disastrous quarrels with other nations.” Chy Lung 92 U.S. at  280.  
54 For variations on this argument see T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: 
THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 160–62 (2002); Legomsky, supra note 36, at 
261–69; NEUMAN, supra note 41, at 135–38; Lindsay, supra note 8, at 53 (2010); Matthew Lindsay, 
Disaggregating ‘Immigration Law’, 68 FLA. L. REV. 179 (2016); David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan 
Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 583, 615-616 (2017).  But see David A. 
Martin, Why Immigration’s Plenary Power Doctrine Endures, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 29, 38-42 (2015) (Arguing 
that the foreign affairs rationale remains a valid justification for a diminished level of judicial review of 
immigration policies in some instances). 
55 One example of this is the retaliatory action the Brazilian government took against U.S. citizens 
seeking to enter Brazil when the United States refused to allow Brazilians to enter without a visa.  C.S., 
You’re Not Welcome, THE ECONOMIST (February 19, 2013), 
https://www.economist.com/blogs/gulliver/2013/02/tourist-visas.  
56 See sources cited in note [54], supra. [Ed.s: The note begins: “For variations on this argument see T. 
Alexander Aleinikoff…”] 
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of	immigration	law.57			More	broadly,	a	number	of	scholars	outside	the	immigration	arena	have	sought	to	undermine	the	assumption	that	the	political	branches’	foreign	affairs	power	itself	lies	beyond	the	realm	of	constitutional	protections.58		Control	over	foreign	affairs	is	only	 implied	 from	 the	 Constitution,	 rather	 than	 explicitly	 set	 forth	 in	 it.59		Nonetheless,	 during	 the	 years	 from	 the	 Supreme	 Court’s	 1936	 Curtiss-Wright60	decision	 through	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Cold	 War,	 the	 Court	 interpreted	 the	 power	expansively,	 permitting	 the	Executive	 to	use	 it	 to	 insulate	 a	wide	 range	of	 actions	from	meaningful	constitutional	review.	 In	“The	Normalization	of	Foreign	Relations	Law,”	Ganesh	Sitaraman	and	Ingrid	Wuerth	have	recently	argued	that	the	Supreme	Court	 has	 now	 entered	 a	 new	 “normalized”	 phase	 of	 construction	 of	 the	 foreign	affairs	 power,	with	 a	 turn	 to	more	 ordinary	 review.61	 	When	 the	 Court	 considers	immigration	cases,	however,	this	normalization	is	not	evident.			Sovereignty	has	been	separately	critiqued	as	a	basis	for	the	immigration	power.		Some	scholars	have	questioned	the	notion	of	sovereignty	as	a	modern	rationale	for	a	number	of	government	powers,	arguing	that	it	 is	rooted	in	an	outdated	nineteenth	century	territorial	conception	of	what	it	means	to	be	a	nation-state.62	 	It	 is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	Article	to	resolve	the	debate	about	the	contemporary	relevance	of	sovereignty	to	immigration	policy.	 	Instead,	it	proceeds	on	the	pragmatic	view	that	arguments	about	the	demise	of	sovereignty	are	unlikely	to	meet	a	warm	reception	in	the	federal	courts.		With	that	assumption	in	mind,	one	response	might	be	to	accept	the	 relationship	 between	 sovereignty	 and	 immigration,	 while	 contesting	 the	exemption	 that	 plenary	 power	 grants	 the	 government	 from	 constitutional	constraints.	 But	 such	 an	 approach	 faces	 an	 uphill	 battle,	 in	 that	 its	 demand	 for	constitutional	rights	will	always	be	taken	up	in	the	shadow	cast	by	the	tradition	of	deference	that	accompanies	sovereignty	justifications.	In	response,	this	Article	calls	for	 a	 doctrinal	 counterweight:	 an	 additional	 constitutional	 source	 for	 the	immigration	power,	on	which	judges	and	litigants	can	draw	as	a	reminder	that	most	immigration	 laws	and	policies	have	quotidian	 rather	 than	grand	aims,	 and	 should	receive	an	ordinary	measure	of	constitutional	review.			With	 some	 exceptions,	 in	 recent	 years	 plenary	 power	 has	 appeared	 to	 be	 in	decline.63		A	number	of	Supreme	Court	decisions	have	veered	away	from	applying	a	
                                                
57 Wadhia, Is Immigration Law National Security Law?, supra note 18.  
58 See Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. 
REV. 1897 (2015) (with responses in the Harvard Law Review Forum by Carlos Vasquez, Curtis Bradley, 
and Stephen Vladek); see also Kerry Abrams, supra note 38, at 635–36.  Most recently, in his forthcoming 
book, Martin Flaherty critiques the idea of judicial deference to the Executive in the realm of foreign affairs 
as a “newcomer to the legal landscape,” and argues for a no-deference standard. MARTIN FLAHERTY, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ch. 10 (forthcoming 2018) (on file with the author).  
59 LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 16 (1972). 
60 U.S. v. Curtis-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).  
61 Sitaraman &Wuerth, supra note 58.  
62 LEGOMSKY, supra note 8, at 184–86; Lindsay, supra note 8; Cleveland, supra note 8, at 99-112. 
63 The case most responsible for this theory was Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), decided just 
a few months before 9/11, in which the Court applied the constitutional avoidance canon to justify reading 
a six-month limit into a statutory provision authorizing unlimited detention of noncitizens who are 
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plenary	power	analysis,	albeit	without	overruling	the	doctrine.			Kevin	Johnson	has	argued	 that	 although	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 has	 announced	 no	 move	 to	 change	 the	doctrine,	 in	 practice	 it	 now	 seeks	 to	 resolve	most	 immigration	 cases	 that	 raise	 a	combination	 of	 constitutional,	 statutory	 interpretation,	 and	 administrative	 law	questions	 by	 avoiding	 the	 constitutional	 issues,	 consistent	with	 the	 constitutional	avoidance	canon.64		Instead,	it	uses	the	ordinary	tools	of	statutory	construction	and	assessment	 of	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 agency’s	 exercise	 of	 its	 discretion	 to	 resolve	 the	case.65	 	He	concludes	that	“[i]mmigration	exceptionalism—and,	with	it,	 the	Chinese	
Exclusion	Case—after	125	years	appears	to	slowly	but	surely	be	on	its	way	out.”66		Others	 are	 less	 optimistic.67	 	 In	 2003,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 relied	 on	 plenary	power	 to	uphold	a	 statute	mandating	detention	 for	 classes	of	noncitizens	prior	 to	determination	 of	 their	 deportability.68	 In	 2015	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 upheld	 a	 State	Department	 policy	 of	 providing	 minimal	 explanation	 to	 a	 noncitizen	 whose	 visa	application	 is	 denied	by	 a	 consular	 official	 in	 a	 plurality	 opinion	 in	Kerry	 v.	Din,69	with	several	justices	explicitly	citing	the	doctrine.70		Many	 had	 hoped	 that	 the	 Court	would	 resolve	 persistent	 questions	 about	 the	vitality	of	the	plenary	power	doctrine	in	the	course	of	its	2016	term,	which	included	an	unusually	 large	number	of	 immigration	controversies.	 	 It	was	not	to	be.	 In	June	2017,	 the	Court	announced	 that	 it	had	not	 reached	a	 resolution	on	 two	cases	 that	squarely	 posed	 the	 question	 of	 the	 applicability	 of	 constitutional	 norms	 to	
                                                                                                                                            
excludable, removable, or a flight risk.  Following 9/11, however, the door appeared to close. See Demore 
v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). Nonetheless, even before the 2017 cases, the Court only occasionally referred 
to plenary power or cited the Chinese Exclusion Case and its fellows, even when it appeared to apply the 
doctrine.  
64 Johnson, supra note 46, at 61–65 and passim.  See also LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE 
JUDICIARY at 156-170; Motomura, Immigration Law after a Century of Plenary Power; Motomura, The 
Curious Evolution of Immigration Law. 
65 Johnson, supra note 46, at 61–65.  
66 Johnson, supra note 46, at 118; David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration 
Exceptionalism, supra note 54; Lindsay, supra note 54, at 241. But see Kevin Johnson, No decision in two 
immigration-enforcement cases, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/no-
decision-two-immigration-enforcement-cases/ (noting uncertainty about the direction the Court will take 
following its 2017 decision to postpone decisions in two cases challenging the constitutionality of aspects 
of immigration law). 
67 See Michael Kagan, Plenary Power Is Dead!  Long Live Plenary Power!, 114 MICH. L. REV. FIRST 
IMPRESSIONS 21, 27 (2015) (“A sober observer would point out that immigration law scholars have been 
predicting the imminent demise of the plenary power doctrine for at least three decades.”) (citing 
Legomsky, supra note 45, at 305.); see also Lindsay, supra note 8, at 8 (“Although the SC in recent 
decades has muted some of the more severe aspects of the plenary power doctrine, the constitutional 
exceptionalism of the immigration power, as well as its core legal rationale, remain fundamentally intact.") 
(citation omitted). 
68 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). 
69 135 S.Ct. 2128 (2015).  
70 See, e.g., id. at 2139–41 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Using this case as a jumping off point to argue 
that the plenary power doctrine is being dismantled as to procedural challenges but preserved as to 
substantive constitutional rights, see Kagan, supra note 67.  Kagan notes that although “recent case law has 
significantly weakened the doctrine,” the Supreme Court “may be hesitant to discard the doctrine entirely.” 
Id. at 23.    
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immigration	law:	Lynch	v.	Dimaya,71	challenging	the	“crime	of	violence”	deportation	ground	 as	 unconstitutionally	 vague;	 and	 Jennings	 v.	 Rodriguez,72	 challenging	 the	denial	 of	 bond	 hearings	 to	 immigrants	 mandatorily	 detained	 for	 longer	 than	 six	months	as	a	violation	of	due	process.	 	 Instead,	 it	ordered	that	 they	be	reargued	 in	the	2017	term,	leaving	Justice	Gorsuch—not	on	the	Court	at	the	time	they	were	first	heard—to	cast	a	deciding	vote.73				As	 the	 term	drew	 to	 a	 close,	 all	 eyes	 turned	 to	 the	 litigation	 surrounding	 the	Trump	 administration’s	 “travel	 bans,”	 temporarily	 barring	nationals	 of	 seven,	 and	then	 six,	 predominately-Muslim	 countries	 from	 entering	 the	 United	 States.	 In	September	 of	 2017,	 the	 administration	 issued	 a	 third	 version	 of	 the	 travel	 ban,	imposing	restrictions	on	a	somewhat	different	list	of	six	majority-Muslim	countries,	together	with	North	Korea	and	some	officials	from	Venezuela.74		Following	this,	and	the	 expiration	 of	 the	 earlier	 orders,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 dismissed	 the	 earlier	litigation	as	moot.75	 	However,	 litigation	on	 the	 third	version	 is	moving	at	 a	 rapid	pace	toward	the	Supreme	Court.		As	of	this	writing...	In	 2017-2018,	 when	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 turns	 back	 to	 its	 pending	 cases	 on	constitutional	rights	in	the	context	of	immigration	law,	it	is	far	from	clear	that	it	will	render	the	plenary	power	doctrine	obsolete.	 	Even	Johnson	notes	that	the	doctrine	“conceivably	 could	 return	 in	 truly	 exceptional	 cases,	 such	 as	 ones	 implicating	 an	imminent	mass	migration	or	following	another	catastrophic	act	of	terrorism.”76		One	might	 reasonably	 fear	 that	 the	 ongoing	 global	 refugee	 crisis	 and	 recent	 acts	 of	terrorism	in	Europe	and	the	United	States	could	too	easily	be	relied	on	to	provide	entrée	for	such	a	return,	particularly	given	a	shift	in	balance	on	the	Supreme	Court.			
III.	 		The	Commerce	Clause	as	a	Source	of	the	Immigration	Power	Today	it	is	recalled	that	for	decades	in	the	1800s,	the	Supreme	Court	held	that	the	 federal	 immigration	 power	was	 rooted	 in	 the	 foreign	 Commerce	 Clause.	 	 The	
                                                
71 Lynch v. Dimaya, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted,  85 U.S.L.W. 3114 (U.S. Sept. 29, 
2016) (No. 15-1498).  
72 Rodriguez, et al. v. Robbins, et al., 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Jennings v. 
Rodriguez, ---S. Ct. ---, (2016) (No. 15-1204).  
73 The Court did decide Sessions v. Morales-Santana, No. 15-1191, slip op. (U.S. June 12, 2017). As 
discussed supra note 46, this case overturned on equal protection grounds a US law imposing a greater 
burden on unwed U.S. citizen fathers than on mothers in order to automatically pass citizenship to their 
children.  The Court also decided several other cases challenging immigration law on non-constitutional 
grounds.  These included another case related to citizenship, Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 1918 
(2017), where the Court applied statutory construction to reach a unanimous conclusion that immaterial 
false statements were not grounds for denaturalization, and Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S.Ct. 1562 
(2017), where the Court applied statutory construction to conclude, again unanimously, that sexual abuse of 
a minor is not an aggravated felony unless the statute under which the noncitizen was convicted defined 
“minor” as younger than sixteen, at 1568.  
        74 Presidential Proclamation Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted 
Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats,  
(Sept. 24, 2017), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/09/24/enhancing-vetting-
capabilities-and-processes-detecting-attempted-entry.  
75 Trump v. Hawaii, No. 16-1540, 2017 WL 4782860 (U.S. Oct. 24, 2017).  
76 Johnson, supra note 46, at 66. 
 17 
 
interstate	Commerce	Clause	has	never	been	seriously	considered	for	this	role.	 	Yet	together,	 they	 offer	 an	 alternative	 framework	 for	 the	 federal	 immigration	 power,	one	 that	 is	 directly	 rooted	 in	 the	 Constitution	 and	 that	 sets	 the	 stage	 for	 a	more	robust	standard	of	judicial	review.			Article	I,	Section	8	of	the	U.S.	Constitution	grants	Congress	power	“[t]o	regulate	commerce	with	foreign	nations,	and	among	the	several	states,	and	with	the	Indian	tribes.”77		Each	element	of	the	clause	has	been	interpreted	as	giving	rise	to	a	distinct	form	of	the	power,	with	its	own	evolution	over	time.		In	addition,	a	fourth	“negative”	or	 “dormant”	 Commerce	Clause	 has	 been	derived	 from	 this	 language,	 rendering	 a	state	or	local	law	is	unconstitutional	when	it	unduly	burdens	interstate	commerce.			Beginning	 with	 Gibbons	 v.	 Ogden78	 in	 1824,	 the	 Commerce	 Clause	 has	 been	understood	as	governing	a	broad	swath	of	economic	activity,	although	 the	precise	contours	of	the	commerce	power	have	been	interpreted	differently	over	time.		This	section	 briefly	 traces	 the	 evolution	 of	 Commerce	 Clause	 jurisprudence,	 argues	 for	locating	the	immigration	power	in	the	foreign	and	interstate	Commerce	Clauses,	and	contends	that	adoption	of	this	view	would	facilitate	more	robust	 judicial	review	of	immigration	laws	and	policies	for	constitutionality.	
A. The	Lost	Source:	The	Foreign	Commerce	Clause	From	early	in	the	nation’s	history,	it	was	understood	that	the	Commerce	Clause	permitted	the	federal	government	to	control	certain	aspects	of	immigration—those	that	were	 analogous	 to	 international	 trade	 in	 commercial	 goods—with	 the	 states	retaining	all	other	authority	under	their	police	powers.79			Underpinning	this	view	of	the	 federal	 power	 was	 the	 concept	 that	 the	 human	 beings	 could	 be	 “articles	 of	commerce,”	 and	 therefore	 that	 their	 transportation	 across	 national	 borders	 was	under	 federal	 purview,	 an	 idea	 goes	 back	 to	 the	 importation	 of	 slaves	 and	indentured	servants	in	the	earliest	days	after	the	founding	of	the	United	States.80			The	 initial	 consensus	 that	 people	 were	 properly	 considered	 articles	 of	commerce	 fell	 apart	 in	 the	 mid-1800s.81	 	 The	 dispute	 was	 not	 generated	 by	
                                                
77 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
78 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
79 Id. at 196–97; Lindsay, supra note 8, at 6, 13; Abrams, supra note 38, at 611 n.41 (citing NEUMAN, 
supra note 41, at 138. For an overview of this question, see Erin Delaney, In the Shadow of Article I: 
Applying a Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis to State Laws Regulating Aliens, 82 NYU L. REV. 1821 
(2007). 
80 Bilder, supra note 8, at 761 and passim. 
81 Id. at 748 (“[T]his assumption—that persons entering from abroad were ‘articles of commerce’—
became one of the most disputed questions of constitutional law.”).  
An important question is whether considering people as commerce and arguing that immigration is 
fundamentally economic commodifies human beings, demeaning their dignity, denying their agency, and 
masking their noneconomic reasons for migrating. This is especially problematic given that the pre-Chae 
Chan Ping jurisprudence rooting the immigration power in the foreign commerce clause and arguing for 
people as commerce really was about pacifying the South and permitting southern states to continue 
denying entrance to free Blacks.  In focusing on economic concerns, does this proposal obscure the frankly 
racist basis of much U.S. immigration policy? See Chin, supra note 8, at 29 (“Mass immigration . . . was 
not the problem; Chinese represented a fraction of total immigration. Moreover, labor competition from 
white aliens was not criticized.”).  See also quotes from multiple legislators expressing white supremacist 
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immigration.		With	important	exceptions,	the	general	attitude	in	the	country	in	the	mid-1800s	was	pro-immigration:	even	as	Irish	and	Asian	immigrants	faced	rampant	xenophobia,82	 newcomers	 were	 recruited	 for	 their	 labor—if	 not	 always	 made	welcome	on	arrival—in	a	growing	nation	with	ample	space.83	Instead,	it	originated	with	 the	 national	 conflict	 over	 slavery.	 	 If	 immigrants	were	 articles	 of	 commerce,	then	 so	 too	were	 slaves—and	 if	 so,	 Congress	 could	 ban	 the	 domestic	 slave	 trade	under	its	Commerce	Clause	authority.84		As	conflict	over	slavery	between	the	North	and	 South	 gained	 intensity,	 southern	 states	 and	 slave	 owners	 fought	 this	interpretation.		Mary	Sarah	Bilder,	in	her	history	of	this	period,	notes	the	profound	irony	of	lawyers	for	the	pro-slavery	camp	accusing	abolitionists	of	demeaning	slaves	as	“chattels”	by	categorizing	them	as	articles	of	commerce.85	As	it	navigated	this	conflict,	the	Supreme	Court	continued	to	assert	the	federal	government’s	 power	 over	 the	 transportation	 of	 immigrants	was	 a	 function	 of	 the	Commerce	Clause.	 	For	the	bulk	of	the	nineteenth	century,	most	efforts	to	regulate	immigration	occurred	on	a	state	level,	and	were	limited	to	weeding	out	those	seen	as	criminal,	sick,	or	unable	to	support	themselves—and/or	to	funding	their	care—rather	 than	to	reducing	 immigration	numbers	as	a	whole.86	 	The	regulated	parties	generally	 were	 not	 individual	 immigrants,	 but	 the	 merchants	 who	 brought	 them	into	 the	 country.87	 	 Most	 of	 these	 state	 initiatives	 efforts	 sought	 to	 impose	 per-passenger	 fees	 and	 reporting	 requirements	 on	 ships	 arriving	 from	 overseas	 and	docking	at	a	port	in	the	state.			In	 the	 cases	 that	 arose	 from	 challenges	 to	 these	 policies,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	made	 clear	 that	 it	 saw	 the	 foreign	 commerce	 power	 as	 the	 explicit	 source	 of	 the	federal	 government’s	 authority	 over	 the	 transportation	 of	 immigrants.88	 The	
                                                                                                                                            
views as a basis for exclusion in this context; for example Chin quotes Senator Teller during the debate 
over the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882 as saying “‘[t]he Caucasian race has a right, considering its 
superiority of intellectual force and mental vigor, to look down upon every other branch of the human 
family. . . . We are superior to the Chinese.’” Id. at 31.  
I take these questions seriously.  Yet on balance, I have concluded that, even given that terrible 
history, locating the immigration power in the Commerce Clause is a better fit and reflects more respect for 
immigrant dignity and agency than the current rooting of the power in foreign affairs and national security, 
which implicitly or explicitly sees every immigrant through a lens of “enemy alien,” invasion, and terrorist 
threat.  
82 Chin, supra note 8, at 20,; Lindsay, supra note 8, at 12–13. 
83 Lindsay, supra note 8, at 11; TONY ALLEN FREYER, THE PASSENGER CASES AND THE COMMERCE 
CLAUSE  109-110 (2014).  
84 One example of such an argument can be seen in Groves v. Slaughter, an 1841 Supreme Court case 
regarding the validity of Mississippi constitution’s prohibition on the importation of slaves. Groves v. 
Slaughter, 40 U.S. 449 (1841). As Bilder points out, although the Supreme Court avoided explicit decision 
about whether slaves were articles of commerce, the case was “argued as a case about commerce.” Bilder, 
supra note 8, at 808. 
85 The attorney for Mississippi argued that slaves were persons not commerce and decried abolitionists 
who would reduce them to “chattels.” The opposing anti-slavery attorneys were forced to argue that slaves 
ARE articles of commerce in order to gain federal regulation. Bilder, supra note 8, at 807–09. 
86 Lindsay, supra note 8, at 13. 
87 “Consistent with the belief that immigration involved a commerce, regulation did not focus on the 
people entering, but on the merchants who imported them.” Bilder, supra note 8, at 772. 
88 Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102 (1837); Smith v. Turner (Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. 283 
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seaboard	 states	 justified	 their	head	 taxes	and	 related	 reporting	 requirements	as	a	way	 to	 assess	 the	 needs	 of	 newcomers	 and	 to	 pay	 for	 their	 care	 and	 support.89		Shipmasters	 argued	 that	 the	 states’	 actions	 represented	 efforts	 to	 control	 foreign	commerce,	 a	 power	 which	 lay	 exclusively	 with	 the	 federal	 government.90	 	 The	Supreme	Court	sometimes	rejected	these	dormant	Commerce	Clause	challenges,	as	it	did	in	Miln91	in	1837,	permitting	New	York’s	reporting	requirement	to	stand	as	an	exercise	of	 the	 state’s	police	power.	 	 It	 sometimes	upheld	 them,	 as	with	 the	1849	
Passenger	Cases,92	where	the	Court	struck	down	New	York	and	Massachusetts	head	tax	 laws	 as	 unconstitutional	 because	 they	 usurped	 the	 federal	 commerce	 power.		Either	 way,	 what	 the	 justices	 debated	 was	 the	 distribution	 of	 power	 over	immigration	 between	 the	 states	 under	 their	 police	 powers	 and	 the	 federal	government	under	its	foreign	commerce	power.		Despite	debate	among	the	justices,	shifting	 majorities	 consistently	 reached	 the	 conclusion	 that	 the	 federal	 authority	over	immigration	derived	from	the	foreign	Commerce	Clause.		When	the	Civil	War	ended,	the	Supreme	Court	left	behind	any	hesitation	about	explicitly	 rooting	 the	 federal	 government’s	 immigration	 power	 in	 the	 foreign	Commerce	Clause.93	After	Congress	passed	an	1875	immigration	statute,	one	of	 its	earliest	efforts	to	regulate	immigration	on	a	national	level,	the	Supreme	Court	struck	down	New	York,	California,	and	Louisiana	statutes	regulating	shipmasters	bringing	newcomers	 to	 those	 seaboard	 states	 under	 a	 dormant	 Commerce	 Clause	 analysis	that	 reiterated	 the	 foreign	Commerce	Clause	 as	 the	 source	of	 an	 exclusive	 federal	authority	 over	 the	 transportation	 of	 immigrants.	 In	 Henderson	 v.	 Mayor	 of	 New	
York,94	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 explicitly	 held	 that	 immigration	 was	 commerce	 with	foreign	nations.95	 	 In	Chy	Lung	v.	Freeman,96	 the	Court	 invalidated	a	California	 law	
                                                                                                                                            
(1849); Lindsay, supra note 8, at 13, 19; FREYER, supra note 84, at 73.  
89 Lindsay, supra note 8, at 17; Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283. 
90 Miln, 36 U.S. 102; Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283.   
91 36 U.S. 102. 
92 48 U.S. 283. 
93 Henderson v. Mayor of City of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 
(1876).  See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942) for discussion of how almost all Commerce 
Clause cases were dormant Commerce Clause cases until 1887. For the importance of the distinction 
between the federalism cases and the immigrants’ rights cases, see Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 
54. 
“Only after the Reconstruction Amendments formally barred people from actually being held as 
potential articles of commerce under slavery or involuntary servitude could the Court accept that 
immigrants were ‘articles of commerce.’” Bilder, supra note 8, at 823.  
94 92 U.S. 259 (1875).  
95 The Henderson Court states that during the time passed since the holding in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 
U.S. 1 (1824), that navigation was commerce, “the transportation of passengers from European ports to 
those of the United States has attained a magnitude and importance far beyond its proportion at that time to 
other branches of commerce. It has become a part of our commerce with foreign nations of vast interest to 
this country as well as to the immigrants who come among us to find a welcome and a home within our 
borders. In addition to the wealth which some of them bring, they bring still more largely the labor which 
we need to till our soil, build our railroads, and develop the latent resources of the country in its minerals, 
its manufactures, and its agriculture. Is the regulation of this great system a regulation of commerce? Can it 
be doubted that a law which prescribes the terms on which vessels shall engage in it is a law regulating this 
branch of commerce?” 92 U.S. at 270–71.  Answering this rhetorical question in the affirmative: “A law or 
a rule emanating from any lawful authority which prescribes terms or conditions on which alone the vessel 
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limiting	 and	 taxing	 immigration	 to	 the	 state,	 arguing	 that	 “[t]he	 passage	 of	 laws	which	 concern	 the	 admission	 of	 citizens	 and	 subjects	 of	 foreign	 nations	 to	 our	shores	 belongs	 to	 Congress,	 and	 not	 to	 the	 states.	 It	 has	 the	 power	 to	 regulate	commerce	 with	 foreign	 nations;	 the	 responsibility	 for	 the	 character	 of	 those	regulations	 and	 for	 the	 manner	 of	 their	 execution	 belongs	 solely	 to	 the	 national	government.”97	 	 Undergirding	 this	 conclusion	 was	 the	 understanding	 that	 the	transportation	 of	 immigrants	 to	 the	United	 States	was	 foreign	 commerce	 of	 great	economic	 importance	 to	 the	 country.98	 Congress’s	 immigration	 power	 grew	 from	the	right	to	regulate	such	commerce,	as	well	as	its	power	over	foreign	affairs.99			All	of	 these	cases	were	challenges	 to	state	action	 in	 the	 immigration	arena.	 	 It	was	not	until	1884	that	the	Supreme	Court	was	called	upon	to	affirmatively	rule	on	a	challenge	to	the	federal	immigration	power,	again	in	the	context	of	a	law	imposing	taxes	and	other	responsibilities	on	shipmasters.	In	the	Head	Money	Cases,100	which	involved	 a	 challenge	 to	 the	 federal	 Immigration	 Act	 of	 1882,101	 taxing	 the	transporters	 of	 immigrants	 at	 fifty	 cents	 per	 head,	 the	 Court	 unanimously	 upheld	the	law	on	the	grounds	that	it	was	a	valid	exercise	of	the	government’s	immigration	authority,	 explicitly	 granted	 by	 the	 foreign	 Commerce	 Clause.102	 In	 support	 of	 its	
                                                                                                                                            
can discharge its passengers is a regulation of commerce, and in case of vessels and passengers coming 
from foreign ports, is a regulation of commerce with foreign nations.” Id. at 271.   
96 92 U.S. 275 (1867). 
97Id. at 280. As the last sentence quoted in the text indicates, the Court emphasizes the political rather 
than economic implications of permitting states to regulate immigration, akin more to the foreign affairs 
power that the Court would later cite in Chae Chan Ping than to the Commerce Clause.  “If that 
government has forbidden the states to hold negotiations with any foreign nations or to declare war and has 
taken the whole subject of these relations upon herself, has the Constitution, which provides for this, done 
so foolish a thing as to leave it in the power of the states to pass laws whose enforcement renders the 
general government liable to just reclamations which it must answer, while it does not prohibit to the states 
the acts for which it is held responsible?” Id. Kerry Abrams traces the relationship between these cases and 
the contemporary Supreme Court decisions on whether state legislation regarding immigrants are 
preempted by the federal immigration power.  See Abrams, supra note 38.  
98 See Lindsay, supra note 8, at 23.  The transportation of European immigrants to the United States 
has “attained a magnitude and importance far beyond its proportion at that time to other branches of 
commerce.” Id. at 24–25 (quoting Justice Miller in Henderson v. Mayor of City of New York, 92 U.S. 159, 
270 (1875)). The reference is to when Gibbons was decided about 50 years earlier, declaring that laws on 
navigation constituted regulation of foreign commerce. See id. at 24.  “In addition to the wealth which 
some of them [the European immigrants] bring, they bring still more largely the labor which we need to till 
our soil, build our railroads and develop the latent resources of our country.” Id. at 25 (quoting Henderson, 
92 U.S. at 270). 
99 Regarding foreign affairs, see id. at 25 (quoting Henderson, 92 U.S. at 273).  
But as Mary Sarah Bilder and others have argued, for the Supreme Court to hold that the 
Commerce Clause covered the movement of human beings as well as goods across borders was 
complicated by far more than definitional issues. See Bilder, supra note 8. 
100 The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884). 
101 The Act taxed the arrival of noncitizens at a U.S. port at fifty cents a head, declaring that “the 
money thus collected shall be paid into the United States Treasury, and shall constitute a fund to be called 
the immigrant fund, and shall be used, under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, to defray the 
expense of regulating immigration under this act, and for the care of immigrants arriving in the United 
States, for the relief of such as are in distress, and for the general purposes and expenses of carrying this act 
into effect.” Id. at 589–90 (citing the Immigration Act of 1882).  
102 Id. at 591 (“We are now asked to decide that [the immigration power] does not exist in Congress, 
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finding	 that	 the	 immigration	 “power	 does	 reside	 in	 Congress,	 [and]	 is	 conferred	upon	 that	 body	by	 the	 express	 language	 of	 the	 Constitution,”103	 the	 Court	 cited	 its	dormant	 Commerce	 Clause	 analysis	 in	 the	 earlier	 state	 immigration	 law	 cases.104		Immigration	 laws	 “are	 regulations	 of	 commerce—of	 commerce	 with	 foreign	nations,”	 the	 Court	 states,	 and	 they	 “constitute	 a	 regulation	 of	 that	 class	 which	belongs	exclusively	to	Congress	[].”105		If	the	federal	immigration	power	is	rooted	in	the	 Commerce	 Clause	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 preempting	 state	 action,	 the	 Court	reasoned,	 that	 same	 source	 grants	 the	 federal	 government	 the	 sole	 power	 to	regulate	affirmatively	in	the	field.106		The	Head	Money	Cases	are	not	remembered	for	this	 holding,	which	was	uncontroversial	 at	 the	 time.	 	 Instead,	 they	 are	 recalled	 as	striking	a	new	balance	between	state	and	federal	control	over	immigration,	one	that	strongly	favored	the	federal	government.107	The	 course	 of	 immigration	 jurisprudence	 changed	 only	 five	 years	 later,	however,	when	a	Court	with	just	two	new	members	took	an	uncharted	path.108	 	In	
Chae	 Chan	 Ping,	 a	 case	 about	 individual	 constitutional	 rights	 rather	 than	immigration	 federalism,	 Justice	Field’s	opinion	 for	a	unanimous	Court	sets	out	 the	plenary	 power	 doctrine	 described	 in	 Part	 II,	 rooting	 immigration	 not	 in	 the	Commerce	 Clause	 but	 in	 the	 nation’s	 sovereignty	 and	 authority	 over	 its	 foreign	affairs.109	 	 In	his	entire	Chinese	Exclusion	Case	opinion,	 Justice	Field	cites	 the	Head	
Money	Cases	 but	one	 time,	and	 there	 for	an	aspect	of	 the	holding	unrelated	 to	 the	source	of	the	immigration	power.110	The	foreign	Commerce	Clause	also	appears	only	
                                                                                                                                            
which is to hold that it does not exist at all—that the framers of the Constitution have so worded that 
remarkable instrument that the ships of all nations, including our own, can, without restraint or regulation, 
deposit here, if they find it to their interest to do so, the entire European population of criminals, paupers, 
and diseased persons without making any provision to preserve them from starvation and its concomitant 
sufferings even for the first few days after they have left the vessel.”).  See also Chin, supra note 8, at 56–
57 (1998); Augustine-Adams, supra note 8, at 719.  
103 Head Money Cases, 122 U.S. at 591 (emphasis added).  
104 Id. at 591–93. 
105 Id. at 591, 595 (“[T]he power exercised in this instance is not the taxing power. The burden 
imposed on the ship owner by this statute is the mere incident of the regulation of commerce—of that 
branch of foreign commerce which is involved in immigration.”). 
106 Most recently, the dormant Commerce Clause has been raised in the context of challenges to state 
efforts to limit the rights of immigrants in Arizona, Alabama, and Georgia, among other states, in the first 
decade of the 2000s.  For a discussion of the blurring of lines between the plenary power doctrine and 
immigration preemption, see Abrams, supra note 38, at 617–18 and passim. 
107 See Lindsay, supra note 8, at 28; FREYER, supra note 84, at 144-45.  Note that the debate had 
important implications for the parallel debate about slavery and state vs. federal power in that context. 
FREYER, supra note 84, at 56 and passim.   
108 Between the Head Money Cases and the Chinese Exclusion Case, Chief Justice Morrison Waite and 
Associate Justice William Woods left the Court and were replaced by Chief Justice Melville Fuller and 
Associate Justice Lucius Lamar II.  The seven associate justices who remained on the Court during this 
period joined the unanimous opinions in both cases.   
While the view I present here—that the emergence of the plenary power doctrine represented a break 
with past jurisprudence, reflecting and motivated by a rise in anti-Chinese sentiment—is widely shared, it is 
not without dissenters.  See, e.g., Andrew Kent & Thomas Lee, supra note 23, arguing that the plenary 
power doctrine was woven into the Constitution since the founding.  
109 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).  
110 “The effect of legislation upon conflicting treaty stipulations was elaborately considered in The 
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once	in	the	opinion,	as	part	of	a	grab-bag	list	of	federal	powers	relevant	to	relations	with	 other	 countries.111	 	 Interstate	 commerce	 is	 mentioned	 a	 single	 time,	 in	 a	similarly	broad	recital	of	aspects	of	 internal	governance.112	Neither	 is	claimed	as	a	source	for	plenary	power.		Justice	 Field	 offers	 no	 explanation	 for	 the	 Court’s	 abandonment	 of	 the	Commerce	 Clause	 as	 the	 primary	 source	 of	 the	 immigration	 power,	 and	 few	commentators	have	explored	the	question.		One	exception	is	Matthew	Lindsay,	who	has	argued	that	the	shift	came	about	due	to	transformations	taking	place	in	the	U.S.	political	 economy	 and	 in	 perceptions	 of	 immigration	 at	 the	 time.113	 	 He	 contends	that	 the	 motivation	 had	 little	 to	 do	 with	 changing	 interpretations	 of	 the	Constitution;	 rather,	 “the	plenary	power	doctrine	was	borne	of	an	urgent	sense	of	national	peril”114	which	recast	the	arrival	of	newcomers	as	a	foreign	invasion	rather	than	an	economic	benefit,	and	that	the	Supreme	Court	unleashed	the	plenary	power	doctrine	in	order	to	free	the	political	branches	to	defend	against	it.115		Many	 scholars	 have	 argued	 that	 racism	 and	 xenophobia	were	 a	 driving	 force	
                                                                                                                                            
Head Money Cases, and it was there adjudged ‘that so far as a treaty made by the United States with any 
foreign nation can become the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of this country, it is subject to 
such acts as Congress may pass for its enforcement, modification, or repeal.’” Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 
600 (quoting The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884)).  
111 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. at 604 (“The powers to declare war, make treaties, 
suppress insurrection, repel invasion, regulate foreign commerce, secure republican governments to the 
States, and admit subjects of other nations to citizenship, are all sovereign powers, restricted in their 
exercise only by the Constitution itself and considerations of public policy and justice which control, more 
or less, the conduct of all civilized nations.”) (emphasis added). 
112 Id. at 605 (“It has jurisdiction over all those general subjects of legislation and sovereignty which 
affect the interests of the whole people equally and alike, and which require uniformity of regulations and 
laws, such as the coinage, weights and measures, bankruptcies, the postal system, patent and copyright 
laws, the public lands and interstate commerce, all which subjects are expressly or impliedly prohibited to 
the state governments.”) (emphasis added). 
113 Lindsay, supra note 8. 
My colleague Tom Lee suggests that the shift may, instead, have been due to the fact that the Chinese 
Exclusion Acts represented the first affirmative federal immigration statutes to exclude a group of people 
based on nationality or race, since prior immigration was principally from Europe and regulated by treaty 
and state taxes on persons transported as in the Head Money cases.  Because the Chinese Exclusion Case 
was the first time the Court faced this new question, and because—as he and my colleague Andrew Kent 
argue in a forthcoming article—plenary power was “part of the original DNA” of the Constitution, Lee 
argues that the Court’s initiation of the plenary power doctrine did not represent a change of course but 
rather the first exercise of a dormant but inherent sovereign power to exclude entry to territory long 
recognized under the law of nations. Email from Thomas Lee, Fordham Law School, to author (March 19, 
2017, 1:56pm EST). 
114 Lindsay, supra note 8, at 6 (as Lindsay goes on to point out “most contemporary policymakers, 
judges, and scholars would reject” the terms on which the sense of peril was based); See also id. at 31–32 
(arguing that the rise of modern immigration exceptionalism lies “more fundamentally in an urgent and 
pervasive discourse of national self-preservation that emerged at the end of the nineteenth century.”). This 
is key to his payoff, which is that the slate of plenary power is not clean: “[T]he ‘slate’ of the American 
immigration power is in fact a palimpsest of anachronisms: alien invasions, existential threats to the 
republic, and simple racism. . . . If the plenary power doctrine is going to survive into the future . . . it 
should at the very least be on grounds that today’s policymakers and judges recognize as legitimate and 
intellectually coherent.” Id. at 56. 
115 Id. at 6, 31, and passim. 
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behind	 the	 Supreme	 Court’s	 shift	 in	 doctrine.116	 	 This	 Article	 posits	 that	 another	factor	was	working	in	tandem.		Both	state	and	federal	immigration	legislation	prior	to	 the	 Chinese	 Exclusion	 Act	 governed	 the	 transportation	 entities	 that	 brought	immigrants	to	the	United	States,	rather	than	regulating	immigrants	 individually.117		This	fit	squarely	within	the	Court’s	understanding	of	foreign	commerce	as	related	to	trade	 and	 navigation.	 	 The	 Chinese	 Exclusion	 Act	 broke	 with	 this	 tradition	 by	directly	 restricting	 the	 immigration	 rights	 of	 individuals	 of	 a	 particular	 country,	without	reference	to	intermediaries.	 	Although	the	opinion	gives	no	hint	as	to	why	the	Court	moved	away	from	the	traditional	foreign	Commerce	Clause	grounding	of	the	 immigration	 power,	 some	 of	 the	 impetus	 may	 have	 come	 from	 this	 new	approach	 in	 the	 law.	 	Since	 the	 challenged	 statute	was	 not	 related	 to	 commercial	entities,	but	instead	represented	the	first	time	that	Congress	had	directly	sought	to	exclude	 a	 particular	 racial	 or	 ethnic	 group,	 the	 Court	 was	 free	 (and	 perhaps	 felt	obliged)	 to	 find	 a	 different	 basis	 in	 the	 Constitution	 for	 this	 aspect	 of	 the	 federal	immigration	authority.		Despite	 its	 turn	 away	 from	 commerce,	 the	Chinese	 Exclusion	 Case	 evidences	 a	strong	concern	about	the	economic	impact	of	immigration.	Even	as	Justice	Field	cuts	the	immigration	power	free	from	the	Commerce	Clause,	he	identifies	the	problem	at	the	core	of	Chinese	immigration	as	a	domestic	economic	one	rather	than	an	issue	of	politics	 or	 foreign	 relations.	 	 He	 states	 that	 Chinese	 people	 in	 the	 United	 States	“were	generally	 industrious	and	 frugal.	Not	being	accompanied	by	 families,	except	in	 rare	 instances,	 their	 expenses	 were	 small;	 and	 they	 were	 content	 with	 the	simplest	 fare,	 such	 as	 would	 not	 suffice	 for	 our	 laborers	 and	 artisans.	 	 The	competition	between	 them	and	our	people	was	 for	 this	 reason	 altogether	 in	 their	favor,	and	the	consequent	irritation,	proportionately	deep	and	bitter,	was	followed,	in	many	cases,	by	open	conflicts,	 to	 the	great	disturbance	of	 the	public	peace.	The	differences	of	race	added	greatly	 to	 the	difficulties	of	 the	situation.”118	 	 It	was	 this	particularly	toxic	combination	of	racism	and	competition	for	jobs	that	set	the	table	for	the	announcement	of	the	plenary	power	doctrine.	Following	 the	 Chinese	 Exclusion	 Case	 and	 its	 companions,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	sometimes	mentioned	the	foreign	Commerce	Clause	in	passing	as	a	kind	of	backup	for	the	plenary	power	doctrine,	either	alone	or	among	other	possible	sources	for	the	immigration	 power.	 	 But	 with	 one	 exception,	 none	 of	 these	 subsequent	 holdings	ultimately	 relied	 on	 the	 foreign	 Commerce	 Clause	 as	 the	 source	 of	 the	 federal	immigration	power.	 	Instead,	they	cited	the	Chinese	Exclusion	Case	and	its	progeny,	with	their	emphasis	on	sovereignty	and	foreign	affairs,	as	the	source	of	the	plenary	power	doctrine.	That	 single	 outlier,	Oceanic	 Steam	Navigation	 v.	 Stranahan,119	 provides	 strong	
                                                
116 See sources cited in supra note 54. [Ed: note begins “See, eg, Gabriel “Jack” Chin, Segregation's 
Last Stronghold…”]. 
117 Note that Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 did purport to regulate the immigration rights of 
individual noncitizens, but were never enforced, and—with the exception of the Alien Enemies Act (now 
codified at 50 U.S.C. § 21–24)—were allowed to expire within three years of their passage. 
118 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 595 (1889). 
119 Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909). 
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support	 for	 the	 theory	 advanced	 here	 that	 the	 Court’s	 shift	 from	 the	 Commerce	Clause	 to	 the	plenary	power	doctrine	 in	 the	Chinese	Exclusion	Case	came	about	 in	part	 because	 the	 Commerce	 Clause	 at	 the	 time	 was	 seen	 to	 allow	 the	 federal	government	 to	 govern	 the	 commercial	 transportation	 of	 immigrants,	 but	 not	 the	right	of	individual	immigrants	to	enter	and	remain.		The	one	time	that	Congressional	action	 after	 the	 Chinese	 Exclusion	 Case	 led	 to	 a	 Supreme	 Court	 challenge	 by	 a	shipping	 company,	 rather	 than	 an	 individual,	 the	 Court	 reverted	 to	 its	 earlier	Commerce	Clause	theory.	In	1903,	Congress	passed	an	‘Act	to	Regulate	the	Immigration	of	Aliens	into	the	United	States.’	 	Responding	 to	growing	concern	about	 the	role	of	anarchists	 in	 the	United	 States	 and	 the	 recent	 assassination	 of	 President	McKinley,	 the	Act	 created	new	categories	of	deportable	and	excludable	noncitizens,	and	penalized	shipmasters	for	bringing	noncitizens	to	the	United	States	who	were	ineligible	to	enter.		The	Act’s	constitutionality	was	twice	challenged	before	the	Supreme	Court.		First,	in	Turner	v.	
Williams,120	an	anarchist	found	deportable	under	the	Act	asserted	that	its	provisions	were	 invalid	 because	 it	 infringed	 on	 his	 free	 speech	 and	 due	 process	 rights.	 	 The	Court’s	 refusal	 to	 consider	whether	 the	 immigration	 law	violated	 the	Constitution	was	by	then	unsurprising.	In	rejecting	Turner’s	individual	claims,	the	Court	hedged	its	bets.		It	cited	the	Chinese	Exclusion	Case	and	subsequent	plenary	power	holdings,	relying	 on	 sovereignty	 rationale,	 but	 also	 “the	 power	 to	 regulate	 commerce	 with	foreign	nations,	which	includes	the	entrance	of	ships,	the	importation	of	goods,	and	the	bringing	of	persons	into	the	ports	of	the	United	States,”	in	concluding	that	“the	act	before	us	is	not	open	to	constitutional	objection.”121	Five	years	later,	the	same	law	was	challenged	by	the	Oceanic	Steam	Navigation	Company,	 which	 had	 been	 fined	 under	 the	 law	 for	 passengers	 who	 arrived	 with	contagious	 diseases	 that	 barred	 them	 from	 entry.	 	 The	 company	 contended	 that	such	a	penalty	was	beyond	Congress’s	powers	to	impose	under	the	Constitution.	In	
Oceanic	 Steam,	 the	 Court	 rejected	 the	 navigation	 firm’s	 arguments	 without	 ever	citing	Chae	Chan	Ping	and	later	plenary	power	decisions,	or	so	much	as	mentioning	the	foreign	affairs	or	national	sovereignty	rationales	that	for	the	prior	two	decades	had	 undergirded	 the	 strong	 version	 of	 Congress’s	 plenary	 immigration	 power.122			Instead,	faced	with	a	case	about	the	transportation	of	immigrants,	it	turned	back	to	the	 foreign	 Commerce	 Clause.123	 	 The	 opinion	 characterized	 immigration	 as	functionally	 the	 same	 as	 trade:	 the	 Act’s	 validity	 rested	 on	 the	 assertion	 that	 “no	
                                                
120 United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904). 
121 Id. at 290. 
122 214 U.S. 320 (1909). 
123 Several cases in lower or administrative courts in the years following Ocean Steam Navigation Co. 
reiterated the tie between foreign commerce and the immigration power, without relying on the statement 
in upholding a congressional act regarding immigration. Such cases generally did not cite the Chinese 
Exclusion Case, referring instead exclusively to prior holdings that the immigration power was rooted in 
the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 374 (1928) (U.S. 
Ct. Cust. Appeals, T.D. 42,030 1927) (upholding Congress’s imposition of a “flexible tariff” on foreign 
nations: “In Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 US 259, and Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. 
Stranahan, 214 US 320, 344 (1909), the regulation of foreign immigration was held to be within the 
congressional power to regulate commerce.”). 
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individual	 has	 a	 vested	 right	 to	 trade	 with	 foreign	 nations,	 which	 is	 so	 broad	 in	character	as	to	limit	and	restrict	the	power	of	Congress	to	determine	what	articles	of	merchandise	may	be	imported	into	this	country,	and	the	terms	upon	which	a	right	to	import	may	be	exercised.”124		Relying	on	this	authority,	the	Court	upheld	the	Act	despite	its	admission	that	in	another	field	its	provisions	might	raise	troubling	constitutional	issues.125		The	most	quoted	line	of	the	Oceanic	Steam	opinion	states	that	“over	no	conceivable	subject	is	the	legislative	power	of	Congress	more	complete	than	it	is	over”	immigration.126		In	so	holding,	 the	Court	 imported	 the	new	assumption	of	plenary	power	 into	 the	old	line	of	cases	based	on	the	Commerce	Clause.127			In	 one	 sense,	 Oceanic	 Steam	 offers	 hope	 for	 the	 argument	 advanced	 here,	because	 it	 points	 to	 the	 continued	 viability	 of	 the	 foreign	 Commerce	 Clause	 as	 a	basis	for	the	immigration	power.		But	it	also	signals	its	potential	limitations.		If	the	relationship	between	 the	Commerce	Clause	and	 the	 federal	 immigration	authority	requires	the	regulation	of	a	commercial	transportation	entity,	then	this	would	pose	a	 serious	obstacle	 to	 the	 argument	 that	 federal	 statutes	 establishing	 the	 terms	on	which	 individuals	 may	 enter	 and	 remain	 in	 the	 United	 States	 (rather	 than	 those	targeting	 transportation	 entities)	 are	 authorized	by	 the	 foreign	Commerce	Clause.		Of	 equal	 concern	 is	 the	 standard	 of	 review.	 If	 the	 Court	 in	 Oceanic	 Steam	 could	ground	Congress’s	 immigration	authority	 in	 the	 foreign	Commerce	Clause	and	yet	describe	 it	 as	 virtually	 unlimited,	 perhaps	 the	 clause	 provides	 as	 little	 protection	from	legislative	overreaching	as	do	foreign	affairs	and	national	sovereignty.128			The	Article	addresses	both	of	these	concerns	below,	noting	in	Part	III.B	that	the	Commerce	 Clause	 now	 is	 understood	 to	 encompass	 individuals	 moving	 across	foreign	and	 interstate	borders,	not	 just	 those	who	 transport	 them;	and	arguing	 in	Part	 IV.B	 that	 the	 understanding	 of	 foreign	 Commerce	 Clause	 plenary	 power	 has	been	 limited	 so	 that	 it	 does	 permit	 meaningful	 judicial	 review.	 Meanwhile,	 the	interstate	Commerce	Clause	offers	an	additional	response	to	both	challenges.	During	
                                                
124 Oceanic Steam, 214 U.S. at 335. 
125 Id. at 338.  The Act barred the entry into the United States of foreigners with contagious diseases, 
and imposed on each shipmaster the duty to inspect the health of his passengers and provide a report to the 
immigration inspection officer at the port of docking. 
126 “As the authority of Congress over the right to bring aliens into the United States embraces every 
conceivable aspect of that subject . . . it follows that the constitutional right of Congress to enact such 
legislation is the sole measure by which its validity is to be determined by the courts.” Id. at 340.  
“In effect, all the contentions pressed in argument concerning the repugnancy of the statute to the due 
process clause really disregarded the complete and absolute power of Congress over the subject with which 
the statute deals . . . . These conclusions are apparent, we think, since the plenary power of Congress as to 
the admission of aliens leaves no room for doubt as to its authority to impose the penalty” Id. at 343 
(emphasis added). Cf. Augustine-Adams, supra note 8.   
127  Like the Chinese Exclusion Case, the opinion refers to the immigration power as “plenary.”  See 
Oceanic Steam, 214 U.S. at 343.  
128 See discussion of this question infra Part IV.B.  On the other hand, Oceanic Steam is a muddled 
case.  Without mentioning plenary power or the cases that established it, it grafts the blanket exception 
from judicial review that was only justified by plenary power’s reference to sovereignty and foreign affairs, 
onto the Commerce Clause, which had not previously been deployed to justify a carve-out from ordinary 
standards of constitutional review.    
 26 
 
the	New	Deal,	the	Supreme	Court	explicitly	rejected	the	requirement	that	an	activity	involve	actual	 transportation	across	state	 lines	 in	order	 to	 fall	within	 the	ambit	of	the	 interstate	 Commerce	 Clause.	 	 And	 the	 interstate	 Commerce	 Clause	 has	 never	been	 held	 to	 immunize	 Congressional	 action	 from	 constitutional	 review.	 	 	 What,	then,	of	the	relationship	between	immigration	and	the	interstate	Commerce	Clause?	
B. A	New	Source:	The	Interstate	Commerce	Clause	It	 is	not	surprising	that	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	century	courts	gave	no	serious	 consideration	 to	 the	 interstate	 Commerce	 Clause	 as	 a	 source	 of	 the	immigration	power.129		The	interpretation	of	interstate	commerce	that	held	sway	at	the	 time	 was	 a	 limited	 one.	 	 Through	 the	 1800s,	 interstate	 commerce	 was	understood	 in	 constrained	 terms,	 as	principally	 justifying	Congress’s	 regulation	of	the	transportation	of	goods	between	states	for	the	purpose	of	sale.		Several	Supreme	Court	Cases	at	the	end	of	that	century	narrowed	the	understanding	of	the	interstate	Commerce	Clause	further.130			During	the	New	Deal,	however,	one	case	on	domestic	labor	migration	and	a	cluster	of	others	on	the	scope	of	federal	regulation	authorized	by	 the	 interstate	Commerce	Clause	opened	 the	door	 to	 the	argument	 that	 internal	migration	is	within	the	ambit	of	the	Commerce	Clause.			1. The	Modern	Jurisprudence	of	the	Interstate	Commerce	Clause	In	1941,	the	Supreme	Court	in	Edwards	v.	California	stated	with	confidence	that	it	was	“settled	beyond	question”	that	the	transportation	of	persons	between	states	was	interstate	commerce.131	 	This	assertion	rested	on	the	affirmative	resolution	of	the	Supreme	Court	debate	outlined	above	over	whether	people	could	be	commerce	in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 foreign	 Commerce	 Clause.	 	 Like	 the	 early	 foreign	 Commerce	Clause	immigration	cases,	Edwards—which	challenged	California’s	prosecution	of	a	man	for	driving	his	unemployed	brother-in-law	into	the	state—was	about	whether	Congress	could	regulate	 the	act	of	moving	others	across	state	or	national	borders.		This	 is	 consistent	 with	 early	 understandings	 of	 commerce	 as	 related	 to	 trade,	navigation,	 or	 transportation.	 To	 be	 relevant	 to	 the	 regulation	 of	 immigrants	themselves,	rather	than	only	to	the	intermediaries	who	transported	them,	however,	the	Court	had	to	reject	this	literal	understanding	of	interstate	commerce.132		
                                                
129 But note that in the context of slavery, there was serious debate about whether interstate commerce 
included the movement of slaves across state borders.  See David Lightner, SLAVERY AND THE COMMERCE 
POWER (2006); see also Bilder, supra note 8. 
130 See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Company, 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (holding that manufacturing is 
not interstate commerce).   
131 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 172 (1941); see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824), 
essentially stating the same thing in 1824.   
132 Ilya Somin states “[t]he Commerce Clause also gives Congress the power to regulate interstate as 
well as international commerce.  Yet almost no one at the time of the Founding believed that Congress 
therefore had the power to forbid Americans from moving from one state to another.” Ilya Somin, Yes, 
Obama’s Executive Action Deferring Deportation for Millions of Immigrants Is Constitutional, REASON 
(Apr. 19, 2016), http://reason.com/archives/2016/04/19/yes-obamas-executive-action-deferring-de.  But 
Annie Chan notes, with reference to Chy Lung and the Head Money Cases, “Finding immigration power 
within Congress’ foreign commerce power dovetailed with the view at the time that domestic commerce 
power encompassed authority over the migration of persons across state lines.”  Annie Chan, Community 
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It	was	 not	 until	 the	New	Deal	 that	 the	 Supreme	Court	made	 plain	 that	 actual	transportation	of	persons	or	articles	of	commerce	across	borders	was	not	necessary	for	an	economic	activity	to	be	covered	by	the	Commerce	Clause.133		To	be	sure,	a	few	cases	in	the	early	1900s	had	hinted	at	this	possibility.134	But	at	the	same	time	that	it	made	these	limited	exceptions,	the	Court	continued	to	reject	efforts	by	Congress	to	set	 standards	 for	 commercial	 activity	 such	 as	 mining	 and	 manufacturing,	 on	 the	grounds	that	the	standards	would	be	applied	to	work	that	took	place	in	a	local	area,	rather	than	to	the	movement	of	products	between	states.135	The	 Supreme	 Court	 decisively	 severed	 its	 definition	 of	 interstate	 commerce	from	 literal	 interstate	 transportation	of	goods	or	people	 in	a	series	of	cases	 in	 the	1940s.	 	US	v.	Darby,136	which	upheld	the	Fair	Labor	Standards	Act,	represented	an	important	step	 in	this	direction.	 	The	Act	established	a	national	minimum	wage	as	well	 as	 other	 workplace	 protections,	 and	 prohibited	 the	 shipment	 across	 state	borders	of	goods	produced	in	violation	of	the	Act.		As	to	the	part	of	the	Act	related	to	transportation,	 the	 Court’s	 holding	 was	 relatively	 uncontroversial.	 	 “While	manufacture	is	not,	of	itself,	interstate	commerce,”	the	Court	held,	“the	shipment	of	manufactured	 goods	 interstate	 is	 such	 commerce,	 and	 the	 prohibition	 of	 such	shipment	by	Congress	is	indubitably	a	regulation	of	the	commerce.”137		Where	Darby	broke	 new	 ground	 was	 by	 holding	 that	 federal	 regulation	 under	 the	 Commerce	Clause	could	set	nation-wide	standards	for	the	conditions	of	production.		Noting	that	the	 lack	of	 a	 federal	minimum	wage	allows	 firms	 in	 states	with	 low	pay	and	poor	working	 standards	 to	 compete	 unfairly	 with	 firms	 in	 other	 states	 that	 hold	employers	to	a	higher	standard,	the	Court	held	that	Congress	also	had	the	power	to	“regulate	 intrastate	 activities	 where	 they	 have	 a	 substantial	 effect	 on	 interstate	commerce.”138	 This	 “substantial	 effect”	 test	 marked	 the	 outer	 limits	 of	 interstate	
                                                                                                                                            
and the Constitution: A Re-Assessment of the Roots of Immigration Law, 21 VT. L. REV. 491, 535 (1996).  
She cites Siegfried Hesse, The Constitutional Status of the Lawfully Admitted Permanent Resident Alien: 
The Pre-1917 Cases, 68 YALE L. J. 1578, 1603 (1959). 
133 But see Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942) (indicating that the Commerce Clause was 
understood as very broad from the beginning: “At the beginning Chief Justice Marshall described the 
federal commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded. He made emphatic the embracing and 
penetrating nature of this power by warning that effective restraints on its exercise must proceed from 
political rather than from judicial processes.) (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)).   
134 See, e.g., Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917); Swift and Company v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 
(1905) (holding that Congress properly drew on its interstate commerce authority when it permitted 
regulation of the local meat market under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Local business can affect the 
interstate movement of goods and services).  
135 See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (manufacturing is not “commerce”); Carter 
v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (coal mining is not “commerce”). 
136 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
137 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113 (1941).  In so holding, the Court defined interstate 
commerce to “embrace[] at least the case where an employer engaged . . . in the manufacture and shipment 
of goods in filling orders of extrastate customers, manufactures his product with the intent or expectation 
that, according to the normal course of his business, all or some part of it will be selected for shipment to 
those customers.” Id. at 117. 
138 Id. at 119 (emphasis added). “The motive and purpose of the present regulation are plainly to make 
effective the Congressional conception of public policy that interstate commerce should not be made the 
instrument of competition in the distribution of goods produced under substandard labor conditions, which 
competition is injurious to the commerce and to the states from and to which the commerce flows. The 
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Commerce	Clause	doctrine	to	that	point	in	the	nation’s	history.		A	year	later,	the	Supreme	Court	expanded	the	doctrine	further,	holding	that	an	impact	on	interstate	commerce	could	be	demonstrated	via	aggregate	noncommercial	activity.	 	In	Wickard	v.	Filburn,	Ohio	farmer	Filburn	challenged	a	federal	regulation	that	required	him	to	pay	a	penalty	for	the	amount	of	wheat	he	grew	in	excess	of	the	allotment	given	to	him	by	the	federal	government,	even	though	he	raised	it	in	part	for	 his	 own	 use	 on	 the	 farm.139	 	 	 Filburn	 contended	 that	 a	 limit	 on	 a	 farmer’s	production	for	his	use	alone	could	not	be	justified	as	flowing	from	the	constitutional	clause	authorizing	Congress	to	regulate	interstate	commerce.140			The	Court	was	not	persuaded.	 	 Although	 any	 individual’s	 wheat	 grown	 for	 home	 use	 might	 have	 a	minimal	impact	on	commerce,	it	held,	in	aggregate	with	many	others	the	effect	could	be	substantial.141	In	the	wake	of	Wickard,	conservative	justices	and	commentators	in	particular	 have	 expressed	 the	 concern	 that	 if	 the	 aggregation	 of	 private	noneconomic	 activity	 can	 meet	 the	 standard	 for	 “affecting	 interstate	 commerce,”	Congress	 could	 regulate	 almost	 anything—including	 “quilting	bees,	 clothes	drives,	and	potluck	suppers	 throughout	 the	50	States,”142	 in	 the	words	of	 Justice	Clarence	
                                                                                                                                            
motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters for the legislative judgment upon the 
exercise of which the Constitution places no restriction, and over which the courts are given no control.”  
Id. at 115.  “Whatever their motive and purpose, regulations of commerce which do not infringe some 
constitutional prohibition are within the plenary power conferred on Congress by the Commerce 
Clause.” Id. at 115. 
139 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). The allotment was calculated under the 1938 Agricultural 
Adjustment Act; the penalty in question was imposed by a 1941 amendment to the Act. Id.  
The Act explicitly regulated not only wheat produced for sale, but that intended to feed animals that 
would then be sold or otherwise exchanged. Id. at 118–19 (citing the Act).  Mr. Filburn’s principal business 
seems to have been the sale of milk, poultry and eggs from his own cows and chickens, but he also grew a 
relatively small amount of wheat, some of which he sold and some of which he used as seed for the next 
crop, animal feed, and to make flour for his family.  Id. at 114.  “The intended disposition of the crop here 
involved has not been expressly stated.”  Id.  The challenge was based on the (unstated) portion of the crop 
intended for consumption on Filburn’s farm, not the part intended for sale. 
140 Id. at 119.  The farmer’s case raised a question beyond that answered in Darby, because the Act 
“extend[ed] federal regulation to production not intended in any part for commerce but wholly for 
consumption on the farm.”  Id. at 118.  The case also challenged the Act on Fifth Amendment due process 
grounds, which were discussed and dismissed elsewhere in the opinion. Id. at 129–31. 
141 Id. at 128.  A farmer could use his own wheat to “forestall resort to the market by producing to meet 
his own needs.” Id. at 127.  In other words, “[h]ome-grown wheat…competes with wheat in commerce.”  
Id. at 128. Taken in total, the Court argued, “[i]t can hardly be denied that a factor of such volume and 
variability as home-consumed wheat would have a substantial influence on price and market conditions.”  
Id.  “This may arise because being in marketable condition such wheat overhangs the market and, if 
induced by rising prices, tends to flow into the market and check price increases. But if we assume that it is 
never marketed, it supplies a need of the man who grew it which would otherwise be reflected by purchases 
in the open market.”  Id.  “[E]ven if appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be regarded as 
commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic 
effect on interstate commerce.” Id. at 125.   
142 Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 43 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thomas’s dissent is in line with 
calls from conservative commentators who have decried the broad scope of federal power permitted by the 
New Deal cases.  See, e.g., David F. Forte, Commerce, Commerce Everywhere: The Uses and Abuses of the 
Commerce Clause, HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Jan. 18, 2011), 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/01/commerce-commerce-everywhere-the-uses-and-abuses-
of-the-commerce-clause (urging Congress to join the Supreme Court in reining in the scope of the interstate 
Commerce Clause). 
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Thomas—under	its	commerce	power.143	Within	the	past	twenty	years,	the	Supreme	Court	has	retrenched	somewhat	on	the	scope	of	the	authority	granted	to	the	federal	government	through	the	interstate	Commerce	Clause.	 	 In	United	 States	 v.	Lopez,144	 the	Court	 held	 that	 an	 attempt	 by	Congress	 to	 ban	 the	 possession	 of	 guns	 in	 school	 zones	 exceeded	 congressional	power	under	 the	 interstate	Commerce	Clause,	 reining	 in	 the	 commerce	power	 for	the	 first	 time	 since	 the	 New	 Deal.	 	 Justice	 Rehnquist,	 writing	 for	 the	 majority,	distinguished	 the	 law	 at	 issue,	 a	 criminal	 statute,	 from	 Congress’s	 restrictions	 on	home-grown	wheat	at	issue	in	Wickard.	 	He	characterizes	Wickard	as	“perhaps	the	most	 far	 reaching	example	of	Commerce	Clause	authority	over	 intrastate	activity,”	but	states	that	 it	still	“involved	economic	activity	in	a	way	that	the	possession	of	a	gun	in	a	school	zone	does	not.”145		In	 Lopez,	 Justice	 Rehnquist	 offers	 three	 options	 for	 congressional	 action	 that	could	be	authorized	by	 the	 interstate	Commerce	Clause:	 	 regulation	of	 “the	use	of	the	 channels	 of	 interstate	 commerce,”146	 “the	 instrumentalities	 of	 interstate	commerce,	 or	 persons	 or	 things	 in	 interstate	 commerce,”147	 or,	 finally,	 “activity	[that]	 ‘substantially	affects’	 interstate	 commerce.”148	The	 law	at	 issue	 in	Lopez	 fell	only	 in	 the	 third	 category.	 	 Although	 the	 briefs	 and	 dissenting	 justices	 presented	empirical	evidence	of	 the	aggregate	 impact	of	guns	 in	school	zones	on	educational	opportunity,	arguing	that	the	damage	to	the	national	economy	and	productivity	was	substantial,149	Justice	Rehnquist	dismisses	those	arguments	as	too	attenuated.150	He	identifies	 the	 target	 of	 the	 regulation	 as	 noneconomic,	 noncommercial,	 purely	criminal	 activity.151	 	 If	 aggregation	 of	 this	 sort	 activates	 Congress’s	 power	 to	legislate	 under	 the	 Commerce	 Clause,	 he	 states,	 “it	 is	 difficult	 to	 perceive	 any	
                                                
143 One additional development in the 1960s is worth note.  In Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 
(1964), commonly known as the “Ollie’s Barbecue” case, the Supreme Court faced a private restaurant that 
openly discriminated against African Americans.  Such discrimination in privately-owned public 
accommodation had been barred in 1964 by Congress through Title II of the Civil Rights Act.  The Court 
upheld the Act against the restaurant’s challenge, making clear that it saw the protection of human dignity 
in commerce as part of Congress’s constitutional mandate, even without considering the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  In support of this view, Justice Clark’s majority opinion in Heart of Atlanta noted that “[t]he 
Senate Commerce Committee made it quite clear that the fundamental object of Title II was to vindicate 
‘the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public 
establishments.’ At the same time, however, it noted that such an objective has been and could be readily 
achieved ‘by congressional action based on the commerce power of the Constitution.’” Heart of Atlanta, 
379 U.S. at 250 (citing S.Rep. No. 88-872 at 2371 (1964)). See also Justice Goldberg’s concurrence, 
linking Congress’s authority under the interstate Commerce Clause to the power to pass a statute affecting 
“the vindication of human dignity, and not mere economics.” Heart of Atlanta Motel at 292 (Goldberg, J., 
concurring; his concurrence also applied to Katzenbach  v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), with which 
Heart of Atlanta was consolidated.)   
144 514 U.S. 549 (1995) 
145 Id. at 560.  
146 Id. at 558.  
147 Id.  
148 Id. at 559.  
149 Id. at 563–64.  
150 Id. at 563–67.  
151 Id. at 560, 567.  
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limitation	 on	 federal	 power,	 even	 in	 areas	 such	 as	 criminal	 law	 enforcement	 or	education	 where	 States	 historically	 have	 been	 sovereign.”152	 The	 regulation	 of	firearms	on	school	grounds,	he	concludes,	does	not	meet	the	test.153			Five	years	later,	in	United	States	v.	Morrison,	the	Court	used	a	similar	rationale	to	 strike	 down	 a	 private	 right	 of	 action	 for	 domestic	 violence	 under	 the	 Violence	Against	 Women	 Act.154	 	 Again,	 in	 Morrison,	 the	 parties	 and	 dissents	 presented	statistics	demonstrating	the	impact	on	the	national	economy	from	violent	attacks	on	women,	seeking	to	demonstrate	a	substantial	effect	on	commerce.155	Again,	 Justice	Rehnquist	 held	 that	 noneconomic	 activities	 such	 as	 violence	 against	 a	 particular	group	 could	 not	 be	 aggregated	 to	 reach	 a	 level	 of	 impact	 on	 interstate	 commerce	that	justified	Congress’s	intervention.156		Justice	Rehnquist	particularly	emphasized	the	need	to	be	vigilant	about	the	reach	of	the	Commerce	Clause	in	order	to	avoid	the	federal	government	encroaching	on	the	traditional	spheres	of	state	autonomy.157	In	Gonzalez	 v.	Raich,158	 however,	 the	 Court	 returned	 to	 the	Wickard	 standard	permitting	aggregation	of	economic	activity—including	activity	that	on	its	face	was	private	and	noncommercial.		In	Raich,	a	case	about	medical	marijuana,	the	question	was	 whether	 Congress’s	 Controlled	 Substances	 Act,	 which	 criminalized	 the	possession	of	marijuana,	could	override	California’s	statute	permitting	the	seriously	ill	 to	 grow	 and	 use	 marijuana	 pursuant	 to	 a	 valid	 prescription.	 	 Writing	 for	 the	majority,	Justice	Stevens	approvingly	cited	Wickard’s	holding	that	“even	if	appellee's	activity	 be	 local	 and	 though	 it	 may	 not	 be	 regarded	 as	 commerce,	 it	 may	 still,	whatever	its	nature,	be	reached	by	Congress	if	it	exerts	a	substantial	economic	effect	on	interstate	commerce.”159		Reasoning	that	the	local	use	had	a	meaningful	effect	on	the	interstate	commercial	market	for	marijuana,	the	Court	noted	that	an	individual	marijuana	 patch	was	much	 like	wheat	 grown	 for	 personal	 use.160	 	 It	 rejected	 the	argument	that	medical	marijuana	fell	outside	the	national	market	for	the	drug.		“We	have	never	required	Congress	to	legislate	with	scientific	exactitude.		When	Congress	decides	that	the	‘total	incidence’	of	a	practice	poses	a	threat	to	a	national	market,	it	may	 regulate	 the	 entire	 class.”161	 The	 situation	 fell	 within	 Congress’s	 power	 to	regulate	local	“activities	that	substantially	affect	interstate	commerce.”162	The	court	emphasized,	however,	 that	 its	decision	 to	permit	 the	Controlled	Substances	Act	 to	override	 California’s	 regulation	 of	 medical	 marijuana	 rested	 in	 part	 on	 the	extensiveness	and	coherence	of	the	federal	regulatory	scheme.163	
                                                
152 Id. at 564.  
153 Id. at 561.   
154 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).  
155 See, e.g., id. 631–34 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
156 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617.   
157 Id. at 644.   
158 545 U.S. 1 (2005).  
159 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (cited in Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 14 (2005)). 
160 Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. at 15.  
161 Id. at 14 (citations omitted).  
162 The Court has since held that all aspects of drug dealing affect interstate Commerce Clause. See 
Taylor v. United States, 579 U.S. __ (2016), slip op. at 6. 
163 Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. at 24 (2005) (“[T]he subdivided class of activities defined by the Court 
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IV.	 	The	 Argument	 for	 Rooting	 the	 Immigration	 Power	 in	 the	 Commerce	
Clause	Today		
A. Immigration	as	an	Economic	Activity	Most	 immigration	 to	 the	United	 States	 is	 economic	 in	motivation	 and	 impact.	The	majority	of	immigrants	come	to	the	United	States	in	search	of	better	economic	opportunities,	and	their	presence	is	felt	in	local,	state,	and	national	job	markets.	In	2015	 there	 were	 twenty-six	 million	 immigrants	 in	 the	 United	 States	 labor	 force,	representing	16.7%	of	all	workers	in	the	country.164		This	is	the	highest	percentage	of	 foreign-born	 individuals	 in	 the	 workforce	 since	 the	 U.S.	 Census	 Bureau	 began	collecting	such	data.165	In	certain	industries,	the	percentage	is	even	higher.		28%	of	construction	trade	workers,166	31%	of	accommodation	workers,167	and	71%	of	crop	workers	 are	 foreign-born.168	 In	 particular	 localities	 and	 occupations,	 immigrant	
                                                                                                                                            
of Appeals [ie medical marijuana, the part that plaintiffs argued was not related to commerce] was an 
essential part of the larger regulatory scheme.”). “One need not have a degree in economics to understand 
why a nationwide exemption for the vast quantity of marijuana (or other drugs) locally cultivated for 
personal use (which presumably would include use by friends, neighbors, and family members) may have a 
substantial impact on the interstate market for this extraordinarily popular substance.” Id. at 26.  
 No discussion of contemporary Interstate Commerce Clause jurisprudence is complete without 
mention of National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), regarding the 
lawfulness of the Affordable Care Act, in which a majority of justices agreed that the individual health 
insurance mandate of that Act was invalid because the Commerce Clause does not authorize Congress to 
regulate economic inactivity. Sebelius majority opinion at 2589; Scalia/Alito/Kennedy/Thomas dissent. I do 
not focus here on Sebelius because it is less relevant for my argument than Lopez, Morrison, and Raich. 
164 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Characteristics of Foreign-born Workers Summary, U.S. 
DEP’T OF LABOR (May 19, 2016), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/forbrn.nr0.htm. 
165 Daniel White, Foreign-Born Workforce at a Two Decade High, TIME (May 20, 2016), 
http://time.com/4343274/foreign-born-labor-data-2015/. In 1970, immigrants made up 5% of the 
population and 5% of the labor force; by 2010 they were 13% of the population and 16% of the labor force. 
See PARTNERSHIP FOR A NEW AMERICAN ECONOMY, IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN THE U.S. LABOR FORCE 2 
(2012), http://www.renewoureconomy.org/sites/all/themes/pnae/img/Immigrant_Workers_Brookings.pdf.    
The percentage of immigrations as a proportion of the total population is approaching the historic 
highs of nearly 15% at the turn of the nineteenth century. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Foreign-Born 
Workers: Labor Force Characteristics—2015, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (May 19, 2016), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/forbrn.pdf at 3. In absolute numbers the country has never seen 
numbers of foreign-born residents remotely approaching that of the past decade. In 1920, for example, at 
the end of the Golden Era, the foreign born population stood at 13.9 million; in 2010 it was 40 million. Id.  
166NAHB Economics, Immigrant Workers in the Construction Labor Force, HOUSINGECONOMICS.COM 
(Feb. 3, 2015),  
https://www.nahbclassic.org/generic.aspx?sectionID=734&genericContentID=241345&channelID=311.   
167 PARTNERSHIP FOR A NEW AMERICAN ECONOMY, IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN THE U.S. LABOR FORCE 
5 (2012), http://www.renewoureconomy.org/sites/all/themes/pnae/img/Immigrant_Workers_Brookings.pdf. 
Accommodation workers include hotel maids and janitors. 
168 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERV., Immigration and the Rural Workforce,  
https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/in-the-news/immigration-and-the-rural-workforce.aspx.  In specific 
immigrant-heavy states and/or occupations, the percentage of immigrants is considerably higher. See, e.g., 
Christian González-Rivera, Where Immigrant New Yorkers Go to Work—Top Occupations by Share of 
Foreign-Born Workers, CENTER FOR AN URBAN FUTURE (Oct. 2016), https://nycfuture.org/data/immigrant-
workers-data-brief#1 (analyzing concentration of immigrants in a range of occupations within New York 
City). While immigrants are disproportionately represented in the service industries that are less of an 
obvious fit with the traditional definition of interstate commerce, more than three-quarters of them work 
outside the service sector, in industries from commercial agriculture that put goods in the stream of 
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concentrations	 are	 even	 higher:	 for	 example,	 almost	 74%	 of	 young	 Silicon	 Valley	computer	 and	 mathematical	 workers,	 169	 and	 between	 77–91%	 of	 less-skilled	construction	workers	in	New	York	City,	depending	on	their	trade,	are	immigrants.170			In	 truth,	 a	 relatively	 small	proportion	of	permanent	 residents	are	admitted	 to	the	United	States	on	 the	basis	of	 employment.171	 	Temporary	visas	permitting	 the	holder	to	work	 in	the	United	States	are	much	more	common.172	 	But	whatever	the	category	through	which	they	enter—including	as	refugees,	as	family	members	of	US	permanent	residents	or	citizens,	or	without	authorization173—almost	all	immigrants	in	the	United	States	are	denied	access	to	public	benefits,	and	must	seek	employment	in	order	to	support	themselves	and	their	dependents.174		Immigrants	participate	in	
                                                                                                                                            
interstate commerce, to manufacturing (17% of the foreign-born workforce is in the manufacturing sector: 
Elizabeth Grieco & Brian Ray, Mexican Immigrants in the U.S. Labor Force, MIGRATION POLICY 
INSTITUTE (Mar. 1, 2004), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/mexican-immigrants-us-labor-force.)  
169 2016 Index News Release, JOINT VENTURE SILICON VALLEY (Feb. 10, 2016), 
http://www.jointventure.org/2016-index-news-release.  
170 Christian González-Rivera, Where Immigrant New Yorkers Go to Work — Top Occupations by 
Share of Foreign-Born Workers, CENTER FOR AN URBAN FUTURE (Oct. 2016), 
https://nycfuture.org/data/immigrant-workers-data-brief#1. 
171 In FY 2015, approximately 144,000 individuals were admitted to permanent residence through the 
employment-based categories. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Table 6. Persons Obtaining Lawful 
Permanent Resident Status By Type And Major Class of Admission: Fiscal Years 2013 To 2015 (2016),  
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015/table6#. 
172 A reliable recent analysis places the number of temporary work visas issued in 2013 at 1.42 million. 
Daniel Costa & Jennifer Rosenbaum, Temporary foreign workers by the numbers, ECONOMIC POLICY 
INSTITUTE (March 7, 2017), http://www.epi.org/publication/temporary-foreign-workers-by-the-numbers-
new-estimates-by-visa-classification/.   
173 In FY 2015, the last for which statistics are available, the Department of Homeland Security reports 
that the United States admitted 1,051,031 immigrants to permanent residence in the following categories: 
Immediate Relatives:  465,068 
Family-sponsored:  213,910 
Employment-based:  144,047 
Refugee:   118,431 
Asylee:   33,564 
“Diversity” lottery:  47,934 
(fewer than 30,000 via other categories) 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Table 6. Persons Obtaining Lawful Permanent Resident Status By Type 
And Major Class of Admission: Fiscal Years 2013 To 2015 (2016),   https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-
statistics/yearbook/2015/table6#.  
In 2013 (the most recent for which analysts have complete data), approximately 1.42 million 
noncitizens entered the United States on temporary visas primarily granted for work purposes. See Daniel 
Costa & Jennifer Rosenbaum, Temporary foreign workers by the numbers, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE 
(March 7, 2017), http://www.epi.org/publication/temporary-foreign-workers-by-the-numbers-new-
estimates-by-visa-classification/.  The authors note that this represents approximately 1% of the United 
States work force.  
Finally, the Pew Charitable Trust estimates that 350,000 undocumented immigrants entered the United 
States in 2015. Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, Unauthorized immigrant population stable for half a 
decade, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (September 21, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2016/09/21/unauthorized-immigrant-population-stable-for-half-a-decade/.  Pew estimates the total 
undocumented population in 2015 at 11.1 million. Jens Manual Krogstad, Jeffrey Passel & D’Vera Cohn, 5 
facts about illegal immigration in the U.S., PEW RESEARCH CENTER (April 27, 2017),  
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/27/5-facts-about-illegal-immigration-in-the-u-s/.  
174 In broad strokes: with the exception of refugees, all legal permanent residents are ineligible for 
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the	labor	force	at	rates	higher	than	their	native	counterparts:	they	make	up	13%	of	the	 total	 population	 but	 nearly	 17%	 of	 workers.175	 	 They	 are	 also	 unusually	economically	 active	 as	 entrepreneurs	 and	 small	 business	 owners,	 launching	 new	enterprises	at	 twice	 the	 rate	of	 the	native-born.176	 	 From	 the	perspective	of	many	foreign	 governments	 in	 immigrant-origin	 countries,	 meanwhile,	 remittances	 from	emigrants	working	in	the	United	States	are	a	major	source	of	GDP.177			The	 Supreme	 Court	 itself	 has	 not	 infrequently	 referenced	 control	 of	 the	domestic	 job	market	 as	 an	 important	purpose	of	 and	 justification	 for	 immigration	regulation,	 including	 with	 regard	 to	 aspects	 of	 immigration	 law	 that	 make	 no	mention	of	employment.178			
B. The	Foreign	Commerce	Clause	Argument	In	many	ways,	 then,	 immigration	is	a	prototypical	economic	activity	with	both	domestic	and	international	impact.		But	under	a	contemporary	understanding	of	the	Commerce	Clause,	is	immigration	commerce?		At	 first	 glance,	 the	 foreign	 Commerce	 Clause	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 more	 obvious	modern	source	of	the	immigration	power	than	its	domestic	counterpart.		Today,	it	is	not	uncommon	for	federal	courts	to	note	that	the	immigration	power	“derives	from	many	sources,”179	including	the	foreign	Commerce	Clause.180	While	this	recital	has	a	
                                                                                                                                            
means-tested federal benefits for five years after admission.  Temporary immigrants and undocumented 
immigrants are barred from almost all federal benefits.  For a detailed overview of these rules, see National 
Immigration Law Center, Overview of Immigrant Eligibility for Federal Programs (December 2015), 
https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/overview-immeligfedprograms-2015-12-09.pdf. 
President Trump has suggested that he will tighten these restrictions further. See Draft Executive Order on 
Protecting Taxpayer Resources by Ensuring Our Immigration Laws Promote Accountability and 
Responsibility (Jan. 23, 2017),  http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/national/draft-executive-
orders-on-immigration/2315/.  
175 The Pew Charitable Trusts, Immigrants in the Workforce, State by State and Industry by Industry, 
THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/immigrants-in-the-
workforce-state-by-state-and-industry-by-industry/458775/.  By contrast, in 1970 immigrants were 5% of 
the population and 5% of the labor force. See Audrey Singer, Immigrant Workers in the U.S. Labor Force, 
BROOKINGS (Mar. 15, 2012), https://www.brookings.edu/research/immigrant-workers-in-the-u-s-labor-
force/. 
176 Dane Stangler & Jason Wiens, The Economic Case for Welcoming Immigrant Entrepreneurs, 
EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUNDATION (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.kauffman.org/what-we-
do/resources/entrepreneurship-policy-digest/the-economic-case-for-welcoming-immigrant-entrepreneurs.  
177 World Bank, Migration and Remittances Fact Book 2016, 
https://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1199807908806/4549025-
1450455807487/Factbookpart1.pdf.  “Migrants are now sending earnings back to their families in 
developing countries at levels above US$441 billion, a figure three times the volume of official aid flows.” 
Id. at iv.  “In 2015, the top recipient countries of recorded remittances were India, China, the Philippines, 
Mexico, and France. As a share of GDP, however, smaller countries such as Tajikistan (42 percent)// the 
Kyrgyz Republic (30 percent), Nepal (29 percent), Tonga (28 percent), and Moldova (26 percent) were the 
largest recipients.” Id. at v-vi. Worldwide, “The United States is by far the largest [source of remittances], 
with an estimated $ 56.3 billion in recorded outflows in 2014.”  Id. at vi. 
178 See discussion in Part IV.D.2, infra. 
179 Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982). 
180 See, e.g., Id. at 10 (“Federal authority to regulate the status of aliens derives from various sources, 
including the Federal Government’s . . . power ‘[t]o regulate commerce with Foreign Nation’”); Korab v. 
Fink, 797 F. 3d 572, 593 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Korab v. MacManaman, 135 S. Ct. 472 
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rote	 quality,	 as	 it	 is	 rarely	 accompanied	 by	 an	 affirmative	 argument	 that	 the	Commerce	Clause	does	or	should	undergird	the	immigration	power,181	it	would	not	be	difficult	 to	make	 such	an	assertion.182	 	 Immigration	 is	 the	movement	of	people	from	other	countries	 into	the	United	States,	where	most	will	work.	 	 It	 is	of	critical	economic	 importance	 to	 many	 foreign	 governments	 because	 of	 the	 remittances	migrants	 send	 home	 from	 the	 United	 States,	 and	 to	 this	 country	 because	 of	 its	reliance	 on	 immigrants	 to	 fill	 particular	 categories	 of	 jobs	 in	 both	 low-	 and	 high-wage	 sectors.	 	 The	 prior	 line	 of	 cases	 tying	 the	 immigration	 power	 to	 foreign	commerce	 remains	 available	 to	 draw	on,	 having	 never	 been	 explicitly	 rejected	 by	the	Court.183		Recognizing	 the	 relationship	 between	 foreign	 commerce	 and	 immigration	would	not,	however,	clear	the	field	of	obstacles.			 As	 a	 preliminary	 matter,	 the	Commerce	 Clause	 grants	 power	 only	 to	 Congress,	 not	 the	 Executive	 Branch.	 As	Adam	 Cox	 and	 Cristina	 Rodriguez	 point	 out	 in	 their	 article,	 The	 President	 and	
Immigration	 Law,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 has	 at	 times	 stated	 that	 the	 Executive	 has	inherent	 authority	 over	 immigration,	 independent	 of	 Congress.184	 	 If	 rooting	 the	immigration	 authority	 in	 the	 Commerce	 Clause	 would	 facilitate	 greater	 judicial	review	of	legislative	but	not	presidential	action,	a	critical	part	of	immigration	policy	would	be	left	behind	under	the	plenary	power	doctrine,	providing	no	answer	to	the	currently	 pressing	 questions	 about	 the	 legality	 of	 presidential	 actions	 on	immigration.			The	simplest	response	to	this	concern	is	to	note	that	in	contemporary	times,	the	Executive	 is	granted	most	of	 its	 immigration	power	by	statute.	Cox	and	Rodriguez	observe	that	this	delegated	authority	is	extensive:	among	other	elements,	it	includes	
                                                                                                                                            
(2014) (mem.).   For an examination of the very few instances in which federal courts mention the 
interstate Commerce Clause in relation to the immigration power, see infra Part IV.C.2.   
181 See, e.g., United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 991 & n.4 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d 641 F.3d 
339 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012), and aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 689 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that the federal 
government has broad and exclusive authority to regulate immigration, supported by both enumerated and 
implied constitutional powers. . . . A variety of enumerated powers implicate the federal government’s 
long-recognized immigration power, including the Commerce Clause, the Naturalization Clause, and the 
Migration and Importation Clause.”) (citing relevant constitutional provisions, Fong Yue Ting v. United 
States, 149 U.S. 698, 706 (1893), and Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603–04 (1889)). 
182 Several scholars touch on the idea as a part of broader analyses, including  T. Alexander Aleinikoff, 
Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution,  83 AM. J. INT’L LAW 862, 864, 866 (1989) (“The power 
to regulate the admission and residence of aliens may be securely located in the commerce power or 
implied from a structural analysis of the Constitution.”); Balkin, supra note 8, at 26–27 (comparing the 
commerce power to the naturalization power: “But there is a far more obvious source of the power to 
regulate the flow of populations across the nation’s borders: it is the commerce power . . . The eighteenth-
century definition of commerce as ‘intercourse’ or ‘exchange’ among different peoples easily encompasses 
immigration and emigration of populations for any purpose, whether economic or noneconomic.”);  
Legomsky, supra note 46, at 186; Chin, supra note 8, at 56–57. 
183 See discussion supra Part III.A. 
184 Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 38, at 462–63 and passim.  The existence of the President’s 
independent immigration authority is reinforced by two major instances the authors recount in which the 
President has acted inconsistently with congressional instructions, and that action has either been 
unchallenged or been upheld by the Court.  Id., at 483-528. 
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prosecutorial	 discretion	 to	 decide	 whether	 or	 not	 to	 pursue	 the	 deportation	 of	noncitizens	within	 the	 categories	 for	 removal	 established	by	 the	 Immigration	 and	Nationality	Act,	which	the	authors	estimate	to	affect	about	a	third	of	the	noncitizens	present	in	the	United	States.185		Were	the	Commerce	Clause	to	be	understood	as	the	source	of	 the	 immigration	power,	 federal	courts	could	review	the	constitutionality	of	Congress’s	instructions,	and	then	of	the	President’s	actions	pursuant	to	them.		An	equally	critical	concern	is	whether	re-rooting	the	immigration	power	in	the	foreign	 Commerce	 Clause	 with	 the	 goal	 of	 granting	 immigrants	 greater	 access	 to	constitutional	rights	would	merely	trade	one	plenary	power	for	another.		In	Gibbons	
v.	Ogden,	Justice	Marshall	famously	states	that	the	Commerce	Clause	power,	“like	all	others	 vested	 in	 Congress,	 is	 complete	 in	 itself,	 may	 be	 exercised	 to	 its	 utmost	extent,	 and	 acknowledges	 no	 limitations	 other	 than	 are	 prescribed	 in	 the	Constitution.”186		 This	 oft-quoted	 line	 appears	 to	 assert	 plenary	 status	 for	Congressional	action	under	the	foreign	Commerce	Clause.			The	cases	that	link	the	immigration	power	to	the	foreign	Commerce	Clause	are	of	 little	 help	 in	 grasping	 the	 appropriate	 standard	 of	 review.	 	 They	 are	 over	 a	century	old,	with	no	real	judicial	consideration	of	the	question	in	the	interim.		They	are	 also	 contradictory.	 In	 two	 immigration	 cases	 just	 before	 and	 after	 the	Chinese	
Exclusion	Case,	 both	based	on	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 federal	 immigration	power	derived	 from	 the	 foreign	 commerce	 clause,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 considered	 this	question	and	reached	opposing	conclusions.			In	Chew	Heong	v.	United	States,187	the	Supreme	Court	was	explicit	in	stating	that	the	 immigration	 power,	 rooted	 in	 the	 foreign	 Commerce	 Clause,	 was	 subject	 to	judicial	 review.	 Like	 the	 Chinese	 Exclusion	 Case	 five	 years	 later,	 Chew	 Heong	challenged	 aspects	 of	 the	 Chinese	 Exclusion	 Act	 as	 in	 violation	 of	 an	 1880	 treaty	through	which	the	US	promised	Chinese	citizens	present	before	the	Act	the	ability	to	“go	and	come	of	their	own	free	will.”188	 	In	the	Chinese	Exclusion	Case,	 Justice	Field	would	dismiss	this	treaty	as	irrelevant,	invalidated	by	the	Act’s	subsequent	passage.			For	 Justice	 Harlan,	 however,	 considering	 the	 question	 in	 light	 of	 a	 federal	immigration	 power	 derived	 from	 the	 foreign	 Commerce	 Clause,	 the	 Court	 had	 an	obligation	 to	 read	 Congress’s	 later	 action	 as	 consistent	 with	 the	 treaty,	 thus	
                                                
185 Id. at 463–65.  Cox and Rodriguez argue that about a third of noncitizens present in the United 
States fall within a deportation category and can be removed at the discretion of the president.  Id. at 463.  
They describe this as an ex-post screening system that “operates as a substitute for front-end policymaking 
power; both are possible methods of achieving a particular size and composition of immigrants.”  Id. at 
464. 
186 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196 (1824).  
187 Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884).  In Chew Heong, the underlying statute was the 
1882 Chinese Exclusion Act and its amendments in 1884, and the challenged provision was its requirement 
of a certificate of reentry for Chinese noncitizens who had departed the United States but had been in the 
country prior to the passage of the Act, and now sought to return, including Chew Heong.  (This was prior 
to the 1888 amendments to the Act, at issue in Chae Chan Ping, which voided all such certificates.)  Chew 
Heong had been outside the country when the requirement arose, and thus was not able to obtain the 
required certificate.   
188 Immigration Treaty of 1880, U.S.-China, art. II, Nov. 17, 1880, 22 Stat. 826. Quoted in Lindsay, 
supra note 8, at 29; for discussion of this case see id. at 29–31.  
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requiring	 that	 Chew	 Heong	 be	 permitted	 to	 return	 to	 the	 United	 States.	 	 Justice	Harlan	characterized	Congress’s	use	of	the	immigration	power	as	a	potential	threat	to	 sovereignty—not	 an	 exercise	 of	 it	 as	 in	 the	 Chinese	 Exclusion	 Case—unless	 it	could	be	limited	by	the	Courts.189		In	 Oceanic	 Steam	 Navigation	 v.	 Stranahan,	 decided	 twenty	 years	 after	 the	
Chinese	 Exclusion	 Case,	 the	 Court	 takes	 a	 different	 position.190	 	 In	 that	 case,	addressed	 in	 more	 depth	 above,	 a	 challenge	 to	 the	 constitutionality	 of	 a	 federal	immigration	statute,	the	Court	does	not	mention	the	Chinese	Exclusion	Case,	foreign	affairs,	or	the	matter	of	sovereignty.		It	discusses	the	immigration	power	solely	as	a	derivative	 of	 the	 foreign	 Commerce	 Clause.	 	 And	 yet,	 it	 repeatedly	 says	 that	Congress’s	power	over	immigration	is	“absolute”	and	“plenary.”	Oceanic	Steam,	not	the	Chinese	 Exclusion	 Case,	 provides	 the	 oft-cited	 assertion	 regarding	 immigration	that	 “over	 no	 conceivable	 subject	 is	 the	 legislative	 power	 of	 Congress	 more	complete.”191	Relying	on	Oceanic	Steam,	Kif	Augustine-Adams	has	thus	argued	that	“Grounding	 the	 power	 to	 exclude	 aliens	 in	 the	 Foreign	 Commerce	 Clause,	 rather	than	in	sovereignty,	may	be	a	starting	point	for	applying	constitutional	protections	in	immigration	law.		It	is	not,	however,	an	entirely	clean	beginning.”192			Nonetheless,	 most	 other	 scholars	 who	 have	 considered	 the	 question	 offer	 a	more	 optimistic	 assessment	 of	 the	 standard	 of	 constitutional	 review	 that	 would	attend	a	renewed	 link	between	the	 foreign	Commerce	Clause	and	the	 immigration	power.193	 	Cases	outside	the	 immigration	arena	make	clear	that	Congress’s	actions	
                                                
189 Lindsay, supra note 8, at 31. “Notwithstanding its expansive scope . . . the federal immigration 
power of the 1870s and 1880s remained a creature of and subject to the U.S. Constitution.” Id. at 23. 
190 Augustine-Adams, supra note 8, at 719–21. “In sum, Supreme Court jurisprudence has limited 
congressional power under the Domestic Commerce Clause, but that case law does not address the scope of 
the Foreign Commerce Clause.” Id. at 719 [citations omitted] “Even when recognizing the Foreign 
Commerce Clause as a basis for congressional control over immigration, the Supreme Court has refused to 
apply the Bill of Rights to a noncitizen’s claim to remain in the United//States.”  Id. at 719-720 (citing 
United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 290 (1904)). In Turner, the Court relies on the 
Chinese Exclusion Case in rejecting challenge to a federal statute excluding/deporting noncitizen 
anarchists, saying that Congress’s decision was “‘not open to constitutional objection,’” and says that it 
would have reached same result under foreign Commerce Clause analysis.  Turner, 194 U.S. at 290.  
191Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909).  Furthering this concern, 
see, e.g., Lopez v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Services, 758 F.2d 1390, 1392 (10th Cir. 1985): 
“Although in the present case the INS acts pursuant to the immigration clause of Article I, S. 9 rather than 
the Commerce Clause, congressional authority under both clauses is plenary.” (citation omitted to 
Kleindienst v. Mandel at 766—although that case does not, in fact, mention commerce.)  
192 Augustine-Adams, supra note 8, at 721.  She elaborates: “While there may be no question that the 
Bill of Rights limits Congress’ authority under the Domestic Commerce Clause, the answer is far from 
clear with respect to the Foreign Commerce Clause.” Id. at 719. 
193 See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J. 
INT’L LAW 862, 866 (1989) (acknowledging that “the commerce power has been labelled ‘plenary.’ . . . 
[But] [e]liminating the talk of sovereignty and inherent power [present in the immigration plenary power 
doctrine] ought to help decision makers recognize that the immigration power does not stand above or 
before the Constitution.”); Chin, supra note 8, at 56–57 (“Because there is no question that the commerce 
authority is limited by the Bill of Rights, if the Court reverted to its original theory of immigration power, 
constitutional immigration law would be brought in to the mainstream.”); Lindsay, supra note 8, at 55 
(“Recasting the federal immigration power as but one instance of Congress’s ‘plenary’ power to regulate 
commerce, for example, would carry with it a presumption that regulations of immigrants and immigration 
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under	the	foreign	commerce	power	are	subject	to	constitutional	review.		The	sweep	of	the	Supreme	Court’s	pronouncements	on	the	question	is	typified	by	its	assertion	in	Buckley	v.	Valeo194	that	“Congress	has	plenary	authority	in	all	areas	in	which	it	has	substantive	legislative	jurisdiction,	so	long	as	the	exercise	of	that	authority	does	not	offend	some	other	constitutional	restriction.”195		Justice	Marshall,	of	course,	says	the	same	with	 specific	 reference	 to	 the	Commerce	Clause	 in	 the	Gibbons	quote	 above,	holding	 Congress’s	 power	 to	 legislate	 under	 the	 that	 clause	 “acknowledges	 no	limitations	other	than	are	prescribed	in	the	Constitution.”196		This	line	of	cases	offers	support	 for	 the	 claims	 by	 Alexander	 Aleinikoff,	 Jack	 Chin,	 Sarah	 Cleveland,	 and	others,	that	while	the	foreign	commerce	power	may	be	plenary,	it	is	still	subject	to	baseline	constitutional	constraints—and	would	remain	so	even	in	the	 immigration	context.197			
C. The	Interstate	Commerce	Clause	Argument	1. Immigration	 in	 Relation	 to	 Modern	 Interstate	 Commerce	 Clause	Jurisprudence	The	argument	 that	 the	 regulation	of	 immigration	 falls	within	 the	ambit	of	 the	interstate	Commerce	Clause	has	barely	been	made	by	litigants	or	courts,	much	less	gained	 traction.	 	 Despite	 the	 door	 that	 Darby	 and	Wickard	would	 seem	 to	 have	opened	to	understanding	immigration	as	a	part	of	interstate	commerce,	not	a	single	federal	 circuit	 court	 case	 since	 they	 were	 decided	 cites	 them	 for	 that	 purpose.	Academics	have	been	similarly	silent.		Like	courts,	although	scholars	and	advocates	have	 amply	 criticized	 the	 origins	 and	 impact	 of	 the	 plenary	 power	 doctrine,	 and	some	academics	in	passing	have	argued	for	consideration	of	the	foreign	Commerce	Clause	 as	 a	 source	 of	 the	 immigration	 power,198	 none	 have	 contended	 that	 the	interstate	Commerce	Clause	should	stand	alone	or	alongside	the	foreign	Commerce	Clause	as	a	source	of	the	immigration	power.			If	 this	 argument	 was	 not	 made	 when	 Wickard	 was	 the	 last	 word	 on	 the	interstate	Commerce	Clause,	 it	 seems	 less	 likely	 to	 gain	 traction	now,	 once	Lopez,	
Morrison,	 and	 Sebelius	 have	 narrowed	 the	 scope	 of	 interstate	 commerce.	 	 Yet,	 I	assert,	 this	more	 recent	 line	 of	 cases	 does	 not	 close	 the	 door	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 the	federal	 immigration	 power	 could	 be	 rooted	 in	 the	 interstate	 Commerce	 Clause.		Indeed,	 immigration	 law	more	 easily	 falls	within	 the	 restricted	 boundaries	 of	 the	Commerce	Clause	announced	 in	Lopez	and	Morrison	 than	either	guns	near	schools	or	 gender-based	 crimes	 of	 violence.	 	 I	 rely	 on	 three	 points	 in	 reaching	 this	
                                                                                                                                            
are subject to the same substantive, judicially enforceable constitutional norms as most other federal 
laws.”). 
194 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
195 Id. at 132 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 316 (1819)).  
196 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196 (1824) (emphasis added). 
197 See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 8, at 279 (2002) (“Since Gibbons v. Ogden, the federal commerce 
power has been recognized as ‘plenary,’ at least with respect to federal-state relations.  Yet Congress may 
not constitutionally exercise its authority under the commerce power to discriminate overtly on the basis of 
race, to deny basic First Amendment rights, or to violate other fundamental constitutional protections 
which are routinely waived in immigration cases.”); see also Lindsay, supra note 8, at 55.  
198 See sources cited supra note 8. 
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conclusion.	 	 First,	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 category	 at	 issue	 in	 Lopez	 and	 Morrison,	“whether	 the	 regulated	 activity	 ‘substantially	 affects’	 interstate	 commerce,”199	immigration	 is	 more	 fundamentally	 and	 directly	 an	 economic	 activity	 than	 guns	near	 schools	 or	 violence	 against	 women.	 	 In	 addition,	 and	 critically,	 immigration	does	 not	 raise	 the	 specter	 of	 federal	 infringement	 on	 traditional	 arenas	 of	 state	action	that	so	clearly	preoccupied	the	Court	in	those	two	cases.	Finally,	separate	and	apart	from	the	argument	that	immigration	substantially	affects	commerce,	it	should	also	be	considered	within	an	additional	category	announced	by	Rehnquist	in	Lopez:	the	regulation	of	“persons	or	things	in	interstate	commerce.”200			Regarding	the	link	between	commercial	activity	and	the	target	of	the	regulation,	in	Lopez	and	Morrison,	Justice	Rehnquist	rejects	what	he	terms	the	“‘costs	of	crime’	and	 ‘national	 productivity’	 arguments”201	 offered	 about	 the	 impact	 of	 guns	 near	schools	 and	 violence	 against	 women	 on	 the	 economy.	 	 He	 characterizes	 them	 as	“but-for	reasoning”202	that	would	open	the	doors	to	federal	regulation	of	just	about	anything,	including	in	spheres	traditionally	reserved	to	the	states.		For	immigration,	however,	 there	 is	 a	 strong	 case	 to	 be	 made	 that	 the	 regulated	 activity	 is	 itself	economic,	 with	 no	 causal	 arguments	 necessary.	 	 Again,	 immigrants	 are	 usually	economic	 actors	 whether	 or	 not	 their	 visa	 is	 granted	 under	 an	 employment	category.203	 	No	 less	 than	 those	who	enter	 after	being	 sponsored	by	an	employer,	refugees	and	those	who	are	admitted	as	siblings	of	citizens	must	work.204		There	are	exceptions,	 of	 course,	 but	 they	do	not	undermine	Congress’s	 authority	 to	 regulate	immigration	 under	 the	 interstate	 Commerce	 Clause.	 	 As	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 has	stated	“where	a	general	regulatory	statute	bears	a	substantial	relation	to	commerce,	the	de	minimis	 character	of	 individual	 instances	arising	under	 that	statute	 is	of	no	consequence.”205	Second,	immigration	presents	quite	a	different	picture	as	to	the	concern	in	both	
Lopez	 and	Morrison	 that	 an	 expansive	 understanding	 of	 the	 interstate	 Commerce	Clause	would	encroach	on	traditional	realms	of	state	power.	 	While	education	and	criminal	 law	 have	 historically	 (although	 perhaps	 less	 exclusively	 than	 Justice	Rehnquist	would	have	it)	been	governed	by	the	states,	immigration	is	a	traditional	subject	of	federal	regulation.206		To	declare	that	the	power	to	regulate	immigration	
                                                
199 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).  
200 Id. at 558.  
201 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612–13 (2000).  
202 Id. at 612.  
203 Also, recall that the test is not whether the challenged activities affect commerce, but could 
Congress have so concluded.  “We need not determine whether respondents’ activities, taken in the 
aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a “rational basis” exists for so 
concluding.” Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 19 (2005) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557).  “That the 
regulation ensnares some purely intrastate activity is of no moment. As we have done many times before, 
we refuse to excise individual components of that larger scheme.” Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 19.  
204 On refugees, see my arguments in “Refugees as Low-Wage Workers,” a work in progress. JG: Do 
you want to cite this as an unpublished work? Or a forthcoming publication? 
205 Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27 (1968), overruled on other grounds by Nat’l League of 
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
206 See supra Part II. 
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derives	 from	the	Commerce	Clause	would	not	 change	 the	180-year	understanding	that	 immigration	 is	 fundamentally	an	area	of	 federal	 control.207	 	 In	 that	 sense,	 the	immigration-as-interstate-commerce	argument	poses	little	threat	to	the	established	boundaries	between	 the	state	and	 the	 federal,	 the	policing	of	which	motivates	 the	Court’s	holdings	 in	Lopez	and	Morrison.	 	Rather,	 it	would	tie	an	area	of	admittedly	federal	 control	more	 closely	 to	 the	 Constitution,	 a	 development	 that	 would	 seem	normatively	 allied	with	 Justice	 Rehnquist’s	 emphasis	 in	Morrison	 that	 “Every	 law	enacted	by	Congress	must	be	based	on	one	or	more	of	its	powers	enumerated	in	the	Constitution.”208				Third,	while	 in	Lopez	 and	Morrison	 the	Court	 analyzed	 the	 law	at	hand	under	only	one	of	the	three	potential	categories	of	Commerce	Clause	regulation	announced	in	 Lopez—that	 related	 to	 “substantial	 effects	 on	 interstate	 commerce”209—in	 the	case	 of	 immigration,	 another	 of	 the	 options	 offers	 a	 distinct	 basis.	 	 A	 separate	category	announced	in	Lopez	includes	regulation	of	“persons	or	things	in	interstate	commerce,	 even	 though	 the	 threat	 may	 come	 only	 from	 intrastate	 activities.”210		Immigrants	would	seem	to	fit	this	description.		They	not	only	are	more	active	in	the	labor	market	than	natives,	but	more	mobile	between	states	in	response	to	changes	in	 demand.	 	 Recent	 studies	 of	 interstate	 migration	 in	 response	 to	 the	 Great	Recession	affirm	the	assertion	of	Harvard	economist	George	Borjas	some	years	ago	that	 “immigration	 greases	 the	 wheels	 of	 the	 labor	 market	 by	 injecting	 into	 the	economy	 a	 group	 of	 persons	 who	 are	 very	 responsive	 to	 regional	 differences	 in	economic	opportunities.”211		This	argument	is	bolstered	by	the	impact	of	immigrants	on	the	state	and	national	economies	noted	above.	Thus,	 under	 the	 test	 announced	 in	 Lopez	 and	 Morrison,	 there	 are	 viable	arguments	that	interstate	Commerce	Clause	can	undergird	the	federal	government’s	immigration	power.		Post-Raich,	however,	to	advance	the	position	that	immigration	falls	 under	 the	 interstate	 Commerce	 Clause,	 one	 must	 also	 contend	 that	 the	
                                                
207 None of this is to imply that all regulation affecting immigrants is reserved to the federal 
government.  The states have always retained their police powers with regard to governing immigrants, 
even as the scope of those powers has been interpreted differently over time.  See, e.g., Mayor of New York 
v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102 (1837); De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976); United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 
2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 132 S. 
Ct. 2492 (2012), and aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 689 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2012).  There is a rich literature on 
immigration federalism exploring the boundary between state and federal powers over immigration, 
particularly in the context of active state and local efforts over the past two decades to either protect 
immigrants from federal enforcement of immigration law or to enact measures more restrictive than federal 
immigration law. See, e.g., PRATHEEPAN GULASEKARAM AND S. KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN, THE NEW 
IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM (2015); Jennifer Chacon, The Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 577 (2012); Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration 
Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787 (2008); Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 
2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57 (2007). 
208 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000).  
209 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559–60 (1995); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611.  
210 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (citations omitted). 
211 George J. Borjas, Does Immigration Grease the Wheels of the Labor Market?, Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, No. 1, 2001, at 69, 70; Mark Ellis, Richard Wright & Matthew Townley, State-Scale 
Immigration Enforcement and Latino Interstate Migration in the United States, 106 ANNALS OF THE AM. 
ASS’N OF GEOGRAPHERS 891 (2016).  
 40 
 
regulation	 of	 the	 economic	 and	noneconomic	 aspects	 of	 immigration	 are	 together	part	 of	 an	 indivisible	 scheme.212	 In	 other	 words,	 removing	 control	 over	 labor	migration	 from	 the	 immigration	 statute	 would	 leave	 behind	 a	 scheme	 that	 was	incoherent	and/or	still	had	an	impact	on	interstate	commerce.213			This	is	a	fairly	straightforward	argument	to	make.		To	excise	the	temporary	and	permanent	employment	visa	categories	from	the	statute	would	not	be	sufficient	to	separate	out	labor	migration,	because	the	eleven	million	undocumented	workers	in	the	United	States	are	largely	labor	migrants.		(In	this	context,	it	is	worth	noting	that	in	 the	 few	 cases	 that	 address	 the	 issue,	 most	 federal	 courts	 have	 found	 no	impediment	 to	 including	 undocumented	 immigrants	 within	 the	 scope	 of	 the	interstate	 Commerce	 Clause.214)	 Undocumented	men	 have	 the	 highest	 labor-force	participation	 rates	 of	 anyone	 in	 the	 United	 States:	 91%	 as	 compared	 to	 84%	 for	legal	 immigrants	 and	 79%	 for	 native	workers.215	Measures	 regarding	 border	 and	interior	enforcement	of	 immigration	 law	thus	would	have	to	be	removed	from	the	statute	as	well.	 	This	would	 leave	behind	an	immigration	law	without	 immigration	control,	 which	 few	would	 consider	 a	 coherent	 scheme	 of	 regulation.	 	 In	 addition,	excising	the	explicitly	 labor-related	aspects	of	 the	statute—resulting	a	 law	that	set	terms	 for	entry	and	continued	presence	of	noncitizens	only	on	 the	basis	of	 family	
                                                
212 Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 26 (2005) (“One need not have a degree in economics to understand 
why a nationwide exemption for the vast quantity of marijuana (or other drugs) locally cultivated for 
personal use (which presumably would include use by friends, neighbors, and family members) may have a 
substantial impact on the interstate market for this extraordinarily popular substance.”). 
213 Immigration raises this question in a somewhat different way than Raich. In Raich, the question was 
whether severing the regulation of privately grown medical marijuana (asserted by the plaintiffs to be 
unrelated to commerce) from the larger federal scheme regulating drugs (which was assumed to have a 
relationship to commerce) would leave a coherent regulatory scheme behind, or whether an exemption for 
the former would undermine the integrity of the latter. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 26 (2005) (framing 
question as “whether Congress’ contrary policy judgment, i.e., its decision to include this narrower ‘set of 
activities’ within the larger regulatory scheme, was constitutionally deficient.”).  In the immigration 
context, the question is whether the regulatory scheme could coherently be divided in two: one part directly 
addressing labor migration and mobile immigrant workers in interstate commerce (assumed to be an 
economic phenomenon), and the other, larger part regulating immigration unrelated to commerce. In what 
follows, I argue that the two are not divisible because both relate to the impact of immigration on 
commerce and should be regulated together to create a coherent regulatory scheme. 
214 United States v. Hanigan, 681 F.2d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1982).  This is consistent with Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence about Congress’s power to regulate other kinds of illegal economic activity.  See, e.g., 
Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 15 (2005).  But see United States v. State of Arizona, No. CV 10-1413-
PHX-SRB, 2010 WL 11405085 (D. Ariz. 2010) (In the context of deciding defendant Arizona’s motion to 
dismiss, rejecting the argument of plaintiff United States that “it is a violation of the dormant Commerce 
Clause for Arizona to regulate the interstate movement of people who are not lawfully present in the United 
States.” Id. at 9, (citation omitted).  “Edwards is distinguishable because, in that case, the underlying 
conduct (being indigent) was not unlawful.” Id. at 9.   
215 Securing the Border: Defining the Current Population Living in the Shadows and Addressing 
Future Flows Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. 7, fig. 3 
(2015) (written testimony of Jeffrey S. Passel, Senior Demographer, Pew Research Center) 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/?id=CA5A3DC6-951E-48BD-9AA4-A7F6D8EDD34F. The 
reverse is true, however, for undocumented women.  Id.  However, men make up the majority of the 
undocumented population. Ariel G. Ruiz, Jie Zong & Jeanne Batalova, Immigrant Women in the United 
States, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/immigrant-
women-united-states#Unauthorized Population.  
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ties,	refugee	status,	study,	and	other	non-work-related	factors—would	not	eliminate	the	direct	impact	of	immigration	on	the	United	States	labor	market.		As	noted	above,	immigrants	 lawfully	 admitted	 through	 nonemployment	 categories	 work	 in	 large	numbers.216	If	 this	argument	proves	persuasive,	Raich	 then	opens	the	door	more	widely	to	linking	 immigration	 to	 interstate	 commerce.	 	 In	Raich,	 the	 Court	 reiterates	 a	 key	aspect	of	the	Wickard	holding:	“When	Congress	decides	that	the	‘total	incidence’	of	a	practice	poses	a	threat	to	a	national	market,	it	may	regulate	the	entire	class,”217	even	if	 some	 of	 the	 activity	 is	 purely	 local.	 	 	 In	 addition,	 the	 critical	 question	 is	 not	whether	 the	 activity	 at	 issue	 “substantially	 affect	 interstate	 commerce	 in	 fact,	 but	only	whether	a	‘rational	basis’	exists	for	so	concluding.”218		There	 is	 no	 question	 that	 laws	 passed	 by	 Congress	 pursuant	 to	 its	 interstate	commerce	authority	can	be	subject	 to	 judicial	review	for	constitutionality.	 	Setting	aside	 the	Wickard-Lopez	 line	 of	 cases,	which	 is	 about	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 commerce	power	 itself,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 is	 not	 infrequently	 called	 on	 to	 assess	 whether	legislation	 that	 incontrovertibly	 falls	 under	 Congress’s	 interstate	 commerce	authority	 nonetheless	 infringes	 on	 other	 constitutional	 provisions.	 	 In	 such	situations,	the	Court	has	not	hesitated	to	review	the	statute—and	indeed	to	strike	it	down.		The	Supreme	Court	has	stated	clearly	that	“Congressional	enactments	which	may	 be	 fully	within	 the	 grant	 of	 legislative	 authority	 contained	 in	 the	 [interstate]	Commerce	Clause	may	nonetheless	be	 invalid	because	 found	 to	offend	against	 the	right	to	trial	by	jury	contained	in	the	Sixth	Amendment	or	the	Due	Process	Clause	of	the	 Fifth	 Amendment.”219	 	 The	 Tenth	 Amendment	 is	 another	 common	 source	 of	challenge	to	government	action	under	the	interstate	Commerce	Clause.	In	New	York	
v.	United	States,	for	example,	the	Court	held	unconstitutional	a	provision	of	a	federal	law	that	required	states	to	dispose	of	low-level	radioactive	waste	within	their	own	borders.		There	was	no	assertion	that	the	provision	itself	exceeded	the	scope	of	the	interstate	Commerce	Clause.		Instead,	it	was	struck	down	because	it	conflicted	with	the	Tenth	Amendment	by	 “commandeering”	state	governments	 in	an	arena	where	the	Amendment	reserved	power	to	the	states.220	2. Discussion	 of	 Immigration	 as	 Interstate	 Commerce	 in	 Contemporary	Case	Law	
                                                
216 This focus on paid work is not meant to marginalize immigrants whose motive for migrating is 
noneconomic or those who are less likely to work for pay on arrival, such as mothers migrating with 
children, older adults migrating to be reunited with their families, and disabled people. My argument is that 
in its totality, it is a better description of the impact of immigration to say that it is economic than to 
characterize it as a threat to sovereignty or national security. 
217 Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (citations omitted). “The CSA is a statute that regulates 
the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities for which there is an established, and 
lucrative, interstate market.” Id. at 26.  
218 Id. at 22 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995)). 
219 Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 841 (1976), overruled on other grounds by Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (citations omitted). 
220 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 
(1997). 
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Paradoxically,	 the	 only	 contemporary	 case	 in	 which	 a	 circuit	 court	 considers	whether	congressional	regulation	of	individual	immigrants	is	tied	to	the	Commerce	Clause	appears	in	a	challenge	not	to	an	immigration	law,	but	to	the	Hobbs	Act,	which	criminalizes	robbery	that	obstructs,	delays,	or	affects	commerce	“‘or	the	movement	of	 any	 article	 of	 commodity	 in	 commerce.’”221	 	 In	United	 States	 v.	 Hanigan,222	 the	government	 sought	 to	 use	 the	 Hobbs	 Act	 to	 prosecute	 a	 man	 who	 robbed	 and	tortured	three	undocumented	Mexican	immigrants.		The	Act	defines	“commerce”	as	coextensive	with	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 Commerce	 Clause.223	 The	 defendant	 challenged	the	 government’s	 prosecution	 and	 the	 underlying	 statute	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	migrants	were	not	articles	of	commerce,	and	even	if	they	were,	regulation	impacting	“undocumented	 alien	 laborers”	 fell	 outside	 of	 Congress’s	 Commerce	 Clause	authority.		A	three-judge	panel	of	the	Ninth	Circuit	disagreed.		The	court	noted	that	“[t]he	statute	by	its	terms	does	not	limit	‘commerce’	to	the	flow	of	legally	condoned	articles.		Nor	could	the	Commerce	Clause	itself	mean	that	an	activity	to	be	regulated	by	Congress	must	be	legally	permissible.”224		The	case	holds	that	“the	movement	of	undocumented	alien	laborers	across	a	national	boundary	into	this	country	is	within	the	constitutional	power	of	Congress	to	regulate	[under	the	Commerce	Clause].”225	The	 few	 cases	 where	 immigration	 regulation	 itself	 has	 been	 discussed	 in	relation	 to	 the	 Commerce	 Clause	 are	 all	 in	 lower	 courts,	 and	 only	 one	 of	 them	touches	on	the	questions	just	raised	with	regard	to	Lopez.	 	In	the	context	of	recent	litigation	 challenging	 state	 laws	 creating	 restrictions	 on	 immigrants,	 advocates—and,	under	the	Obama	administration,	the	government	itself—attempted	to	advance	the	 dormant	 Commerce	 Clause	 argument	 that	 such	 laws	 impermissibly	 burden	interstate	 and	 foreign	 commerce.226	 In	 general,	 district	 courts	 have	 found	 this	position	 unpersuasive	 as	 applied	 to	 the	 state	 laws	 under	 consideration.	 	 For	example,	 the	 relationship	 between	 interstate	 commerce	 and	 immigration	undergirded	a	dormant	Commerce	Clause	analysis	in	the	unreported	2010	opinion	of	 the	 Arizona	 US	 District	 Court	 considering	 the	 legality	 of	 Arizona’s	 “attrition	through	enforcement”	 law.227	The	Solicitor	General	 argued	 that	 the	Arizona	 law—
                                                
221 United States v. Hanigan, 681 F.2d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 1982) (“The Hobbs Act makes it a federal 
crime to obstruct, delay, or affect commerce ‘or the movement of any article of commodity in commerce, 
by robbery’”) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)). “The Hobbs Act definition of commerce is coextensive with the 
constitutional definition.” Id. at 1130 (1982) (citing Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173–74 (1941) 
(noting that “intercourse” in the commerce clause includes the movement of persons); Service Machine & 
Shipbuilding Corp. v. Edwards, 617 F.2d 70, 76 (5th Cir. 1980) (striking down registration fee imposed on 
all workers as hindrance to migrant labor).  
222 Hanigan, 681 F.2d 1127.  
223 Id. at 1129 (“As defined in the Act, commerce includes ‘all…other commerce over which the 
United States has jurisdiction.’”) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(3)).  
224 Id. at 1131.  
225 Id.   
226 See, e.g., United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1003 (D. Ariz. 2010); Brief for the League 
of United Latin American Citizens, et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee, U.S. v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 
339 (9th Cir. 2011).  
227 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) aff'd, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) 
aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 183 L. Ed. 2d 351 (2012) and aff'd in part, rev'd 
in part, 689 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2012). 
“Attrition through enforcement” refers to the idea, popularized by the restrictionist policy organization 
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which	created	new	state	penalties	for	offenses	ranging	from	transporting	and	hiring	undocumented	 immigrants	 to	 making	 unlawful	 presence	 a	 state	 trespassing	violation—“offends	 the	 Dormant	 Commerce	 Clause	 by	 restricting	 the	 interstate	movement	 of	 aliens.”228	 The	 District	 Court	 agreed	 that	 “the	 regulation	 of	immigration	does	have	 an	 impact	 on	 interstate	 commerce,”229	 	 but	 since	 the	 state	law	in	question	did	not	explicitly	 limit	 the	entry	of	 immigrants	 to	Arizona,	 instead	prohibiting	conduct	already	banned	by	federal	law,	the	United	States	failed	to	show	that	the	Arizona	law	raised	this	concern.230		Higher	courts	declined	to	consider	the	Commerce	Clause	issue	on	appeal.231	
United	States	v.	Hernandez	Guerrero,	a	1997	Southern	District	of	California	case	in	which	a	noncitizen	with	a	record	of	multiple	deportations	challenged	the	legality	of	provisions	of	 the	 Immigration	and	Nationality	Act	 setting	out	 the	consequences	for	 unlawful	 re-entry	 following	 deportation,232	 is	 the	 one	 published	 post-Lopez	federal	court	decision	to	seriously	consider	whether	the	immigration	power	derives	from	the	Commerce	Clause.		There,	the	court	states	plainly	that	“[t]he	fact	that	prior	precedent	 recognizes	 Congress’s	 power	 over	 immigration	 as	 an	 incident	 of	sovereignty	does	not	signify	that	Congress	could	not	regulate	immigration	under	the	auspices	of	one	of	its	enumerated	powers.	 	Accordingly,	even	if	Congress	could	not	enact	criminal	immigration	sanctions	pursuant	to	the	inherent	power	of	a	sovereign	nation,	S.	1326	would	still	be	 constitutional	as	an	exercise	of	Congress’s	authority	under	the	Commerce	Clause.”233	The	opinion	goes	on	 to	assert	 that	 “[i]t	 is	undeniable	 that	 the	entry	of	 foreign	nationals	 could	 affect	 both	 foreign	 and	 interstate	 commerce.	 	 Indeed,	 one	 can	assume	 that	 many	 individuals	 enter	 the	 United	 States	 illegally	 because	 of	 their	desire	to	find	better	economic	opportunities	here.	Such	individuals	provide	both	an	inexpensive	source	of	foreign	labor,	and	a	market	for	domestic	goods	and	services,	thereby	 affecting	 both	 interstate	 and	 foreign	 commerce.”234	 	 Having	 decided	 that	
                                                                                                                                            
the Center for Immigration Studies, that undocumented immigrants will leave the country (“self-deport”) if 
the government closes off access to housing, employment, drivers’ licenses, and medical care.  The theory 
undergirded many state and local anti-immigrant initiatives in the 2000s. For a summary of and argument 
for the strategy, see Jessica Vaughan, Attrition through Enforcement, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES 
2006, http://cis.org/Enforcement-IllegalPopulation; Kris W. Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement: A 
Rational Approach to Illegal Immigration, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 155 (2008). 
228 Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 1003 (internal quotations omitted).   
229  Id. at 1003.  
230 Id. The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court cases reversing and affirming the District Court’s 
decision did not discuss the Commerce Clause argument. 
 Similarly, in United States v. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1328–29 (N.D. Ala. 2011) aff'd in 
part, rev'd in part, dismissed in part, 691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012), the District Court rejected the US 
government’s argument that the Alabama law imposed an excessive burden on interstate commerce, and 
therefore dismissed the Commerce Clause portion of the federal government’s argument (the section in 
question was nonetheless enjoined on the grounds that it was preempted under federal immigration law).   
231 In neither the Arizona nor the Alabama case appeals did the circuit court or the Supreme Court 
discuss the Commerce Clause issue.  
232 United States v. Hernandez-Guerrero, 963 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Cal. 1997) aff'd, 147 F.3d 1075 (9th 
Cir. 1998). 
233  Id. at 937. 
234 Id. at 937–38.  
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immigration	 is	 tied	 to	 the	 commerce	power,	 the	 court	 then	 rejects	 the	 contention	that	 in	 this	 instance	 Congress	 exceeded	 the	 boundaries	 set	 forth	 in	 Lopez.	 	 “‘The	possession	of	a	gun	 in	a	 local	school	zone	 is	 in	no	sense	an	economic	activity	 that	might,	 through	 repetition	 elsewhere,	 substantially	 affect	 any	 sort	 of	 interstate	commerce.’	In	the	present	case,	however,	the	illegal	entry	of	foreign	nationals	after	deportation	 does	 substantially	 affect	 interstate	 commerce.	 Moreover,	 individuals	who	 enter	 the	 country	 illegally	 provide	 a	 source	 of	 labor,	 thereby	 constituting	‘persons	 or	 things	 in	 interstate	 commerce.’”235	 	 The	 Ninth	 Circuit	 affirmed	 the	District	 Court’s	 decision	 on	 sovereignty	 grounds;	 it	 did	 not	 reach	 the	 commerce	argument.236	 	
D. What	Do	We	Get	from	Conceiving	of	Immigration	as	Commerce?			1. Impact	Overall	If	 the	 interstate	and	 foreign	Commerce	Clauses	were	recognized	as	sources	of	the	 contemporary	 federal	 immigration	 authority,	 that	 power	 would	 have	 a	 far	firmer	 anchor	 in	 the	 Constitution	 than	 it	 does	 under	 current	 jurisprudence.	 	 	 Of	course,	 taking	 this	 step	will	 not	 eliminate	 the	 plenary	 power	 doctrine	 in	 one	 fell	swoop.		The	constitutional	source	of	a	particular	governmental	power	is	related	to,	but	not	the	sole	determinant	of,	the	degree	to	which	courts	will	review	government	action	 in	 that	arena	 for	violations	of	 individual	constitutional	rights.237	 	Nor	will	 it	automatically	divorce	immigration	questions	from	sovereignty	or	national	security	concerns.		Whatever	the	source	of	the	power,	the	government	can	always	assert	that	any	 policy	 related	 to	 control	 over	 immigration	 implicates	 sovereignty,	 or	 that	national	 security	 concerns	motivate	 its	 promulgation	 of	 a	 particular	 policy,	 in	 an	effort	to	persuade	courts	to	give	it	room	to	operate	unfettered.238		With	 this	 in	mind,	 the	Article	 is	 pragmatic	 in	 its	 claims	 and	 its	 argument.	 	 Its	goal	 is	 to	 counteract	 the	 reflexive	 assumption	 embedded	 in	 the	 plenary	 power	doctrine’s	tie	to	sovereignty	and	foreign	affairs,	 that	all	 immigration	law	relates	to	foreign	 relations	 and/or	 national	 security.	 	 This	 assumption	 encourages	 judges	 to	default	 to	 a	 position	 of	 deference	 without	 an	 actual	 inquiry	 about	 whether	 it	 is	
                                                
235 Id. at 938 (citations omitted). 
236 Id. 
237 See supra [note 11]. 
238 Lindsay, supra note 54, at 241. Likewise, it seems unlikely that the distinction in immigration 
jurisprudence between immigrants already admitted to the United States and those who are seeking 
admission, which grants some measure of constitutional review to the former while essentially denying it to 
the latter, will disappear.  It is interesting—but beyond the scope of this article—to consider whether the 
2017 Supreme Court decision to grant certiorari in Trump v. IRAP, the first travel ban case, signals the 
beginning of a process of reconsidering this distinction.  In its per curiam opinion on the question of 
whether to uphold the preliminary injunctions against the travel ban granted by the Fourth and Ninth 
Circuits, the Court draws the line not at lawful admission, but between would-be immigrants with “bona-
fide relationships” to persons or entities in the United States, and those without such relationships.  As to 
the former, the Court upheld the injunction; as to the latter, it permitted the travel ban to take effect.  Trump 
v. IRAP, No. 16-1436, slip op at 13 (U.S. June 26, 2017).  It is important to note, though, that all plaintiffs 
in this case were individuals and institutions inside the United States. 
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appropriate	given	the	immigration	policy	in	question.239		The	Article	seeks	to	build	a	stronger	constitutional	undergirding	 for	 the	 immigration	power,	one	 that	 reminds	judges	that	in	the	main,	immigration	is	an	economic	issue,	and	therefore	that	claims	about	rights	violations	 in	 the	 immigration	context	should	receive	ordinary	 judicial	review	unless	 the	policies	 in	 question	 actually	 impact	 national	 security	 or	 foreign	affairs.			A	recognition	that	the	Commerce	Clause	grounds	the	government’s	immigration	power	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 re-orient	 the	 federal	 courts’	 degree	 of	 constitutional	analysis	of	immigration	questions	in	several	important	ways.		First,	returning	to	the	foreign	Commerce	Clause	as	a	source	of	the	government’s	immigration	 authority	 ties	 modern	 immigration	 jurisprudence	 to	 the	 historical	understanding	 of	 the	 immigration	 power	 adopted	 in	 the	 early	 immigration	federalism	cases.	Those	cases	arose	under	 the	 foreign	Commerce	Clause	and	were	about	federalism—ie,	whether	the	states	or	the	federal	government	had	the	power	to	regulate	immigration—rather	than	individual	rights.		Nonetheless,	it	is	significant	that,	 as	 it	 answered	 these	 federalism	 questions,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 treated	 the	immigration	 power	 as	 non-exceptional	with	 regard	 to	 the	 Constitution.	 	 Although	early	 immigration	cases	were	not	explicitly	about	the	 interstate	Commerce	Clause,	in	deciding	them	the	justices	often	spoke	of	the	power	to	regulate	immigrants	from	abroad	 as	 having	 the	 same	 constitutional	 origin	 and	 limitations	 as	 the	 power	 to	regulate	migrants	 between	 states,	 reasoning	 that	 a	 holding	 about	 one	would	 also	apply	 to	 the	other.240	 	This	offers	some	 indication	that	during	the	19th	century	the	Supreme	Court	did	not	contemplate	that	all	uses	of	the	immigration	power	would	be	subject	to	a	more	deferential	standard	of	constitutional	review.	Second,	 the	 addition	 of	 the	 interstate	 Commerce	 Clause	 as	 a	 source	 of	 the	immigration	 power	 grounds	 that	 authority	 even	more	 firmly	 in	 an	 arena	without	any	carve-outs	from	constitutional	oversight.		As	I	note	in	Part	IV.B.,	supra,	although	courts	 have	 explicitly	 held	 that	 government	 actions	 under	 the	 foreign	 Commerce	Clause	 are	 subject	 to	 constitutional	 constraints,	 there	 is	 a	 danger	 that	 locating	immigration	only	in	the	foreign	branch	of	the	Commerce	Clause	might	create	echoes	of	 foreign	 policy	 concerns	 requiring	 deference	 to	 the	 political	 branches.	 	 The	interstate	 Commerce	 Clause	 as	 a	 constitutional	 source	 of	 the	 immigration	 power	signals	that	the	government’s	exercise	of	that	authority	arises	from	a	power	under	which	courts	routinely	review	government	actions	for	constitutionality.		The	default	assumption	 is	 that	a	government	action	rooted	 in	 the	 interstate	Commerce	Clause	receives	ordinary	review	in	the	face	of	a	challenge	to	the	action’s	constitutionality.	Finally,	an	immigration	power	that	arises	from	the	Commerce	Clause	highlights	the	 economic	 nature	 of	 most	 immigration.	 	 It	 serves	 as	 a	 reminder	 that	 the	 vast	majority	of	immigration	law	is	about	the	daily	management	of	a	flow	of	noncitizens	
                                                
239 Legomsky, supra note 36 at 261-9. 
240 See, e.g., The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283, 417 (Wayne, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing 
that the federal power to regulate the movement of human beings across borders applies in the same way to 
interstate and foreign commerce.)  See also Matthew Lindsay, Immigration, Sovereignty, and the 
Constitution of Foreignness at 781-82, 784-85. 
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who	 contribute	 to	 the	 US	 economy	 through	 tourism,	 investment,	 purchases,	 and	labor.		Most	immigration	statutes,	regulations,	and	policies	relate	to	routine	matters	of	 bureaucratic	 processing	 and	management	 of	 this	 flow.	 	 Aspects	 of	 immigration	law	 that	 do	 address	national	 security	 or	 foreign	 affairs	 are	 generally	 contained	 in	discrete	 statutory	 provisions,	 regulations,	 or	 policy	 documents	 that	 explicitly	reference	 such	 concerns.241	 	 	 The	 remaining	majority	 of	 the	 federal	 government’s	exercises	 of	 the	 immigration	 power	 are	 grounded	 in	 the	 central	 concerns	 of	 the	Commerce	 Clause.	 	 This	 insight	 offers	 an	 important	 counter-narrative	 to	 the	government’s	repeated	claims	in	litigation	that	foreign	affairs	and	national	security	are	 the	drivers	of	all	 aspects	of	 immigration	policy,	and	 that	 immigration	 law	as	a	whole	should	thus	receive	greater	judicial	deference.		2. Impact	on	Constitutional	Challenges	to	Different	Classes	of	Immigration	Policies	Grounding	 the	 immigration	 power	 in	 the	 Commerce	 Clause	 is	 likely	 to	 have	 a	different	 impact	on	 judicial	 review	depending	on	 the	nature	of	 the	underlying	 law	being	 challenged.	 	 I	 will	 consider	 the	 effect	 of	 such	 a	 shift	 on	 three	 categories	 of	immigration	policies:	those	that	are	intended	to	regulate	employment-related	visas	or	 otherwise	 address	 concerns	 about	 labor	 market	 competition;	 those	 that	 set	general	 categories	 and	 procedures	 for	 admission	 and	 removal,	 unrelated	 to	employment	 or	 to	 national	 security	 concerns;	 and	 those	 that	 specifically	 address	foreign	affairs	or	national	security	concerns.	a. Immigration	Policies	Related	to	Employment	and	Labor	Competition	The	 arguments	 put	 forth	 in	 this	 Article	 are	 likely	 to	 have	 the	 greatest	 impact	where	 plaintiffs	 challenge	 an	 aspect	 of	 immigration	 law	 or	 policy	 that	 directly	regulates	immigrant	employment,	or	that	was	enacted	in	response	to	labor	market	concerns.	 	 The	 latter	 category,	 I	 would	 argue,	 includes	 almost	 all	 provisions	regulating	 undocumented	 immigrants.	 	 The	 Supreme	 Court	 has	 not	 infrequently	asserted	 that	 immigration	 restrictions	 are	 motivated	 by	 the	 need	 to	 limit	competition	 for	 work	 within	 the	 United	 States.	 	 In	 1991,	 for	 example,	 in	 a	 case	upholding	 the	 validity	 of	 a	 regulation	 requiring	 that	 the	Attorney	General	make	 a	bar	on	unauthorized	work	a	bond	condition	for	noncitizens	in	removal	proceedings,	a	unanimous	Court	stated	that	protecting	US	workers	against	displacement	was	an	“established	 concern	 of	 immigration	 law.”242	 Looking	 to	 past	 cases,	 the	 opinion	noted,	“We	have	often	recognized	that	a	‘primary	purpose	in	restricting	immigration	is	to	preserve	jobs	for	American	workers.’”243		In	the	context	of	a	constitutional	challenge	to	an	aspect	of	immigration	law	that	sets	 out	 the	 routes	 through	which	noncitizens	 can	 enter	 the	United	 States	 for	 the	purposes	of	employment;	or	that	penalizes	unlawful	entry,	presence	in	the	country	without	admission,	or	visa	overstay;	plaintiffs	can	trace	 the	power	to	enact	such	a	
                                                
241 The inadmissibility grounds related to terrorism and foreign policy are examples.  Security and 
Related Grounds, Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1182 (1965).    
242 INS v. National Center for Immigrants Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 194 (1991). 
243 Id. (citing Sure-Tan v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 893 (1984)). 
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provision	 to	 the	 foreign	 and	 interstate	 Commerce	 Clause	 and	 the	 government’s	acknowledged	right	to	control	the	movement	of	noncitizen	workers	(by	now	clearly	understood	as	 “commerce”244)	across	 its	borders.	 	 	 In	 recognizing	 this	 connection,	the	 Court	 would	 be	 in	 line	 with	 longstanding	 interpretations	 of	 the	 foreign	Commerce	 Clause	 and	 the	 modern	 understanding	 of	 the	 interstate	 Commerce	Clause.	 	 While	 there	 is	 no	 question	 that	 regulating	 immigration	 to	 limit	 labor	competition	remains	a	federal	power,	tying	it	to	the	Commerce	Clause	underscores	the	argument	that	challenges	to	such	policies	should	be	subject	to	ordinary	levels	of	constitutional	review.		Ironically,	the	Chinese	Exclusion	Act	itself—which	supplied	the	occasion	for	the	Supreme	Court’s	abandonment	of	the	Commerce	Clause	as	the	constitutional	source	of	the	immigration	power—is	a	paradigmatic	example	of	an	immigration	law	passed	to	regulate	 the	 labor	market.245	 	The	Act	applied	exclusively	 to	Chinese	“laborers,”	not	 to	most	 other	 categories	 of	 Chinese	 immigrants.246	 	 In	 the	 Chinese	 Exclusion	Case,	 Justice	 Fields	 explicitly	 recognized	 that	 fear	 of	 job	 competition	 was	 a	 key	factor	 behind	 the	 passage	 of	 the	 statute.247	 	 	 It	 is	 telling	 that	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	reviewing	 the	 procedures	 laid	 out	 in	 the	 Act	 for	 compliance	 with	 due	 process	requirements,	 the	 Court	 felt	 compelled	 to	 break	 with	 longstanding	 precedent	anchoring	 the	 immigration	 power	 in	 the	 Commerce	 Clause,	 and	 create	 a	 new	doctrine	 of	 plenary	 power,	 constitutionally	 justified	 by	 the	 federal	 government’s	control	 of	 sovereignty	 and	 foreign	 affairs.	 	 Had	 the	 case	 been	 understood	 as	 a	challenge	to	a	procedural	aspect	of	legislation	arising	under	the	Commerce	Clause,	it	would	have	been	harder	for	the	Court	to	hold	that	Congress’s	actions	were	outside	the	scope	of	judicial	review	for	constitutionality.		b. Immigration	Policies	Not	Related	to	Employment	or	National	Security		The	middle	category	identified	here	consists	of	laws	that	set	generally-applicable	substantive	or	procedural	 terms	 for	admission	or	 removal,	with	 few	 if	any	special	implications	for	national	security	or	foreign	affairs.		This	class	of	cases	encompasses	the	 majority	 of	 challenged	 immigration	 laws	 and	 policies.	 	 In	 such	 cases,	 the	government	does	not	argue	that	this	specific	law	or	policy	is	primarily	motivated	by	national	security	or	foreign	policy	concerns,	although	they	may	suggest	that	it	could	nonetheless	 have	 some	 impact	 on	 diplomacy.248	 	 Instead,	 it	 advances	 the	 plenary	
                                                
244 See discussion in Parts III.B.1 and IV.B, supra. 
245 See discussion in note [120] and accompanying text.  [Ed: Note in its entirely is “Chae Chan Ping v. 
United States, 130 U.S. 581, 595 (1889).] 
246 Chinese Exclusion Act, Pub. L. No. 47-126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882), Preamble (Suspending for ten years 
“the coming of Chinese laborers to the United States”); Sec. 6 (setting out procedures for “every Chinese 
Person other than a laborer who may be entitled…to come within the United States” to obtain a certificate 
from the Chinese government indicating that they met the entrance requirements); Sec. 13 (exempting 
diplomats and their servants); Sec. 15 (“That the words ‘Chinese laborers’, whenever used in the act, shall 
be construed to mean both skilled and unskilled laborers and Chinese employed in mining.”)  
247 See supra Note [120—at end of quote from the case regarding competition]. 
248 For example, in Zadvydas, the government asserted that the Court should not review for due process 
concerns its policy of indefinitely detaining noncitizens who had been found deportable, without an 
individualized determination of dangerousness.  While the government conceded that there were no 
important national security concerns implicated by this policy, it did argue that judicial review might 
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power	 doctrine	 in	 general,	 contending	 that	 this	 should	 minimize	 or	 eradicate	judicial	 review	 of	 immigration	 law	 for	 constitutionality	 without	 reference	 to	whether	 the	 actual	 policy	 implicates	 sovereignty,	 foreign	 affairs,	 or	 national	security.249		The	 Supreme	 Court’s	 response	 to	 such	 arguments	 has	 been	 inconsistent.	 	 In	recent	 years,	 the	 Court	 has	 moved	 between	 applying	 ordinary	 standards	 of	constitutional	 review	 (often	 without	 rejecting	 or	 refuting	 the	 plenary	 power	doctrine),	 and	 applying	 the	 plenary	 power	 doctrine	 and	 deferring	 to	 the	government.		In	cases	where	it	does	the	former,	it	has	de-emphasized	the	idea	that	the	immigration	power	is	rooted	in	sovereignty—but	has	not	offered	an	alternative	constitutional	 source.	 	 In	 the	 latter	 cases,	 it	has	 leaned	heavily	on	 the	 sovereignty	anchor.		In	this	category,	consistent	recognition	of	the	link	between	the	immigration	power	 in	 the	 Commerce	 Clause	 would	 serve	 to	 counterbalance	 the	 government’s	assertion	 of	 plenary	 power,	 anchoring	 the	 government’s	 authority	 in	 an	 ordinary	constitutional	 power	 that	 has	 not	 developed	 pockets	 of	 exemption	 from	 judicial	review.				A	recent	trio	of	Supreme	Court	cases	on	the	detention	of	noncitizens	during	or	after	removal	proceedings	offers	an	 illustration	of	 this	 inconsistency	problem,	and	suggests	 the	 potential	 stabilizing	 impact	 of	 tying	 the	 immigration	 power	 to	 the	Commerce	Clause.	 	The	cases	are	Zadvydas,	decided	 less	than	three	months	before	9/11,	Demore	 v.	 Kim,	 issued	 nineteen	 months	 after,	 and	 Jennings	 v.	 Rodriguez,250	which	is	before	the	Court	in	the	2017	term.			All	fall	within	this	middle	category:	they	address	 due	process	 challenges	 to	 aspects	 of	 the	 Immigration	 and	Nationality	Act	that	 relate	 to	 the	 detention	 of	 noncitizens	 during	 or	 after	 the	 conclusion	 of	deportation	 proceedings,251	 with	 no	 reference	 to	 employment,	 undocumented	immigration,	or	foreign	affairs.		Indeed,	in	none	of	the	cases	did	the	Court	find	that	national	 security	 or	 foreign	 policy	 concerns	 motivated	 the	 statutory	 provision	 at	issue.			In	Zadvydas,	although	the	government	asserted	that	the	plenary	power	doctrine	required	the	Court	to	defer	to	Congress’s	decision	to	permit	indefinite	detention	of	noncitizens	pending	removal,	the	Court	disagreed.		It	held	that	indefinite	detention	of	 deportable	 noncitizens	 beyond	 the	 time	 when	 removal	 was	 reasonably	
                                                                                                                                            
“interfere with ‘sensitive’ repatriation negotiations” (at 696) and thus impact foreign policy.  See Part 
IV.D.2.b, infra. 
249 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Jennings v. Rodriguez, --- S. Ct. --- (2016) (No. 15-
1204). (In case related to the long term detention of noncitizens during the pendency of removal 
proceedings, a policy unrelated to national security or foreign policy concerns, the Deputy Solicitor 
General opened his oral argument by reminding the Supreme Court that it had “often stressed the breadth of 
Congress’s constitutional authority to establish the rules under which aliens will be allowed to enter and 
remain in the United States.”) 
250 Rodriguez, et. al. v. Robbins, et. al., 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Jennings 
v. Rodriguez, --- S. Ct. ---, 2016 WL 1182403 (2016) (No. 15-1204). 
251 The fact that all of these cases related to deportation and not exclusion is significant, given that the 
plenary power doctrine is understood to be much stronger as to policies relating to noncitizens the 
government seeks to exclude than as to those it seeks to deport.  See eg Zadvydas at 693-694. 
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foreseeable	was	an	unconstitutional	deprivation	of	liberty.252	 	In	deciding	the	case,	the	 Court	 recognized	 the	 “primary	 Executive	 Branch	 responsibility”253	 in	 the	immigration	 area,	 which	 “require[s]	 courts	 to	 listen	 with	 care”254	 to	 the	government’s	 arguments.	 	 But	 the	 Court	 took	 note	 of	 the	 absence	 of	 any	 national	security	 concerns	 in	 the	 case	 before	 it,255	 and	 considered	 and	 rejected	 the	government’s	 assertion	 that	 its	 interpretation	 of	 the	 statute	 to	 permit	 indefinite	detention	implicated	foreign	policy	concerns.256		The	majority’s	conclusion	that	“[a]	statute	 permitting	 indefinite	 detention	 of	 an	 alien	 would	 raise	 a	 serious	constitutional	 problem”257	 grew	 from	 an	 essentially	 ordinary	 substantive	 and	procedural	 due	 process	 analysis.	 	 Notably,	 the	 opinion	 did	 not	 once	mention	 the	source	of	the	immigration	power,	or	even	use	the	word	“sovereignty”	in	its	opinion.			In	Demore	v.	Kim,	the	issue	before	the	Court	was	whether	the	government	could	mandatorily	 detain	 all	 noncitizens	 pending	 deportation	 proceedings	 on	 certain	grounds	 (for	 example,	 because	 they	 had	 committed	 certain	 crimes),	 without	 any	individualized	determination	of	flight	risk	or	danger	to	the	community.			Here,	with	the	country	still	on	high	alert	less	than	two	years	after	9/11,	the	Court	took	a	very	different	approach	to	reviewing	the	statute	for	constitutionality.	 	 	The	government	did	 not	 allege	 that	 the	 challenged	 policy	 was	 motivated	 by	 or	 impacted	 foreign	relations	 or	 national	 security.	 	 Yet	 in	 deciding	 the	 case,	 the	Court	 tied	 the	 federal	government’s	immigration	authority	to	foreign	relations	and	the	war	power,258	and	emphasized	 Cold	 War	 cases	 where	 immigration	 provisions	 were	 upheld	 under	plenary	power	to	protect	the	country	from	Communism,259	thus	waving	the	flag	in	a	way	that	implicitly	suggested	a	link	between	the	routine	provision	at	issue	and	the	need	 to	protect	national	 security.	 	 It	 then	relied	on	 the	plenary	power	doctrine	 to	reach	 the	 conclusion	 that	 the	 mandatory	 detention	 policy	 did	 not	 violate	 due	process,	despite	the	holding	in	Zadvydas.260			
                                                
252 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).  
253 Id. at 700. 
254 Id. at 700. 
255 Id. at 695-96. 
256 Id. at 696. 
257 Id. at 690. 
258 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003). 
259 Id. at 523-25. 
260 Demore at 521-22, 531.  
While acknowledging that the government traditionally is held to higher constitutional standards in 
proceedings for deporting a noncitizen, as here, than for excluding one at the border (at 523), the Court 
carried out a very limited due process analysis, quickly rejecting the claim that Zadvydas was the 
controlling case.  At 527-530.  In addition, the Court relied on data provided by the government (retracted 
thirteen years later as false) to conclude that detention times were shorter, and flight risk higher, for 
noncitizens mandatorily detained before the conclusion of removal proceedings than for those in detention 
pending deportation as in Zadvydas. See Letter from the Department of Justice, Office of the Solicitor 
General, to the Supreme Court (August 26, 2016) available at 
https://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/Demore.pdf. See also Transcript of Oral Argument at 
18, lines 18-21, Jennings v. Rodriguez, --- S.Ct. --- (2016) (No. 15-1204) (Acting Solicitor General, for the 
government, in response to a question from Justice Kagan: “Your honor is right that the statistics we 
provided to the Court were inaccurate, and we apologize.”).  
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After	Demore	v.	Kim	was	decided,	 several	 circuits	 found	 that	once	a	noncitizen	had	 been	 detained	 for	 some	 time	 pending	 the	 conclusion	 of	 proceedings,	 a	 bond	hearing	was	mandatory	 to	avoid	due	process	concerns.261	 	The	2nd	and	9th	circuits	followed	 the	 reasoning	 in	 Zadvydas	 and	 imposed	 a	 6	 month	 limit	 on	 mandatory	detention	before	an	individualized	bond	hearing	must	be	held.262		This	issue	is	now	before	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 in	 Jennings	 v.	 Rodriguez.263	 During	 oral	 argument	 on	
Rodriguez	on	October	3,	2017,	 the	government	opened	with	a	strong	statement	of	the	 plenary	 power	 doctrine.264	 	 A	majority	 of	 justices	 responded	with	 skepticism	that	 the	 Constitution	 permitted	 lengthy	 periods	 of	 detention	without	 opportunity	for	 a	 bond	hearing	 pending	 the	 outcome	of	 a	 removal	 proceeding.265	 	Neither	 the	litigants	 nor	 the	 justices	 once	 mentioned	 the	 constitutional	 source	 of	 the	immigration	power.		As	of	this	writing,	the	Court	has	not	issued	a	decision.	The	comparison	between	Zadvydas	and	Demore	illustrates	the	Court’s	tendency	to	 ignore	 the	 question	 of	 the	 constitutional	 grounding	 of	 the	 immigration	 power	when	it	is	inclined	to	undertake	ordinary	constitutional	review,	but	to	return	to	the	line	 of	 cases	 rooting	 the	 immigration	 power	 in	 sovereignty	when	 it	 defers	 to	 the	government—even	 and	 perhaps	 especially	 when	 the	 provision	 or	 policy	 being	challenged	 raises	no	 specific	 foreign	policy	or	national	 security	 issues.	 	 If	 the	oral	argument	 is	 an	 accurate	 predictor,	 Rodriguez	 seems	 likely	 to	 follow	 this	 pattern.		The	result	is	an	incoherent	doctrine,	leaving	the	relationship	of	immigration	law	to	the	 Constitution	 (in	 terms	 of	 both	 power	 and	 rights)	 subject	 to	 change	 with	 the	political	mood.		If	the	source	of	the	immigration	power	is	important	in	one	case,	it	is	important	in	all.			Recognition	 of	 the	 Commerce	 Clause	 as	 an	 anchor	 of	 the	 immigration	 power	would	 put	 the	 Court	 on	 a	 path	 to	 developing	 a	 constitutional	 jurisprudence	 for	immigration	law	that	consistently	identifies	the	source	of	the	immigration	authority,	and	 applies	 ordinary	 constitutional	 review	 unless	 there	 is	 an	 additional	 reason	(beyond	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 law	relates	 to	 the	entry	or	departure	of	noncitizens)	 for	deference.		c. Immigration	Policies	Related	to	Foreign	Affairs	and	National	Security		The	third	class	of	cases	are	those	challenging	aspects	of	 immigration	 law	that	explicitly	address	national	security	and	foreign	affairs,	or	those	that	the	government	asserts	 were	 primarily	 motivated	 by	 such	 concerns.	 Where	 the	 government	
                                                
261 Rodriguez, et. al. v. Robbins, et. al., 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Jennings v. 
Rodriguez, --- S. Ct. --- (2016) (No. 15-1204); Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601 (2d Cir. 2015), petition for 
cert. denied (June 20, 2016). Both circuits required bond hearings at the six-month mark.  The First, Third, 
Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits, have also required a bond hearing, but have tied the timing to an unspecified 
“reasonable period.” See Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486 (1st Cir. 2016); Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 
F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2011); Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2003); Sopo v. United States AG, 825 F.3d 
1199 (11th Cir. 2016). 
262 Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601 (2d Cir. 2015); Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015).  
263 Oral argument on the case was heard during the 2016 term, but after Justice Scalia died and Justice 
Gorsuch replaced him, the case was put over for additional briefing and reargument in the 2017 term.   
264 Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Jennings v. Rodriguez, --- S.Ct. --- (2016) (No. 15-1204).  
265 Transcript of Oral Argument, Jennings v. Rodriguez, --- S.Ct. ---(2016) (No. 15-1204).  
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responds	 to	 a	 constitutional	 challenge	 to	 an	 immigration	 policy	 by	 making	 an	assertion	that	the	policy	implicates	security	or	foreign	policy,	the	obstacle	to	judicial	review	of	rights	is	twofold.		First	is	the	plenary	power	presumption	of	deference	for	all	 federal	 immigration	actions.	 	 Second,	both	 foreign	affairs	 and	national	 security	have	their	own	deference	doctrines,	independent	of	immigration.			As	 to	 the	 first	 obstacle,	 scholars	 have	 suggested	 that	 the	 appropriate	 judicial	response	 to	 the	 government’s	 assertion	 that	 the	 immigration	 policy	 in	 question	implicates	national	security	and	foreign	affairs	would	be	a	meaningful	 inquiry	into	whether	the	policy	actually	is	based	on	or	meaningfully	affects	such	concerns.266		In	this	 they	 seek	 to	 adapt	 the	 holding	 of	 Baker	 v.	 Carr,267	 a	 1962	 case	 regarding	 a	challenge	to	redistricting,	to	the	immigration	context.		In	Baker	v.	Carr,	the	Supreme	Court	made	 clear	 that	 it	 would	 not	 find	 a	 question	 to	 be	 political	 (and	 therefore	beyond	the	scope	of	its	review	for	constitutionality)	simply	because	it	arose,	as	this	one	did,	in	the	context	of	politics.		In	reaching	this	conclusion,	the	Court	summarized	its	 jurisprudence	 on	 the	 justiciability	 of	 issues	 related	 to	 foreign	 relations,268	asserting	that	“Our	cases	in	this	field	[foreign	relations]	seem	invariably	to	show	a	discriminating	analysis	of	the	particular	question	posed,	in	terms	of	the	history	of	its	management	by	the	political	branches,	of	its	susceptibility	to	judicial	handling	in	the	light	of	its	nature	and	posture	in	the	specific	case,	and	of	the	possible	consequences	of	 judicial	 action.”269	 	 Stephen	 Legomsky	 and	 others	 contend	 that	 courts	 should	undertake	 a	 similar	 assessment	 before	 determining	 that	 a	 particular	 immigration	policy	 should	 be	 reviewed	 deferentially	 because	 it	 implicates	 foreign	 affairs	 and	national	security.270	If	the	government	demonstrates	to	the	courts’	satisfaction	that	an	actual	risk	to	national	security	motivated	the	particular	 immigration	policy,	constitutional	rights	arguments	would	then	face	the	challenges	growing	from	independent	traditions	of	deference	 to	 the	 political	 branches	 on	 questions	 of	 security	 and	 foreign	 affairs.		Although	a	 full	 examination	of	 the	 arguments	 are	beyond	 the	 scope	of	 this	paper,	suffice	 it	to	note	that,	 like	plenary	power,	these	deference	doctrines	have	critics	of	their	own.271		Among	current	cases,	judicial	review	of	challenges	to	President	Trump’s	series	of	 Travel	 Bans	 provide	 a	 relevant	 example.	 	 In	 spring	 of	 2017,	 the	 Fourth	 Circuit	upheld	a	preliminary	injunction	against	the	first	iteration	of	the	travel	ban	based	on	a	 finding	of	an	Establishment	Clause	violation,	 and	 the	Ninth	Circuit	 later	 reached	the	 same	 result	 on	 statutory	 grounds.272	 	 Both	 courts	 rejected	 the	 government’s	
                                                
266 Legomsky, supra note 36, at 261-9; ALEINIKOFF, supra note 54, at 160; Lindsay, supra note 54, at 
236-38.   
267 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
268 Id. at 211-13. 
269 Id. at 211-12. [ed: page break is after “consequences”] 
270 Legomsky, supra note 36, at 261-9; ALEINIKOFF, supra note 54, at 160; Lindsay, supra note 54, at 
265 and passim.  
271 See notes [53-62] and accompanying text.  [Ed.s: Note 53 begins “Note, however, that foreign 
affairs was already present…”] 
272 IRAP v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017); Hawaii v. Trump, No. 17-15589 (9th Cir., June 12 
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assertion	 that	 the	President’s	 reliance	 on	 a	 rationale	 of	 national	 security	 shielded	the	orders	from	constitutional	review.		The	Supreme	Court	granted	certiorari.		In	an	interim	decision	on	 the	 stay,	 it	 upheld	 the	 injunctions	 against	 the	ban	 as	 to	 those	seeking	to	enter	from	the	six	countries	who	have	a	“bona	fide	relationship”	to	a	U.S.	relative,	institution,	or	employer.		It	allowed	the	ban	to	go	into	effect,	however,	as	to	anyone	without	 such	 a	 relationship.	 	 In	 its	 per	 curiam	 opinion,	 the	 Court	 did	 not	reach	the	merits.273		Subsequently,	in	September	of	2017,	the	administration	issued	a	third	version	of	the	travel	ban,	rendering	most	aspects	of	the	earlier	cases	moot.274		However,	 litigation	 on	 the	 third	 version	 is	 moving	 at	 a	 rapid	 pace	 toward	 the	Supreme	Court.			Exchanges	between	judges	and	litigants	 in	the	context	of	challenges	to	the	first	Executive	 Order	 banning	 nationals	 of	 seven	 countries	 from	 entering	 the	 United	States	 suggest	 that	 at	 least	 some	 federal	 judges	 are	 inclined	 to	 look	 behind	 the	government’s	 assertions.	 	 For	 example,	 during	 oral	 argument	 regarding	 the	propriety	of	a	nation-wide	temporary	restraining	order	on	the	Order,	Seattle	District	Court	Judge	Robart	responded	to	the	administration’s	argument	that	he	should	not	question	the	Order	since	it	was	justified	by	the	President’s	assessment	of	a	national	security	risk	by	stating,	“I’m…asked	to	look	and	determine	if	the	Executive	Order	is	rationally	based.	 	And	rationally	based	to	me	implies	that	to	some	extent	I	have	to	find	it	grounded	in	facts	as	opposed	to	fiction.”275	 	Judge	Robart	then	ruled	against	the	 President,	 issuing	 the	 TRO.276	 	 The	 9th	 Circuit	 upheld	 his	 decision.277	 	 Such	colloquies,	and	a	number	of	the	opinions	on	the	various	iterations	of	the	travel	ban,	
                                                                                                                                            
2017). 
273 Trump v. IRAP, 582 U.S. ___, slip op. at 9 (2017).  The distinction between those with and without 
a bona fide relationship to a U.S. relative or entity does not reflect an existing doctrine in immigration law.  
It appears to represent the Supreme Court’s effort to assess the level of potential harm to noncitizens and 
U.S. citizens and entities as it balanced the equities in deciding on the stay.  The Court subsequently issued 
a second decision in response to a lower court’s clarification of the extent of the stay, refining the definition 
of close relationship.  U.S. Supreme Court, Order in Pending Case, Trump v. Hawaii, 16-1540 (July 19, 
2017), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/071917zr_o7jp.pdf.  
274 “Presidential Proclamation Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted 
Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public Safety Threats” (Sept. 24, 2017) 
275 Transcript of Oral Argument, State of Washington vs. Donald J. Trump, et. al., No. 17-CV-00141-
JLR (W.D. Wash 2017).  
276 Temporary Restraining Order issued by Judge Robart in State of Washington and State of 
Minnesota vs. Donald J. Trump, et. al., No. 17-CV-00141-JLR (W.D. Wash. 2017).  
On the other hand, a District Court judge in Massachusetts, reviewing the same policy as applied to 
Logan Airport in Boston, referenced the plenary power doctrine and applied the “facially legitimate and 
bona fide” standard to find the policy rational on the basis of the assertion within the document that its 
genesis was a national security concern, and allowed a TRO previously issued by the same court to expire.  
Louhghalam v. Donald J. Trump, No. 17-10154-NMG at 17-19 (D. Mass. 2017).  
277 State of Washington; State of Minnesota vs. Donald J. Trump, et. al., 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(per curium). Similarly, in the Order Granting Motion for Temporary Restraining Order in Hawaii v. 
Trump, Judge Derrick Watson of US District Court in Hawaii temporarily enjoined the part of the third 
travel ban, referred to as Executive Order 3 or EO-3.  In his order, Judge Watson stated that “EO-3 suffers 
from precisely the same maladies as its predecessor: it lacks sufficient findings that the entry of more than 
150 million nationals from six specified countries would be ‘detrimental to the interests of the United 
States,’ a precondition that the Ninth Circuit determined must be satisfied before the Executive may 
properly invoke Section 1182(f).” Hawaii v. Trump, No. 17-00050 DKW-KSC (D. Haw. 2017) at 2.  
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model	the	sort	of	meaningful	inquiry	regarding	national	security	considerations	that	should	 be	 more	 widespread	 when	 the	 government	 asserts	 that	 they	 are	 the	motivation	for	its	actions	in	the	immigration	arena.	At	base,	most	immigration	law	is	about	economic	relationships	between	nations	and	within	 the	 United	 States.	 	 An	 immigration	 power	 anchored	 in	 the	 Commerce	Clause	 would	 offer	 a	 counterweight	 to	 the	 tendency	 of	 courts	 to	 engage	 in	 only	limited	constitutional	review	of	actions	taken	by	Congress	and	the	Executive	Branch	on	 immigration	 matters.	 	 It	 would	 signal	 that,	 as	 a	 whole,	 the	 exercise	 of	 the	immigration	 authority	 is	 ordinarily	 subject	 to	 ordinary	 judicial	 review.	 	 It	 would	encourage	 courts	 to	 hold	 plenary	 power	 inapplicable	 when	 they	 found	 that	 the	policy	in	question	did	not,	in	fact,	threaten	national	security	or	implicate	important	aspects	 of	 foreign	 policy,	 rather	 than	 deferring	 to	 the	 government’s	 routine	assertion	that	it	should	always	be	free	to	act	as	it	sees	fit	in	the	immigration	arena,	because	 the	 power	 is	 rooted	 in	 its	 constitutional	 control	 over	 sovereignty,	 and	because	all	immigration	law	is	an	issue	of	foreign	policy.			3.		The	Same	End	by	Different	Means?	Could	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 achieve	 a	 more	 normalized	 jurisprudence	 of	immigration	 in	 relation	 to	 constitutional	 rights	without	 holding	 that	 immigration	power	is	derived	from	the	Commerce	Clause?	 	As	other	scholars	have	noted,	there	are	 alternative	 routes	 to	 the	 outcome	 this	 Article	 seeks.278	 	 Most	 recently,	 in	
Disaggregating	 “Immigration	 Law,”	 Matthew	 Lindsay	 argues	 that	 courts	 should	disaggregate	 the	 interests	 implicated	by	various	 immigration	 laws,	 “and	recognize	both	 federal	 and	 state	 regulation	 of	 noncitizens	 for	 what	 it	 is:	 a	 variegated	conglomeration	of	 laws	and	enforcement	 actions	 that	 concern	 labor,	 crime,	public	health	and	welfare,	and,	sometimes,	foreign	affairs	and	national	security.”279	He	calls	for	 ordinary	 constitutional	 review	 of	 all	 immigration	 law	 except	 aspects	 that	actually	relate	to	security	and	foreign	policy.280			But	to	disaggregate	immigration	law	without	disaggregating	our	understanding	of	 the	 origins	 of	 the	 immigration	 power,	 only	 goes	 half	 way.	 	 As	 long	 as	 the	immigration	 power	 remains	 understood	 as	 principally	 derived	 from	 national	sovereignty	and	foreign	affairs,	the	default	will	remain	a	thumb	on	the	scale	in	favor	of	judicial	abdication	of	constitutional	review	no	matter	what	the	challenged	policy.			Others	have	argued	 that	 the	 courts	 should,	 and	 indeed	already	often	do,	 apply	ordinary	 statutory	 interpretation	 principles	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 reaching	constitutional	 questions,	 proposed	 a	 burden	 shift	 that	 would	 require	 the	government	to	demonstrate	an	actual	impact	on	foreign	affairs	or	national	security,	or	made	frontal	attacks	on	the	concept	of	sovereignty	or	the	origins	and	coherence	
                                                
278 Legomsky, supra note 36, at 261-9; Lindsay, supra note 54; see also sources cited supra note 54. 
[Ed.s: note begins “For variations on this argument see T. Alexander Aleinikoff,…”] 
279 Lindsay, supra note 54, at 186. In a previous article, Lindsay proposed returning the immigration 
power to the foreign Commerce Clause. Matthew Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion: Sovereignty, Security, 
and the Origins of the Federal Immigration Power, 45 HAR. C.R.-C.L L. REV. 1, 43-44 (2010).  
280 Lindsay, supra note 54, at 186. 
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of	 the	 foreign	 affairs	 power.281	 	 Similarly,	 what	 would	 anchor	 those	 changes?		Without	a	clear	new	articulation	of	the	source	of	the	constitutional	power,	the	level	of	review	of	immigration	policy	for	constitutional	violations	will	remain	untethered,	leaving	it	vulnerable	to	drift	with	the	winds	of	public	sentiment.			
Conclusion	When	 the	Supreme	Court	 stated	 in	Marbury	 v.	Madison	 that	 it	was	 the	 role	of	federal	 courts	 to	 review	 all	 legislation	 for	 constitutionality,	 it	 did	 not	 exempt	immigration	from	its	scope.		Nor	is	there	an	immigration	loophole	in	the	doctrine	of	enumerated	powers.		Yet	for	the	past	century	and	a	quarter,	the	Supreme	Court	has	rooted	 the	 immigration	 authority	 in	 a	 tenuous	 series	 of	 implications	 from	constitutional	 powers,	 and	 has	 repeatedly	 (if,	 of	 late,	 inconsistently)	 used	 that	reasoning	 to	 justify	 abdicating	 constitutional	 review	 of	 immigration	 law.	 	 The	impact	of	this	approach	on	constitutional	rights	in	the	immigration	context	has	been	devastating.			Plenary	power	was	created	by	the	Supreme	Court	 in	1889	to	cloak	rank	racial	prejudice,	 fears	 about	 economic	 competition,	 and	 xenophobia	 in	 the	 vaunted	garments	 of	 sovereignty	 and	 foreign	 affairs.	 	 Today,	 immigration	 law	 in	 its	 vast	majority	has	nothing	to	do	with	foreign	policy.		The	core	questions	that	arise	in	the	field	are	about	creating	fair,	rational,	and	efficient	procedures	to	carry	out	the	work	of	 a	 bureaucracy	 whose	 decisions	 touch	 tens	 of	 millions	 of	 lives	 a	 year	 in	 every	nation	around	the	globe,	with	a	direct	impact	on	the	U.S.	labor	market.	The	 task	 of	 modernizing	 and	 constitutionalizing	 federal	 court	 review	 of	immigration	policy	is	complicated	by	the	fact	that	no	one	aspect	of	the	Constitution	covers	 all	 facets	 of	 immigration.	 	 Cognizant	 of	 that	 challenge,	 this	 Article	 has	advanced	 the	 argument	 that,	 in	 many	 circumstances,	 the	 federal	 government’s	authority	to	control	immigration	can	be	understood	as	derived	from	the	foreign	and	interstate	Commerce	Clause.			Courts	 have	made	 clear	 that	 the	 foreign	 Commerce	 Clause	 grants	 Congress	 a	“plenary	power”—but,	unlike	 the	 immigration	power	 rooted	 in	 foreign	affairs	and	sovereignty,	one	subject	to	judicial	review	for	constitutionality.		The	Supreme	Court	has	never	disavowed	the	 foreign	Commerce	Clause	as	a	source	of	 the	 immigration	power.		It	remains	available	to	modern	litigants	and	courts.		Given	the	large	number	of	 immigrants	 in	 the	United	States	 labor	market,	 their	 interstate	mobility,	 and	 the	more	 capacious	 standard	 for	 what	 constitutes	 “interstate	 commerce”	 today	 as	opposed	to	a	century	ago,	there	are	strong	arguments	that	the	interstate	Commerce	Clause	 is	 also	 available	 to	 undergird	 the	 federal	 government’s	 immigration	authority.			Some	 scholars	 would	 respond	 that	 a	 “dramatic	 new	 reading	 of	 the	Constitution”282	 is	 not	 necessary	 to	 cure	 the	 constitutional	 outlier	 status	 of	immigration	law	wrought	by	the	plenary	power	doctrine.		They	would	point	out	that	
                                                
281 See discussion in Part I, supra, notes [52-66] and accompanying text.  [Ed.s: the note to which I 
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282 ALEINIKOFF, supra note 54, at 159 ; see also Johnson, supra note 46; Martin, supra note 54.   
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in	many,	 although	 not	 all,	 recent	 cases,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 appears	 to	 be	 quietly	moving	away	from	immigration	exceptionalism.	 	The	Court	should	be	left	in	peace,	they	might	 say,	 to	 apply	 ordinary	 tools	 of	 statutory	 interpretation,	 administrative	law,	 and—on	 rare	 occasions—constitutional	 review	 to	 laws	 about	 entry	 and	removal,	 as	 it	 sees	 fit,	without	 the	upheaval	 that	would	 attend	overruling	plenary	power.	This	Article	asserts	by	contrast	that	plenary	power	must	be	explicitly	rejected,	not	 just	pushed	 to	 the	back	of	 the	shelf.	 	Otherwise,	 it	will	 remain	ripe	 for	 revival	when	national	anxiety	about	immigration	runs	high	and	the	political	branches	take	action	against	 immigrants	 in	ways	 that	 threaten	core	constitutional	values.	 	 	 In	 its	stead,	 the	 Commerce	 Clause	 offers	 a	 coherent	 source	 of	 the	 federal	 government’s	immigration	 authority	 that	 can	 undergird	 broader	 constitutional	 review	 of	congressional	and	executive	actions	in	the	immigration	arena.			
